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Abstract 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has not worked for sub-Saharan Africa and its mainly 
small projects, delivering only 0.3% of the total CDM carbon offsets. This is thought to be because of 
the low intensity of the greenhouse gas reducing interventions prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
lack of institutional capacity relating to the CDM processes, the high transaction costs of the lengthy 
CDM process – typically amounting to R 500 000 per project per year and taking years to complete 
the process. An alternative for small carbon emission-reducing projects is to register carbon 
reductions with the voluntary carbon market and its Verified Emission Reductions (VERs) carbon 
credits. By examining the carbon markets in some detail through the lens of a particular case study, 
this dissertation has investigated and identified the main factors affecting the cost-effective 
generation of small emission reduction projects in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The chosen case study was a small-scale South African voluntary carbon project, the Umdoni bio-
ethanol gel fuel-switching project. Umdoni was identified as an example of a project that generated 
carbon revenue outside of the CDM. By assessing the manner in which this project addressed the 
critical requirements of the carbon market while simultaneously alleviating poverty, the study seeks 
to provide new insight in the components of effective carbon markets. B th the detailed 
understanding of the voluntary carbon market components and the exposition of an example in 
which this market worked effectively is considered important at a time when the efficacy of the CDM 
is being reviewed, casting uncertainty over the role of market based instruments in addressing the 
global threat of an anthropogenically warmed climate.  
The study has identified the main factors affecting the ability of small carbon projects to generate 
net-positive carbon revenue and has suggested ways a small project could exploit this information to 
its benefit: 
 The type of carbon market the project operates in – the small voluntary carbon market is 
best, with higher prices and lower costs 
 The inherent attractiveness of the project to potential carbon offset buyers – small projects 
with strong sustainable development aspects command higher carbon prices 
 The registry and carbon standard through which the project trades its carbon offsets – 
registries and standards which measure and emphasise sustainable development benefits 
realise higher prices for suitable projects 
 The type of buyer – Corporate buyers purchasing carbon offsets for image and public 
relations purposes are best for small projects with good sustainable development co-
benefits 
 The supply-demand situation in the relevant carbon markets – the voluntary carbon market 
has been relatively unaffected by the crash in the compliance market in 2012 
 The project size and the calculation methods chosen – the volume of emission reductions is 
sensitive to the project scale, the emission reducing technology and the emission reduction 
methodologies chosen 
 The transaction costs – the transaction costs for a CDM project are in excess of R500 000, 
which is far bigger than the likely carbon revenue. Whereas some small voluntary carbon 
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VCM – Voluntary carbon market. 
WCI  – Western Climate Initiative, a US/Canadian GHG emissions reduction scheme. 
 
Glossary 
Additionality – This is the CDM requirement that the project in question would not have happened 
without the carbon credit revenue, i.e. in a business-as-usual scenario, or that the CDM helped the 
project overcome barriers to its implementation. 
Annex I – The Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol are those countries which have committed 
to achieving quantified GHG reductions within an agreed time frame. There are 42 Annex I countries 
which include the EU, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan etc. For the full list, see: 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php 
 
Cap and trade – This is a greenhouse gas emission reduction system which issues a cap (an upper 
limit of GHG emissions) to its participants. If the cap is exceeded, the participant will generally be 
fined. The “trade” part allows participants to trade emission reduction allowances with each other 
so as to meet the cap. 
Chicago Carbon Exchange (CCX) – A self-regulated voluntary carbon exchange in the US. 
Designated National Authority (DNA) – The DNA is a body set up by a country’s government to carry 
out parts of the CDM process under the Kyoto Protocol. For instance; the DNA is responsible for 
approving the sustainable development aspects of a CDM project. 
Designated Operational Entity (DOE) – The DOE is an independent auditor, accredited by the CDM 
Executive Board that carries out the validation, verification and certification of a CDM project and its 
GHG reductions. 
Emission Reduction Unit (ERU) – These are emission reductions achieved through a Joint 
Implementation (JI) project. One ERU is 1 tCO2e. 
EU ETS – European Emissions Trading System: A system which enables businesses and countries 
within the EU to trade carbon credits. 
European Union Allowance (EUA) – A tradable unit within the EU ETS, one EUA represents the right 
to emit 1 tCO2e. 
Executive Board (EB) – The controlling body of the CDM. 
Free Basic Alternative energy Policy (FBAE) - This is a South African Policy which addresses energy 
poverty by supplying qualifying households who do not have access to electricity with an allowance 
of an appropriate alternative energy amount, roughly equivalent to the FBE’s 
50  kWh/household/month. 
Free Basic Energy Policy (FBE) – This is a South African Policy which addresses energy poverty by 
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Fungible – In the context of carbon trading, fungibility means the ability to exchange carbon credits 
from one carbon trading scheme for carbon credits from another trading scheme. It implies that the 
buyers of credits in one scheme trust and agree with the standards and verification processes in the 
other scheme. Fungibility enables different carbon markets to be linked together. 
Global Warming Potential – Different GHGs have different impacts on global warming, so in order to 
make it easier to measure and compare GHGs, the concept of the global warming potential was 
developed. Each GHG is given a global warming potential value, which is the ratio of the heat 
trapped by the GHG compared to the heat trapped by an equal mass of CO2. For instance methane 
has a GWP of about 21 (and CO2 is of course 1). 
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) – These are defined by the Kyoto Protocol as: Carbon dioxide (CO2), 
Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and 
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
Gold Standard (GS) – One of the entities in the carbon offsetting industry. The GS builds on the CDM 
standards and provides an emphasis on the sustainable development aspects of carbon projects in 
addition to emission reductions. 
International Emissions Trading (IET) – Part of the CDM, the IET enables countries to buy and sell 
CERs. 
Joint Implementation (JI) – This is a mechanism, similar to the CDM, but which operates between 
Annex B countries only (Annex B countries are Annex I plus four other European countries: 
Lichtenstein, Monaco, Croatia and Slovenia). It allows Annex B countries to trade emission permits 
with one another. 
Leakage – Leakage is the increase in GHG emissions outside the project’s boundary and caused by 
the project. For example, a project which replaces kerosene with bio-ethanol gel from a constrained 
source, might cause someone else to have to revert back to higher-emitting kerosene because of 
bio-ethanol gel availability problems. 
Methodology – In the CDM context a methodology is the definition of the calculation methods to be 
used to determine the GHG reduction caused by an intervention and measured against a baseline of 
what would have happened in the absence of the intervention.  
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) – The UN Millennium Declaration of 2000 listed a set goals 
aimed at eliminating poverty by 2015. 
Non-Annex I – These are countries that are part of the UNFCCC, but which are classed as developing 
countries and do not have to commit to GHG reductions at this stage. The full list can be found at 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php 
Offsetting – This is the practice of buying GHG reduction credits from a GHG emission reduction 
project in order to reduce one’s own carbon footprint. This could be because one has to for 
compliance reasons, or because one wants to for altruistic, image or corporate social responsibility 
reasons. An example of compliance offsetting is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The 
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part of their emission reduction targets by buying carbon offsets generated in non-signatory 
countries by suitable emission reduction projects. The rationale behind this is that the emitting 
country can meet their emission reduction targets more cost-effectively and benefit the country 
supplying the offsets at the same time. 
Over-the-counter (OTC) – The most common method of buying carbon credits (VERs) is over-the-
counter; meaning through a broker or directly via an online carbon store. The other way is to buy 
through a private carbon exchange (the biggest of which was the Chicago Carbon Exchange). 
Project Design Document (PDD): A formal document, required by the CDM, which defines a CDM 
project and its deliverables. Similar to a PIN. 
PIN – Project Idea Note: A document which outlines the scope, objectives and deliverables of a 
carbon project. Similar to a PDD. 
Programme of Activities (PoA) – one of the measures designed to reduce CDM transaction costs and 
speed up small project delivery. The PoA allows a project developer to get a project template 
approved by the CDM EB and then apply that template to many similar projects without having to 
get each project approved individually. 
Retirement of carbon credits – This is a non-reversible process whereby carbon credits, such as CERs 
or VERs are removed from the register and are formally offset against the owner’s carbon footprint – 
carbon credits can only be retired once and can’t be traded again. 
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) – One of the larger standards in the world in terms of the number of 
registries and projects using VCS in the voluntary carbon market. 
Verified Emission Reduction (VER) – the voluntary carbon market equivalent of the CDM CER, one 
VER represents one tonne of CO2 equivalent emission reduction. 
Vintage – As with wine vintage, a carbon credit’s vintage refers to the year in which the carbon 
credit was created. 
Voluntary carbon market (VCM) – This is a carbon market for buyers who wish to voluntarily buy 
carbon offsets rather than being compelled to (e.g. through the Kyoto Protocol or a cap and trade 
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1. Introduction   
“Global warming is a serious problem that will not solve itself. Countries should take co-operative 
steps to slow global warming”: this was one of the main messages from William Nordhaus, a 
professor of economics at Yale University in his book “A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options 
on Global Warming Policies” (Nordhaus & Boyer, 1999) . Climate change is especially serious for sub-
Saharan Africa, which is already poverty-stricken. In 2008, close to 50% of people in sub-Saharan 
Africa were living on less than US$ 1.25/day (The World Bank, 2011). It is widely accepted that rising 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are the main cause of climate change. The Kyoto Protocol, 
its formal compliance carbon market and the Clean Development Mechanism is one of the 
mechanisms for facilitating greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
Africa, and particularly sub-Saharan Africa, which is the geographical focus of this research, abounds 
with opportunities for carbon emission reduction projects with good sustainable development (SD) 
potential. Arens et al. estimated that in 11 of the LDCs in sub-Saharan African countries surveyed in 
2012, the total emission reduction potential was 49 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per 
year (Arens et al., 2012:7). The extreme levels of poverty in many of the sub-Saharan African 
countries indicate a great need for SD projects and this need is likely to be aggravated by the current 
global recession and future climate change impacts. Also, historically SSA has not benefitted as much 
from investment in infrastructure as have the other developing countries; SSA only received 2.7% of 
the total investment from 1990 to 2006, the lowest share compared to all the other developing 
countries (Olsen & Fenhann, 2008a:87 Table 1).  Therefore sub-Saharan Africa should have been 
fertile ground for Kyoto carbon market projects. However this carbon market has largely failed in 
Africa (discussed in Section 2.3, page 21) and this is serious for sub-Saharan Africa, because of the 
loss of foreign investment in carbon projects and their sustainable development benefits as well as 
for climate change, because of missed opportunities to reduce GHG emissions on a large scale. 
Nevertheless, there are examples of the carbon market working in sub-Saharan Africa. The Umdoni 
project, which is used as a case study in this dissertation, is one such example. In order to 
understand this case study, it is felt that the carbon markets need to be understood in some detail, 
which has been done in the literature review (Section 2). Then, when the reasons for the success of 
the Umdoni case study project in these markets have been investigated and understood, suggestions 
and guidelines for the replication of similar projects can be proposed – this has been done in the 
analysis, discussion and conclusion sections (Sections 5 and 6). 
1.1. Carbon offsetting and carbon markets 
The shortage of SD project finance has encouraged projects to try to generate additional revenue 
from carbon offsetting – where one party needs or wants to buy carbon reduction credits to offset 
its carbon footprint and a second party is able to generate carbon reduction credits through SD 
projects. The purchasing entity will naturally only resort to offsetting if this is more cost-effective 
than reducing its own emissions. The need to offset can either be mandatory or voluntary.  For 
instance, signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, which came into force in 2005, have committed to 
reduce their carbon emissions and might be forced to buy carbon offsets in order to comply; this 
would be an example of a mandatory or compliance offset. Voluntary offset purchases, on the other 
hand, are not obligatory and are motivated by a variety of factors – such as the desire to become 
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There are several facilities for managing and verifying carbon offset projects and their markets. 
These facilities consist of carbon registries which verify the existence of carbon credits and track the 
transfer of ownership of carbon credits, manage their certification and finally carry out their sale to 
entities wishing to purchase carbon offsets. The carbon markets can be broadly split into the 
regulated/compliance markets and the voluntary markets (Lovell, 2010:353).  
The compliance market is where the Kyoto Protocol signatories may purchase certified carbon 
offsets from other countries in order to partially offset their own GHG emissions in order to meet 
their emission reduction targets. The compliance offset market operates under the UN’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). 
In the voluntary carbon market anyone may purchase voluntary carbon credits from suitable GHG 
emission projects in order to offset their own emissions – usually for reasons of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, image enhancement or for ethical reasons. 
If the CDM had operated as intended, the voluntary carbon market would probably not have grown 
as it has. Unfortunately, the CDM has not worked as well as it was hoped it would, for many reasons 
which are explored later in this dissertation (see Section 2.3, page 21). In particular, the CDM has not 
penetrated into Africa and sub-Saharan Africa to any significant degree, mainly due to the small 
scale and distributed nature of the GHG reducing projects, coupled with the high CDM transaction 
costs. To make matters worse, the future of the Kyoto Protocol is still uncertain and the compliance 
carbon market prices have collapsed, making the CDM even less attractive to carbon-reducing 
projects. 
As discussed later in this dissertation, the voluntary carbon market might be better suited to sub-
Saharan projects. However, the voluntary carbon market exists in many different forms, ranging 
from large carbon registries and standards modelled on the CDM down to small registries using their 
own verification standards. Therefore it is important for a carbon project to consider how best to 
exploit the carbon market. This is what this dissertation is about – investigating the factors that 
impact on the ability of small, sub-Saharan African projects to generate carbon revenue cost-
effectively. 
A South African case study will be used to show how a small VCM registry enables a community 
project to tap into the VCM and attract carbon credit buyers. The chosen case study is the Umdoni 
bio-ethanol gel stove project (Cartwright, 2012), which currently consists of a community of about 
4 000 households, each having a local government-supplied gel stove and receiving 7 litres of bio-
ethanol gel fuel per month free of charge. 
The relative success of the case study is used to identify and assess whether the approach adopted 
holds potential lessons for addressing some of the limitations of the broader carbon market. 
Problems encountered by voluntary carbon registries and how they are being resolved was 
investigated and analysed; for example: which standards and processes have been adopted, how 
suitable projects are found, how the stakeholders were engaged, how to quantify, audit and sell the 
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1.2. Why this research is important 
This research is important because it reveals insights into how small carbon projects, many of which are found 
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2. Literature Review 
The carbon market is important to sub-Saharan Africa for many reasons. It incentivises GHG 
reductions through creating carbon credits which can then be sold. It helps carbon revenue-
supported projects to get off the ground and be sustainable. These projects generally deliver 
community benefits and contribute to most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Hunt et 
al., 2010:7), such as: 
 Poverty alleviation 
 Improved education 
 The empowerment of women through freeing up their time and improving home conditions 
 The provision of healthy homes through interventions such as air pollution reduction and 
water purification 
In addition, if the project is partially funded from foreign sources and uses imported technology, it 
may result in an inflow of foreign capital and the transfer of technology to the host country. 
2.1. Carbon emission offsetting – the theory and the practice 
Carbon emission offsetting and the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM was briefly discussed in the introduction. 
Offsetting is a subject cloaked in controversy, with some, such as Nicholas Stern, supporting carbon 
trading as a way of reducing the costs of CO2 emission reductions (Stern, 2008), whilst others, such 
as Nordhaus, argue that the Kyoto Protocol and the CDM are not an efficient way of reducing global 
emissions at all (Nordhaus & Boyer, 1999:38-39). 
The economic theory behind carbon emission trading is grounded in the analysis of pollution control 
and the most efficient way to control pollution. The theoretical treatment generally assumes that 
the relevant market system is perfect, with competing firms who have little power to manipulate the 
market or change prices. It is also assumed that the main variables are all known, these being: the 
amount of pollution (in this, case GHG emissions), the marginal costs and benefits of controlling the 
level of pollution – and that all these can be expressed in monetary terms. The system can then be 
optimised, in economic terms, by increasing the level of control until the marginal cost of further 
control outweighs the marginal benefit (Spash, 2010:172). So, theoretically, the economic optimum 
pollution level can then be calculated, and the next step is to apply suitable measures to arrive at 
that optimum in practice. 
According to Spash, assuming that the costs and benefits of pollution control are known, then policy-
makers can set taxes that would financially motivate rational actors to change their behaviour until 
their own optimum point is reached, for instance by reducing their GHG emissions, and thus their 
carbon tax exposure, until the marginal cost of emission reduction measures exceeds the marginal 
carbon tax savings. Or policy-makers can set compulsory standards which would force the actors to 
change their behaviour. Either way the idealised optimum could be reached. In practice, companies 
tend to prefer the standards route because if they are already compliant it doesn’t cost them 
anything to do nothing, even though it could be argued that they are still doing damage and should 
pay suitable penalties (Spash, 2010:172). Assuming the standards route was followed (as it was in 
the case of the Kyoto Protocol, with carbon emissions being capped) the next step would be to 
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efficiency of the intervention could be improved through the use of emissions permits that can be 
traded. 
Before carbon credits can be traded, they must be converted into a tradable commodity. This is 
done through individual projects which are designed to reduce carbon emissions. To be credible, 
these reductions must be measurable and verifiable and they must be additional to a quantified, 
business-as-usual baseline (Bumpus et al., 2008:134). 
The theory goes on to say that allowing emitters to trade their permits enables an actor who has 
exceeded its permitted emission level can buy permits from another actor who has surplus emission 
space. Then provided that the asking price for the permits is less than the high-emitting actor’s 
marginal cost of reducing emissions, it makes sense for the trade to happen. More than this, 
emissions trading also allows two emitters, both of whom are operating within their permitted level, 
but who have different marginal costs of emission reduction to exploit this difference to the 
advantage of both. The emitter with the lower costs can choose to emit less and then sell the surplus 
permits to the emitter with higher costs at a mutually profitable price (Spash, 2010:173). That is the 
theory, but the practice is somewhat different, as it usually is. 
The real world is complex and many of the theoretical assumptions described above in this section 
are not valid. Some of the resulting problems as described by Spash (Spash, 2010:175-178) are 
summarised here: 
 Because different countries are at different industrial levels, have different environments 
and emission profiles, implementing a universal emissions trading system will have very 
different impacts on the participating countries. This is likely to result in an uneven 
distribution of costs and benefits. For instance the model-based research by Nordhaus 
shows that Russia and Eastern Europe would be by far the biggest beneficiaries of 
unconstrained carbon emission trading, with the US and Europe the biggest losers. Nordhaus 
suggests that the large potential US costs of Koyoto might be why the US was unhappy with 
the Kyoto Protocol (Nordhaus & Boyer, 1999:30). 
 The marginal costs of controlling GHG emissions are certainly not well-established across the 
world, partly due to lack of data, but also because of the influence of the carbon price on 
pollution control costs (e.g. the price of carbon affects the cost of generated electricity 
which affects energy efficiency measures and other process changes)  
 The benefits of emission reduction are often difficult to quantify and so are ignored, these 
could include beneficial impacts on wildlife or quality of human life. 
 The real-world market is not perfect, in that not all actors are equal and some have the 
power to manipulate the conditions (e.g. prices, issued permit quantities etc.). This then 
means that the equilibrium price of carbon does not represent a true optimum because of 
the resulting market distortions. 
 The disparity between the power and influence of large emitters (e.g. energy industry) and 
the many small emitters: the large emitters have market power and can and do influence 
policy to their benefit. This is compounded by national governments trying to protect their 
commercial competitiveness. 
 Unfair allocation of emissions permits to countries and businesses: instead of this being a 
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influencing the allocations. An extreme example of this was the emissions baseline used by 
Russia and the Ukraine under the Kyoto Protocol, resulting in non-existent emission 
reductions known as “hot air”. 
Those in favour of carbon trading would no doubt counter these criticisms with arguments of their 
own. For instance Stern defends the initial allocation of free emission permits as a way of getting 
industry acceptance, leaving the way open to moving towards auctioned permits. Stern also sees 
international emissions trading (as done through the trade in carbon credit offsets) between the 
global North and South) as a way of persuading the poor countries to participate (Stern, 2008:25). 
Alex Bowen in “The case for carbon pricing” appears to take a more optimistic view (Bowen, 2011) 
compared to Nordhaus and Spash. He suggests that one can get around the problems associated 
with trying to calculate the cost of emission reductions and the marginal cost of future damages to 
the environment caused by emissions. This can be done by globally agreeing on a climate change 
impact target (in terms of the maximum acceptable temperature increase above pre-industrial levels 
i.e. 2°C) and Bowen argues that in agreeing on this target, policy makers have already implicitly 
struck a balance between the cost of reducing emissions and the cost of future damages. One can 
then move on to using climate models to estimate the required emission reductions and the carbon 
price to achieve these reductions. The estimates Bowen quotes range between GBP 30 in 2020 (UK 
Committee on Climate Change) and GBP 176 also in 2020. Having explored the required carbon 
price, he goes on to suggest how the price could be influenced by controlling emission quantities or 
levying a carbon tax. The quantity-control approach is similar to cap-and-trade, with emission quotas 
being issued (with the associated problems of baseline determination, manipulation of the markets 
etc.). 
Carbon trading can be seen as a form of “market environmentalism” which seeks to protect the 
environment by pricing environmental services, selling rights of ownership to these services and 
then trading these globally (Bumpus et al., 2008:132-134). Bumpus further says that, although this 
goes against the idea that nature and its services belong to us all, it does open the door to increased 
investment in the non-Annex I countries through the medium of carbon revenue, whilst reducing the 
emission reduction costs of Annex I countries.   
Some researchers have also questioned the cost-effectiveness of the CDM as a mechanism of letting 
the market find the lowest cost emission reduction opportunities and then exploiting them. For 
instance, in China there are many end-of-pipe projects involving the reduction of HFC-23 gas 
emissions. HFC-23 is a waste product in the manufacture of HCFC-22 and HCFC-22 is a refrigerant gas 
used to replace ozone-damaging refrigerants. With the advent of CDM, the previously worthless 
HFC-23, suddenly became more valuable than the HCFC-22 manufacture itself. This was because 
HFC-23 has a GWP of 11 700 and was relatively easy to capture and destroy, so the net revenue from 
HFC-23 CERs was very high. Research done by the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development 
(Wara & Victor, 2008:11-12) describes the HFC-23 problem and estimates that the actual cost of 
capturing and destroying the HFC-23 would have amounted to about Euro 100 million, whereas the 
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Nevertheless, in spite of its shortcomings, carbon trading is thriving, the Kyoto Protocol is still with 
us and its CDM continues to operate as does the European Emissions Trading System1 (EU ETS), 
albeit with very low carbon prices (see Section 2.7.2, page 32). Also, other ETSs are emerging around 
the world (as described in Sections 2.7.3, page 15 and 2.7.4, page 36). 
2.2. Compliance carbon markets 
The main instrument in the regulated/compliance carbon market is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) operating under the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon credits are validated against the 
CDM standards and calculations methods and actual performance is audited by authorised carbon 
auditors. These carbon credits are then formally “issued” by the CDM and are available to be traded 
– the carbon credits are known as Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). One CER is equivalent in 
global warming potential to 1 tonne of CO2. Initially there was one trading mechanism for CDM 
AAUs2, the International Emissions Trading (IET) entity – however there has been very little trading 
on the IET, possibly because of the development of regional trading entities such as the EU ETS. 
Countries with compliance obligations could trade their AAUs on the IET.  One has to distinguish 
between primary CERs, credits bought directly through the CDM, and secondary CERs, which are 
traded on other registries such as the EU ETS. Note that CERs are not necessarily used as offsets, 
they can be held or retired by the country hosting the carbon project, thus reducing the host 
country’s GHG emissions (Raab, 2012:44). 
2.3. Failure of the CDM in sub-Saharan Africa 
At first sight one would think that SSA would be well-placed to capitalise on carbon offset revenues. 
SSA, with its relatively undeveloped technical infrastructure and a dire need for SD projects should 
be ideal for the CDM. However, the CDM has struggled to fulfil its potential in SSA – this is evidenced 
by the fact that SSA CDM projects have only delivered 0.3 % (and Africa 1.4%) of global CDM carbon 
emission reductions up to 1 July 2012, according to the CD4CDM CDM pipeline spread sheet 
(Fenhann, 2012), analysed in Appendix A.  
This lack of penetration of the CDM into SSA is thought to be due to a number of contributing 
factors: 
 The general complexity of the CDM processes and the lack of decision-makers who 
understand the CDM in Africa and SSA as compared to countries such as China (Olsen & 
Fenhann, 2008a:36, 74, 75, 106). 
 Lack of institutional capacity. The absence and/or lack of capacity of in-country UN 
accredited verifiers and auditors (i.e. Designated Operational Entities) is a problem 
because the CDM is a complex and demanding process, requiring specialists with good 
analytical skills, a thorough knowledge of the CDM and government backing. Most sub-
Saharan countries have bigger issues to deal with than grappling with CDM processes in 
pursuit of uncertain rewards, so the right resources and backing is often not forthcoming 
from the governments. It is left to NGOs to push carbon projects and the CDM (Maxwell 
et al., 2011:4). 
                                                             
1 The European Union Emissions Trading System was set up in 2003 by the EU as a mechanism to help meet 
the EU Kyoto targets. 
2
 AAUs – Assigned Amount Units, these being the initial emissions cap, measured in tCO2e and issued under 
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 Lack of political and business support for carbon projects. The extent of the host 
government’s involvement in CDM matters is often small. The presence of a strong 
Designated National Authority3 (DNA) willing to support carbon projects through the 
CDM process is important, as are companies and utilities with the means and the will to 
initiate and implement CDM projects (Maxwell et al., 2011:4). David LeSolle, DNA for 
Botswana, writing in “A Reformed CDM – including new Mechanisms for Sustainable 
Development” (Olsen & Fenhann, 2008a:36) states that in most African countries the 
low awareness of climate change on the part of the DNA, businesses and civil society has 
a strong correlation with low CDM penetration – the low penetration is especially 
apparent in the LDCs in SSA (Olsen & Fenhann, 2008a:36 Table 1). 
 Small, diffuse projects. In this dissertation ‘small’ means projects generating less than 
5 000 tCO2e per year. The lack of large projects (concentrated, commercial projects, such 
as HFC reduction, which accounted for 40% of the CDM CERs up to 2012, versus diffuse, 
SD projects) (Olsen & Fenhann, 2008b:2826 Table 7) in SSA is a problem. Because of the 
CDM transaction costs of at least R 500 000 per project per year, the CDM is not 
worthwhile for these small projects. For the CDM to be cost-effective for a project, it 
would need to deliver in excess of 50 000 tCO2e per year (50 000 tCO2e at R 10/t = R 500 
000). The CDM PoA concept is helping because one can group many similar projects 
together under one umbrella, but PoAs have their own challenges – reams of paper-
work to get all the documentation done, lengthy lead times for approval and registration 
and no guarantee of success. The risk is just generally too high for project developers.  
 High transaction costs and high risk. As mentioned earlier, the CDM process requires 
skilled and experienced practitioners to produce the required documentation, then one 
needs to get the documentation approved by a DOE (at present DOEs are mainly only 
available in Western countries, so they have to be flown out at great expense and are 
paid high per diem rates). All this adds up to prohibitively high transaction costs – R 0.5 
million to R 2.6 million. Carbon projects in Africa “are riskier and more costly to develop 
in Africa than in other regions”, because of fewer CDM successes and fewer big projects  
(Arens et al., 2012:20).  
 Lack of project funding because of high risk. The bankability or otherwise of the projects 
in Africa (availability of working capital, return on investment, risk) has caused difficulty 
in attracting investment finance  (Maxwell et al., 2011:4). This is in contrast to the 
relative availability of “financial and institutional capabilities” of industrialised countries 
such as China compared to the LDCs (Maxwell et al., 2011:4). 
 Different stakeholders have different expectations. The community wants its social 
development benefits and a share of the carbon revenue; the project developer wants a 
quick, low-risk project as does the funder; the local government wants to satisfy its 
sustainable development objectives; the CDM wants to significantly reduce GHG 
emissions rather than focussing on sustainable development benefits (Olsen & Fenhann, 
2008a:36); the CER buyer wants high-quality (i.e. believable and verifiable GHG 
reductions and SD benefits) and the various consultants want to make money. Many of 
these objectives work against each other, for instance, as previously mentioned (see 
                                                             
3
 Designated National Authority (DNA) – The DNA is a body set up by a country’s government to carry out parts 
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Section 2.10.1, page 40), there appears to be an inverse relationship between GHG 
reductions and SD benefits (UNFCCC-CDM, 2011:16-19). Also, small projects generally 
deliver SD better than large projects, whereas large projects are better at GHG emission 
reductions (Gupta, Van Asselt, & Van Beukering, 2006). This mix of differing and 
conflicting agendas is a challenge to successful project initiation and implementation.  
 Information asymmetry. The project developer, the project proponent, the carbon 
auditor and the carbon credit buyer each have access to different levels of information 
about the project and “addressing asymmetric information is at the core of addressing 
the structural impediments to carbon market access for small projects in Africa” (Wlokas 
& Cartwright, 2012). Conte and Kotchen express the same idea more bluntly: “Offset 
providers know a lot about the projects in which they invest, but offset buyers know 
only what the providers tell them. The asymmetry gives rise to a standard source of 
market failure” (Conte & Kotchen, 2010:96). Information asymmetry can pose problems 
in at least three dimensions. Firstly, from the point of view of the CDM EB there is the 
risk that the project developer, having access to much more information than the CDM 
adjudicators, can massage the project information so as to increase their project’s 
chances of acceptance by the CDM EB (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012:61). For instance, a 
project could inflate its baseline emissions so as to show large GHG reductions. Another 
example is when a host government deliberately relaxes its own environmental 
constraints so as to allow its projects to appear to be additional – that it then appears 
that the projects are being done for CDM reasons and not because government policy 
forces them anyway (Rosendahl & Strand, 2009:3). However, most distortions should be 
picked up later when the first full audit is done, so a project developer would probably 
be quite careful about misrepresenting the project.  
Secondly, from the point of view of the project developers, although they have an 
intimate knowledge of the project and all its ramifications, they still they have to be able 
to communicate the details of their project to the CDM EB in such a way as to get the 
project approved. Reducing the information asymmetry is difficult and expensive. One 
can’t expect the CDM EB to make field trips to all the projects, so one has to use proxies, 
in the form of DOEs and consultants doing endless reports. In order to make the reports 
on different projects and in different countries consistent, the natural reaction is to 
force the reporting to conform to standard templates – this then distorts the project 
information because generalised templates can never do justice to the wide range of 
projects. The result of all this is that transaction costs are driven up in an attempt to get 
better information and reduce the risk of accepting dodgy projects. 
Thirdly, from the point of view of the buyer of the CERs it is difficult to assess the quality 
of the project producing the CERs, because of the difficulty of getting enough 
information. The result is that the buyers tend to be cautious about which projects they 
support; if a buyer doesn’t understand a project, that project’s CERs price is likely to 
suffer. In the VCM, buyers often actually visit the project and engage with the 
stakeholders in order to reduce the information asymmetry risk to some extent.  
William Bibby argues that these factors, which cite the limitations of Africa as the reason why SSA 
has so few CDM carbon projects, do not adequately explain this phenomenon. Rather, he points to 
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energy comprising 39.2% and methane capture 22.8% of the SSA total, but only 0.9% and 0.5% of 
the CDM total). He also states that the lack of high GHG reduction intensity projects in SSA, such as 
destruction of HFC is a contributing factor to the low number of CDM projects in SSA (Bibby, 
2012:110-112). 
There is another aspect of the CDM failure which is relevant for this dissertation and that is to do 
with ‘small’ carbon projects4. If a project is unable to generate enough carbon revenue to cover the 
CDM transaction costs of R 0.5 – R2.6 million per project per year (Arens et al., 2012:20) then it 
wouldn’t make sense to even attempt going the CDM route as this would lose money for the project. 
At the current CDM CER prices of around R10/CER (less than Euro 1/CER (EU ETS, 2013)), a project 
would need to generate 50 000 tCO2e per year just to break even. A further consideration is the long 
time it takes to get from the initial project idea through to CDM registration; historically this has 
been up to three years (Climate Change Working Group (CCWG), African Task Force (ATF), & UNEPFI, 
2009:11). So if the project is relying on carbon revenue for its viability, but hasn’t access to finance 
to carry it through until its CERs have been issued and sold, these long lead times would be a 
deterrent to attempting to use the CDM mechanism to generate carbon revenue (Bibby, 2012:113). 
Note that the high transaction costs, long lead times and high drop-out rates of the CDM do not 
apply to Africa and SSA only, but nevertheless are a problem for small or under-financed carbon 
projects anywhere. 
2.3.1. Future uncertainty clouds the Kyoto Protocol and carbon offset trading 
In addition, the future of the compliance market and the CDM was uncertain following the decision 
at COP 17 to effectively postpone the formal extensions of the Kyoto Protocol until 2015. The first 
commitment period (CP 1) of the Kyoto Protocol ran until the end of 2012, after which the CDM 
mechanism is likely to go into a period of stagnation with few new CDM projects entering the CDM 
project pipeline (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:52).  
COP 18, held in Doha in December 2012, has removed some of the uncertainty about the future of 
the Kyoto Protocol and offset trading (Climate Connect, 2012) in that the Annex I countries have 
made some new commitments For instance: 
 The Kyoto Protocol Phase II is to run from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2020 –  whereas 
previously there was some doubt about whether there would be a Phase II at all. 
 The main Annex I countries have agreed not to roll over accumulated Phase I AAUs to 
achieve Phase II targets and the trading of surplus Phase I AAUs is restricted to 2% of 
unused Phase I AAUs – this should help reduce possible CER surpluses. 
 The EU, Australia, Norway and Switzerland have committed to reducing their emissions by 
785 million tCO2e by 2020 – any actions which increase emission reduction commitments is 
likely to increase the demand for CER offsets. 
 CDM: only 2.5% of unused Phase I CERs can be carried over into Phase II – this might help 
increase the demand for CERs in Phase II. 
 CDM: Around 480 million tCO2e of industrial gas CERs will probably remain unused because 
the EU, Australia and New Zealand have banned the use if this type of CER – this might also 
help increase the demand for CERs. 
                                                             
4
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 NAMAs5: 35 NAMAs are in the process of being formalised of which 8 are in the NAMA 
Registry and are looking for US$ 13.5 million in financial support – it is not clear what 
impact the NAMAs will have on offset trading and carbon prices. 
 A new climate deal for post 2020 is to be agreed at COP 21 in 2015 – previously there was 
more doubt about what will happen post-Kyoto, at least now there is a commitment to 
something. 
Some of the problem areas associated with the Kyoto Protocol are: 
 USA: Many words but few commitments 
 China: Likely to beat its carbon intensity reduction target of 2.5% per year, but has not 
committed to absolute emission reductions 
 Japan: Will not take part in Phase II of the Kyoto Protocol, but will not use its Phase I AAU’s 
either and will continue with its Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism (BOCM – now the Joint 
Credit Mechanism – JCM). 
Another factor is that the market for CERs is becoming more selective. For instance, the EU ETS has 
now stopped trading CERs from the so-called Developing Countries and is concentrating on the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs)6 only (Raab, 2012:20).  
Some would argue that the CDM hasn’t worked for SSA on the basis of the very low contribution of 
SSA CDM projects to the total (0.3% of issued CERs have come from Africa up to mid-2012, see 
Appendix A: CDM Pipeline analysis spreadsheet, page 93). However, others, such as Michaelowa, 
point out that Africa is not at all homogeneous and that there are areas of relative success such as 
Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco (Michaelowa et al., 2011:92). Further, most of the projects registered in 
the LDCs have done so during 2011, so perhaps the CDM is starting to work in parts of Africa. It 
should be noted that one should be careful of looking at registered projects statistics; one should 
rather look at projects that have reached the issuance stage, bearing in mind the high drop-out rate - 
the ratio of issuing projects to registered projects is only 15.5% (Appendix A). 
The upturn in African CDM volumes (and the others) is shown clearly in Figure 1 (page 71) (Kossoy & 
Guigon, 2012:53-54). Note “post-2012 volumes” refers to the purchase of future volumes of CERs, 
which is permitted in most ETSs. 
                                                             
5
 NAMAs – Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, see section 5.1.2.7, page 61 
6
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Figure 1: Post-2012 volumes transacted per seller, 2010-2011 
Source: (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:53-54) 
Africa contributed 21% of forward sales of post-2012 CERs (36 million tCO2e). Note that African 
volumes doubled from 2010 to 2011, with most coming from the LDCs because of the EU ETS 
constraints from 2013 onwards. 
2.4. The voluntary carbon market to the rescue? 
An alternative revenue source for carbon emission-reduction projects is the voluntary carbon market 
(VCM) and its Verified Emission Reduction (VER) carbon credits. The VCM, as its name implies is a 
carbon market for buyers who wish to voluntarily buy carbon offsets for a variety of reasons which 
will be discussed in Section  2.13.2, page 50. 
The VCM uses many different standards and has many registries, each with its own standards and 
verification systems. Examples of large voluntary carbon offset standards bodies are the Gold 
Standard (GS, a foundation supported by more than 80 non-government organisations) and the 
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS, an international non-profit organisation). There are several 
registries, including GS and VCS themselves that make use of the GS and VCS standards. 
However, the large, international voluntary carbon registers, such as the GS and VCS, also have high 
barriers to entry. These barriers are in the form of the CDM-like standards used by these registries 
and their standards, which also require extensive project documentation and the use of 
international carbon auditors – the result is high transaction costs and long delays. Another problem 
for many projects is the question of ‘additionality’, particularly financial additionality – this is the 
CDM/GS/VCS requirement that the project in question would not have happened in a business-as-
usual scenario (e.g. without the carbon credit revenue) or that the CDM helped the project 
overcome barriers to its implementation (Taiyab, 2006:3). For many projects this is a problem, 
particularly small carbon projects with limited GHG reduction potential, because the carbon revenue 
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of finance and consequently cannot generally claim that they would not have gone ahead without 
the carbon revenue. For these reasons, only large projects with significant GHG reductions find it 
worthwhile attempting to get carbon revenue from these types of registries7.  This can be seen from 
an analysis of the GS and VCS statistics which shows that of projects which have issued VERs only 9% 
of GS and 12% of VCS projects generate less than 5 000 tCO2e per year; see Table 1.  
Table 1: Analysis of Gold Standard and VCS project sizes 







% of projects 
with <1000 
tCO2e 
% of projects 
with <5000 
tCO2e 
Gold Standard 11,085,931 58,042 2% 9% 
Verified Carbon 
Standard 24,119,107 3768610% 1% 12% 
Source: (Markit, n.d.) 
However, carbon markets are not homogenous and come in different shapes and sizes with different 
emphases and regulations that operate in different ways and some markets are well-suited to small 
projects and some aren’t. In this dissertation the SSA carbon market is divided into two types – Type 
1 and Type 2. 
2.5. Type 1 and Type 2 carbon market and their processes 
2.5.1. Type 1 carbon markets 
Type 1 markets are characterised by strong additionality8 requirements and lengthy processes with 
result in long delays before carbon revenues start flowing. Projects in Type 1 markets typically 
achieve relatively high GHG reductions in relation to the costs of the project and the community 
benefits delivered. Examples of Type 1 markets are the CDM compliance market operating under the 
Kyoto Protocol and big VCMs using the GS and the VCS. Customers for carbon offsets in the Type 1 
VCM tend to be large businesses that wish to offset their carbon footprint for internal company 
reasons such as Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Relations (PR) (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 
2012:38). These businesses might also need the stamp of approval from a large registry in order to 
satisfy their pre-compliance, CSR or PR requirements (Taiyab, 2006:16). This is especially true for 
pre-compliance buyers9, who accounted for two thirds of the VCM transactions in 2011 (Peters-
Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:vii). Pre-compliance buyers would naturally favour the rigour and market 
acceptance found in Type 1 markets and their associated standards in order to maximise the 
likelihood of being able to use their carbon credits for compliance purposes. The dominance of the 
big players is reflected in statistics for 2011 which show VCS with a 58% market share and the GS 
with 12% (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:vii Figure 4). 
Small community projects generally focus on SD benefits, this being their reason for existing, and 
usually have low GHG reduction potential by virtue of their small scale. Therefore these projects are 
not well-suited for the CDM and the compliance market (Type 1). 
                                                             
7 Examples of VCM registries: APX Inc., VCS, CDC Climate, Climate Care, TUV Nord 
8 One common additionality problem for both Type 1 and Type 2 markets is having to prove that the 
intervention wouldn’t have happened anyway. 
9
 Pre-compliance buyers are those who voluntarily buy carbon credits with the intention of being ready for 
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This is where a different form of carbon market comes in: registries, standards and processes that 
are a better fit for small projects with limited resources and relatively low GHG reduction potential. 
In this dissertation these have been called Type 2 markets and registries. 
2.5.2. Type 2 carbon markets and their projects and processes 
Type 2 carbon registries generally focus on small projects which cannot afford the Type 1 processes 
or the long approval lead times, or do not conform to the Type 1 definitions of additionality. These 
Type 2 projects tend to focus on the SD benefits of the projects such as: 
 Improved energy access 
 Health improvements 
 Poverty alleviation 
 Gender equality 
 Education improvements 
 Local environmental improvements 
An example of a Type 2 registry is Credible Carbon10 which is described in the case study section. In 
order to reduce the transaction costs and generate carbon revenues sooner, Type 2 registries have 
to simplify and accelerate the approval and auditing procedures. However there is a risk that if the 
approval and verification standards are perceived to be too lax, credibility will be lost and the 
associated carbon credits will be devalued or even become impossible to sell. In the case of the 
Type 1 registries, the credibility risk is managed by requiring more documentation with more detail 
produced by accredited specialists, hence the high costs and long lead times. Type 2 registries do not 
have this luxury; instead they have had to find more effective ways of bridging the credibility gap 
Type 2 markets, as defined in this dissertation, generally do have strict rules to ensure that the GHG 
reductions are real and do actually result in a permanent, net overall reduction in GHG emissions. 
However they do not require financial additionality in the CDM sense and will usually require 
additional external funding to be viable.  To be additional, the CDM requires that not only must the 
project result in a permanent, net overall reduction in GHG emissions, measured against a business-
as-usual baseline, but also that the project would not have taken place in the absence of the CDM 
(CDM Rulebook, n.d.). The idea being that an offset is only a valid means of reducing an entity’s GHG 
emissions if it wouldn’t have taken place anyway. The Type 2 market’s simpler acceptance criteria 
and on-going audit processes result in fast approvals and early starts to carbon revenue flows, which 
are essential to the viability of most small projects. Often, the approval and auditing processes can 
be done by local agencies instead of having to call in accredited international consultants at great 
expense. The projects in Type 2 VCM markets also tend to deliver significant SD benefits compared 
to their GHG reduction potential. The carbon markets do not, of course exist in a vacuum and are 
there to connect carbon credit buyers with carbon credit sources. The carbon credit sources are the 
underlying projects, or carbon projects. 
2.5.3. Carbon projects 
‘Carbon’ projects, those which reduce GHG emissions and deliver community benefits, also come in 
different forms and sizes. Some generate huge GHG reductions resulting in large potential carbon 
revenues compared to the project costs and carbon market costs. This type of project is often well-
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suited to Type 1 carbon markets. Other projects are smaller in scale and in GHG reduction potential, 
although they might deliver relatively large SD benefits – these projects generally fit well with Type 2 
markets. 
The carbon projects in Africa and sub-Saharan Africa have a low penetration into the Type 1 market 
category. This can be seen from an analysis of the CDM, GS and VCS Type 1 markets which shows the 
low penetration of African projects into these markets. For instance, Africa CDM CERs from 1.4% of 
the global total up to mid-2012; African VCM VERs sold amounted to 9% of the global total in 2011 
(Table 3, Appendix A (Fenhann, 2012) and Table 4 Appendix B (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:24)). 
This raises the question: what do the sub-Saharan African carbon projects look like and why do they 
not fit into the Type 1 markets? 
2.5.4. Sub-Saharan African projects 
Typical sub-Saharan African carbon projects in the Type 2 market are small in scale and have low 
GHG emission reduction potential, need funding from external sources in addition to the carbon 
revenue, and have limited resources for analysis and documentation related to securing carbon 
revenue. These carbon projects are usually strong on community benefits as this is their core 
purpose and is what is required to attract external funding.  
These characteristics make most of the sub-Saharan Africa carbon projects completely unsuitable for 
Type 1 markets, because:  
 The transaction costs are too high compared to the carbon revenue likely to be generated 
(Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:20; Taiyab, 2006:7) 
 The registration, validation/verification and issuance processes take too long for a small 
cash-strapped project (Taiyab, 2006:7) 
 People with the required skills and experience to navigate the Type 1 process are not readily 
available in Africa and SSA (for instance, Africa’s first, and only so far, UNFCCC accredited 
carbon auditor or DOE11 was only appointed in April 2011 (Carbon Check, 2011)   
 Type 1 buyers tend to focus on the credibility of the GHG emission reduction rather than SD 
benefits, so a small project with low GHG emission reduction potential but high community 
benefits will tend to be undervalued (Taiyab, 2006:16) 
 The risks of failure are too high, especially in the CDM, with only 15.9% of projects making it 
through to the issuance stage by mid-2012 (Appendix A, (Fenhann, 2012)) 
 The future of the compliance market (Type 1) and hence the value of its CERs, is still 
uncertain, thus adding to the project risk (See Section 1.2.1 and news reports about the 
collapse of CER prices (Point Carbon, 2013)) 
 
Added to all this, whilst they are waiting for the approval, validation and selling process to happen, 
the carbon price is likely to fluctuate wildly, adding further uncertainty to the viability of the project 
–  this is discussed in Section 2.6, page 30, on carbon pricing. 
The Type 2 market is altogether more suitable and appropriate for typical sub-Saharan African 
projects because:  
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 DOE. The DOE is an independent auditor, accredited by the CDM Executive Board that carries out the 
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 The Type 2 transaction costs are much lower than those for Type 1 (Arens et al., 2012:20; 
Guigon, Bellassen, & Ambrosi, 2009:24) 
 The unit price of the Type 2 carbon credits is comparable to those achieved in the Type 1 
markets whilst the Type 2 transaction costs are much lower so the net revenue from carbon 
is greater in the Type 2 markets (see Section 2.4 on pricing) 
 The projects are approved or rejected and the carbon credits can be sold more quickly 
(Climate Change Working Group (CCWG) et al., 2009:11; Guigon et al., 2009:30). 
 The projects deliver significant SD benefits relative to their size (Corbera, Estrada, & Brown, 
2009:46)  
 There is a strong market in sub-Saharan Africa for Type 2 carbon offsets because the SD 
benefits and GHG reductions of the originating projects are attractive to potential buyers 
wanting to meet corporate social responsibility and carbon footprint reduction targets. This 
is evidenced by the experience of Credible Carbon (Cartwright, personal communication 
2013, May 30) and ClimateCare (Bibby, 2012:112). 
All this means that it is easier to fund and implement Type 2 projects instead of going the Type 1 
route with the longer lead times and higher costs of the CDM, GS or VCS approval pipelines. 
However, both the Type 1 and Type 2 markets are characterised by volatile carbon credit pricing and 
uncertain futures. It is interesting to compare the two in these respects. 
2.6. Carbon credit pricing 
Carbon credits are not fungible (freely transferable and tradable) between the compliance markets 
and the VCM, or even between different registries and standards within the VCM. This is because 
the markets have different standards and governing rules. So, for instance, an Annex I country12, 
operating under the Kyoto Protocol, cannot use voluntary carbon credits (VERs) to satisfy its Kyoto 
obligations, which require CERs and all the associated standards, methodologies and auditing rules. 
Similarly, a corporation wishing to offset part of its carbon footprint for corporate social 
responsibility reasons (CSR) by buying carbon credits, will generally not buy CERs. The reason for this 
is that the corporation usually wants to both reduce its carbon footprint and get favourable publicity 
through benefitting a local community project that delivers significant and visible social 
development and poverty alleviation (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:7). 
Occasionally what does happen is that projects initially try to register in the Type 1 markets (CDM, 
GS, VCS, etc.), but fail and then try the VCMs. Having tried the CDM route, the projects have often 
already done much of the paperwork required by the VCMs, thus reducing the time and effort still 
required to register VERs. An example of this is Reliance Compost13 which started off down the Type 
1 route with the TUV Nord14 VER standard without much success, but then switched to Credible 
Carbon (Type 2) and very quickly managed to sell its accumulated VERs. Sometimes the reverse has 
                                                             
12 The Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol are those countries which have committed to achieving 
quantified GHG reductions within an agreed time frame. There are 42 Annex I countries which include the EU, 
USA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan etc. For the full list, see: 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php 
13 Reliance Compost (www.reliance.co.za).  
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also happened – a VCM project that has been set up and running then decides to register under the 
CDM. 
However, in spite of carbon credits not being fungible across the different carbon markets, 
nevertheless the compliance and VCM prices do appear to follow each other to some degree. This is 
possibly because the markets are free in that the prices are not set but negotiated for each 
transaction and buyers and sellers will point to the other market prices as part of the negotiating 
process. This is discussed in Section 2.7. 
2.7. Compliance carbon market processes and pricing 
The compliance market has evolved into a complex mechanism from its original, simple roots. It 
consists of a primary market plus a number of secondary markets. Primary CERs can be bought on 
the primary market and these can be retired or traded on a secondary market, or simply held.  
Retiring CERs is a non-reversible process whereby they are removed from the register and are 
formally offset against the owner’s carbon footprint – CERs can only be retired once and can’t be 
traded thereafter. Before retirement, CDM CERs can be traded on the CDM’s own IET as well as on 
other domestic carbon trading entities such as the EU ETS. 
CERs can be traded, or sold to another entity (country agency, corporation or individual) at a 
mutually agreed price. The title to the traded CERs is transferred to the new owner by an entry in 
the CDM or the chosen secondary registry (see Section 1.1, page 15). Each transaction, consisting of 
a CER quantity, transaction date and a unique reference number, can be tracked and ownership 
proved. 
Holding CERs means just that, holding them until you want to retire them or sell them to someone 
else. 
2.7.1. The CDM and how it works 
The CDM is managed by the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB, operating under the UNFCCC) whose 
task is to set up rules and process s to ensure that the claimed CERs are real, permanent and 
additional to what would have happened in the absence of the CDM. The CDM also acts as a registry 
for CDM projects and verifies and records the status of each project and its CERs. The life-cycle of a 
typical project as far as the CDM is concerned consists of eight stages, elegantly described in the 
CDM Rulebook (CDM Rulebook, n.d.): 
1. Project Design Document (PDD).  
The PDD must include the following: the project boundary, the baseline methodology, the 
crediting period, the additionality motivation, the environmental impacts, public funding 
sources, stakeholder comments, the monitoring plan and documentation of all calculations 
relevant to the project. 
2. Letters of Approval (LOA) 
The LOA is provided by the country hosting the project through its Designated National 
Authority (DNA). The LOA’s intention is to make sure that the host country approves of the 
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The validation must be done by a Designated Operational Entity (DOE)15 and the object is to 
confirm that the project meets all the relevant CDM requirements. This step is different to 
the later Verification step, when a formal audit is done once the project has been running 
for a while. 
4. Registration 
This step confirms that the project has been accepted by the CDM EB as a valid CDM project 
which will appear on the CDM database of projects. 
5. Monitoring 
This includes the measurement and recording of GHG emissions for the baseline and after 
the project’s implementation, so that the GHG reductions can be quantified as tCO2e. Any 
leakage must also be identified and monitored. 
6. Verification 
Periodically the project’s GHG reduction performance as measured by the monitoring 
process must be audited by a DOE. Only verified CERs can be issued and sold.  
7. Issuance 
Once the CERs have been certified by a DOE, they are ready to be issued by the CDM 
registry administrator. This means that the CERs go into a CDM holding account, ready to be 
forwarded (sold). 
8. Forwarding 
This is the process whereby CERs are transferred to the party who is buying the offsets. In 
other words, the CERs are sold from the CER provider (a non-Annex I country) to an Annex I 
country. 
Having generated CDM CERs, the underlying projects now seek to turn their carbon into money. This 
is done through carbon registries, with the primary one being the CDM registry itself. There are 
many other secondary carbon registries on which CERs in various forms can be bought and sold by 
countries, companies and even individuals. These are important for sub-Saharan African carbon 
projects only in so far as they affect the market for carbon credits generated by these projects. Of 
course Emissions Trading Systems (ETS) are tremendously important to the bigger picture of using 
market mechanisms to facilitate global GHG reductions.  
In addition to the primary CDM market there are now many secondary markets which deal in carbon 
credits. There are also derivative markets which trade in carbon credit futures – very much like the 
financial stock markets and derivative markets. Examples of these are the European Climate 
Exchange, the Green Exchange (Button, 2008:576). The secondary markets make the carbon market 
more liquid (Larson & Parks, 1998:33) and they do provide some pricing visibility. The largest by far 
amongst the secondary markets is the European Union Emissions Trading System. 
2.7.2. The European Union Emissions Trading System 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was set up in 2003 by the EU as a 
mechanism to meet the EU Kyoto targets. Initially it covered the EU-15 countries and, after a trial 
period, it was expanded to cover the 27 EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway (Aasrud, Baron & Karousakis, 2010:42). 
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 The DOE is an independent auditor, accredited by the CDM Executive Board that carries out the validation, 










33   
 
The EU ETS is first and foremost a domestic mechanism, designed to serve the EU’s interests. 
Nevertheless, with the EU ETS accounting for about 80% of the global carbon market transactions 
(Michaelowa et al., 2011:25), the EU ETS has a considerable impact on the carbon markets around 
the world. The EU ETS started in 2005 with its pilot phase and then went into its second phase which 
runs from 2008 to 2012, with the third phase planned for 2013. The EU ETS is currently suffering 
from an over-supply of allowances which has led to a collapse in its carbon price. The mechanisms 
for controlling carry-overs from previous phases and for the issue of new allowances are currently 
being debated within the EU in an attempt to get the carbon price up to the point where it will make 
more of a difference to emission reduction. 
The EU ETS is becoming more selective about the CDM offset market (Michaelowa et al., 2011:16). 
Initially the EU ETS would allow CDM CERs to be offset against EU emissions in the EU ETS regardless 
of the source country and the project type. However, the EU ETS rules will change from 2013 as it 
enters its third phase. The new restrictions on imports of CERs include: 
 The numerical import limits on CDM CERs will be considerably reduced 
 Only CDM CERs from existing projects registered before 2013 or from LDCs will be accepted 
 CDM CERs from projects based on reduction of HFC-23 and N2O from certain sources will not 
be accepted – and these have been the dominant projects in the CDM in terms of GHG 
reduction tonnes. 
The analysis of carbon pricing is further complicated by the variety of carbon instruments that is 
traded on the EU ETS, such as: AAUs, EUAs, ERUs and CERs. These are explained as follows: 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) are equivalent to CERs; that is if an Annex I country holds one AAU it 
is entitled to emit 1 tCO2e
16 under the Kyoto Protocol. In order to be able to spread the emission 
allowances to business entities within a country, the EU Allowance (EUA) was invented. For each 
AAU there is one EUA, so that if you add up all the EUAs you will get to the correct AAU total for that 
country. 
EUAs are distributed or sold to EU business entities and entitle those entities to emit that many 
EUAs (1 EUA is equivalent to 1 tCO2e). If a company finds it is able to emit less carbon than its EUA 
total, it can trade its surplus EUAs with another company that is struggling to meet its Kyoto 
obligations. 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) are similar to CERs except that they result from Joint 
Implementation (JI) instead of from CDM offsets (PointCarbon, 2012:12). The JI is a mechanism, 
similar to the CDM, but which operates between Annex B countries only (Annex B countries are 
Annex I plus four other European countries: Liechtenstein, Monaco, Croatia and Slovenia). The JI 
allows emission permits to be traded between Annex B countries. 
Since 2008, the secondary carbon market in compliance credits has been extremely volatile, both in 
terms of volumes traded and carbon prices achieved. This can be seen in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Prices and volumes for EUAs, SERs and ERUs in the secondary market (2008-2011) 
Source: (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:18) 
Figure 1 shows the enormous amount of EUA trading compared to the amount of CERs actually 
issued and sold to satisfy the EUA allowances (each EUA is equivalent to one CER). The high EUA 
volumes (traded on the EU ETS) are because carbon credits can change hands several times as they 
pass through brokers and are traded. Note also the spread between the EUA prices and the CER 
prices, with the EUA prices always higher. This is because the number of CERs entering the EU ETS is 
limited by the EUA allowances, whilst the CDM growth continues to add CERs into the primary CDM 
market, resulting in an oversupply of CERs in the primary CER market and therefore lower prices 
(Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:37). Note that the ERUs (CERS traded on secondary exchanges) form a very 
small part of the trade and take their prices from the CER prices at this stage. 
In a Point Carbon17 report (PointCarbon, 2012:6), it can be seen that since December 2011 and up to 
mid-2012, carbon prices have fallen further, with AAUs trading below €2/tCO2e. 
The Point Carbon analysis shows that the fall in the compliance market carbon prices appears to be 
due to: 
 A surplus of AAUs in most Kyoto countries for both Commitment Period 1 (CP 1 2008 – 2012) 
and CP 2 (2013 – 2017) 
 This surplus leads to a drop in AAU prices and this is followed by a drop in the price of EUAs 
and ERUs, because if a country has a surplus of AAUs it will not be buying EUAs or ERUs 
 General uncertainty about the future of the Kyoto Protocol after COP 17, some of which was 
resolved at COP 18 in Doha (see section 1.2.1, page 15). 
                                                             
17 A Thomson Reuters company which provides “independent news, analysis and consulting services 
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The fall in prices was consistent with the classical economic theory of emissions trading in that 
the market appears to have found a new equilibrium point due to the supply curve shifting to 







As the supply of CERs increases, the equilibrium point moves to right and the equilibrium price 
drops from P1 to P2 (Ellerman & Decaux, 1998). 
2.7.3. Other Emissions Trading Systems 
2.7.3.1. Australia 
Australia made some emission related commitments after COP 16 in Cancun in 2010. These included 
the intention to reduce carbon emissions by 5% from the 2000 levels by 2020. This was to be done 
by carbon pricing being introduced in 2012 and leading to emissions trading by 2015 (Michaelowa et 
al., 2011:75). The promised carbon tax was introduced by the Labour party in 2012 in the form of the 
Carbon Price Mechanism (CPM), against predictable resistance from the opposition party and the 
energy intensive industries. Tony Abbott, of the pposition Liberal party has sworn to dismantle the 
carbon tax if his party gets into power in 2013; so it is anyone’s guess what will happen in the future. 
2012 saw the passing of the Clean Energy Act, which will introduce a cap and trade mechanism by 
2015. This scheme will cover about 60% of Australia’s emissions initially. The units of emission 
reduction are the Carbon Units (CUs) issued by the government and the Australian Carbon Credit 
Units (ACCUs), the latter coming out of the Carbon Farming Initiative – another part of Australia’s 
Clean Energy Future Package. These schemes will be phased in, starting with a fixed price on carbon 
from 2012-2015 and moving to a flexible price with caps on emission quantities from 2015. The 
scheme does allow international carbon credits to be imported, initially up to 50% of an entity’s 
emission reduction obligation (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:73). 
2.7.3.2. USA 
In spite of the fact that the USA, under the Bush administration withdrew from Kyoto and that the 
Republican-held Congress continues to block key energy bills, there considerable activity at state 
level concerning emission reduction policy. 
There is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which covers power plant emissions in ten 
states18. It is interesting that the revenue from the auctions of RGGI CO2 allowances gets re-cycled 
back in carbon-constructive ways, with nearly 50% going to energy efficiency measures, 14% back 
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 RGGI States: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont 
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into the consumers’ pockets via electricity bill assistance and only 20% going into the general state 
coffers. The initial period yielded a net benefit to the state of US$ 1.6 billion and a claimed creation 
of 16 000 jobs. However, offset trading is not part of the RGGI at present (Kossoy & Guigon, 
2012:81). 
The other big USA-related carbon reduction mechanism is the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). This 
currently comprises California in the USA plus four Canadian states (British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Ontario, and Québec). The WCI, will, if all goes well, result in a cap-and-trade system that works 
across state and national boundaries, with each party controlling its own territory. As could be 
expected, political challenges abound and so far only California and Quebec have passed their 
regulations enabling the WCI in their states. In addition to the pending WCI, California will be 
introducing a cap-and-trade system in 2013. Offset trading will be restricted to USA-based projects 
and certain developing countries – this part of the scheme is still in its making (Kossoy & Guigon, 
2012:81-84).  
Note that the Chicago Carbon Exchange (CCX), although it was a big player in the USA VCM, closed 
down in 2010 and is no longer active. The CCX was set up in anticipation of the USA applying formal 
GHG emissions reduction constraints, either as part of the UNFCCC or as a USA unilateral compliance 
measure. When this didn’t happen and the USA continued to stay out of the Kyoto Protocol, the CCX 
collapsed and was closed down, thereafter most of the VER trade was on the OTC markets. 
2.7.3.3. Japan 
Japan, whilst remaining a Kyoto signatory, unlike Canada which withdrew completely in 2011, has 
decided not to take part in CP 2. Japan has been a big buyer of CERs (18% in the period 2008-2012, 
although smaller than the EU with its 79% (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:71 Table 6)). 
Japan implemented the Tokyo metropolitan area cap-and-trade system (which includes offset 
trading) in 2010. This system aims to achieve a 6% reduction against the “base-year emissions”19. 
There is also the Japan Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (JVETS). This scheme allows the use of 
Kyoto CERs as offsets. In spite of being voluntary the scheme has attracted 389 participants who 
have collectively saved nearly two million tCO2e. 
In addition there are a number of other initiatives such as the Domestic Credit Scheme and the Japan 
Verified Emission Reduction (J-VER) Scheme for local projects. 
However, the big new thing which will follow Japan’s withdrawal from CP 2 is the bilateral offset 
credit mechanism (BOCM) (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:102). This was established under the Cancun 
Agreement in 2011. Japan will use the BOCM both to reduce its GHG emissions in line with its Kyoto 
and Cancun commitments, and also to effectively export its own low-carbon technology to 
developing countries. If the move away from nuclear power generation results in more coal power 
plants, then Japan will need the BOCM to work to balance its carbon book (Kossoy & Guigon, 
2012:102-103). 
2.7.4. Carbon trading in the developing countries – China and India 
From a GHG point of view, China and India are by far the biggest emitters amongst the developing 
countries. They have also been the CDM’s biggest providers of CERs as can be seen in Figure 4 (China 
59.8%, India 14.9% and Africa 1.4%). 
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Figure 4: Comparison of quantity by country – in terms of CERs registered and issued 
Source: (Fenhann, 2012) and author’s analysis in Appendix A. 
Being classed as developing countries, China and India have been direct competitors of African 
projects seeking to capitalise on CDM revenue. This will be changing somewhat in 2013, when the 
EU ETS will only support carbon projects in the LDCs – which rules out China and India (and South 
Africa) (Raab, 2012:20). 
China proposes to concentrate on the reduction of carbon intensity and energy intensity in its 
industries and has set targets to achieve a 17% carbon intensity and 16% energy intensity reduction 
by 2015. China’s measures include carbon trading and a voluntary carbon market (Michaelowa et al., 
2011: 76 Table 2). Similarly, India will also be concentrating on improving its industrial carbon 
intensity and is aiming at 20-25% reductions by 2020-2025, using market-based mechanisms.  
The carbon markets and their mechanisms have been described in this section and the next step was 
to examine what is behind it all – how GHG reductions are measured and how SD improvements are 
assessed. All carbon projects wishing to generate carbon revenue have to convince their carbon 
customers that they have reduced GHG emissions and have made a contribution to SD. 
2.8. Voluntary carbon market pricing 
The voluntary carbon market is much less homogenous than the compliance market. This is to be 
expected because instead of one standard (i.e. the CDM), there are many different standards being 
used in many different countries. Therefore it is difficult to compare voluntary carbon prices to 
compliance carbon prices. 
Nevertheless, some trends can be identified. First of all, looking at Figure 5 (page 38), taken from the 
report “State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2012” (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:24 Figure 
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Figure 5: Change in VCM volume and value by region, OTC. 2010 vs 2011 
Source: (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:24 Figure 23) 
By reading the approximate figures off the graph and dividing one by the other, the estimated 
average unit prices can be calculated as in Table 2 (see also Appendix B: Carbon volume and value 
analysis for the detailed data) (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:24 Figure 23). The CDM figures were 
taken directly from the 2012 World Bank report (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:49 Table 3). 
Table 2: VCM and CDM volumes, values and prices, 2010-2011 
Volume and Value 
for the VCM and 
CDM 
VCM VERs CDM CERs (Primary market only) 
2010 2011 % change 2010 2011 % change 
Volume MtCO2e 66 92 39% 224 263 17% 
Value US$ Millions 360 466 29% 2675 2980 11% 
US$/tCO2e 5.5 5.1 -7% 11.9 11.3 -5% 
Source for VCM: (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:24 Figure 23) 
Source for CDM: (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:49 Table 3). 
The compliance market volumes20 went up from 2010 to 2011, while the compliance carbon price 
fell from around $ 11.9/tCO2e to US$ 11.3/tCO2e. In the voluntary carbon market, the volumes also 
went up, and the carbon price went down by 7% (from US$ 5.5/tCO2e to US$ 5.1/tCO2e).  
More recently, in 2012, the VCM prices have overtaken the CDM prices – the volume-weighted 
average VCM price was $5.9/tCO2e whilst the CDM offset price had fallen to below $1/tCO2e (Molly 
Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:vii). The next question is what will happen in the next few years? 
According to a study done by Conte and Kotchen (Conte & Kotchen, 2010), prices in the VCM appear 
to be driven by factors to do with the nature of the offsets and the associated projects  in addition to 
the theoretical factors such as the equilibrium between marginal abatement costs in the regulated 
country and those in the offset project country in a pure regulatory environment as discussed in 
                                                             
20 Note that the CDM primary market volumes as opposed to the secondary and EU ETS volumes were used as 
these are more comparable to the VCM figures. The comparison aims to show new carbon credits and their 
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Section 2.1 (page 18). Conte and Kotchen developed price functions that attempted to explain VCM 
offset prices in terms of factors such as where the host project was situated, what type of validation 
and certification was used (valuing co-benefits or not) and the technologies used in the projects, 
such as wind, solar or biomass. The findings from Conte and Kotchen’s research (Conte & Kotchen, 
2010:96), included the following: 
 VER providers (registries, brokers, retailers) operating in the EU achieved significantly higher 
prices (30%) than those situated elsewhere 
 VERs from sources (that is the generating projects themselves) that were in developing 
countries or LDCS realised higher prices (20%) those sources in other countries 
 The certifying standards used also make a significant difference, with standard based on 
Kyoto and the CDM achieved higher offset prices (30%) than others, such as the VCS 
The factors influencing VCM offset prices have been discussed further in the analysis section (Section 
5.3 (page 82)). 
2.9. What is the future outlook for the carbon markets? 
The futures of the compliance and voluntary, Type 1 and Type 2 carbon markets are uncertain. For 
the compliance markets, and especially the CDM and EU ETS, much depends on what happens to 
global GHG reduction targets and compliance rules in the next few years. The COP 17 and Durban 
Platform outcomes left us with the Kyoto Protocol hanging in limbo – the Annex I countries have 
until 2015 to decide what they are prepared to commit. It appears to be the nature of governments 
(and companies and individuals) to delay awkward decisions in the hopes that the choices will 
become clearer with time. In the case of climate change and what should be done about it, there are 
competing points of view: restraint versus innovation – Malthus versus Solow. The Malthusians 
argue that it is essential for us to stop using up the planet’s resource, whereas the Solovians hold 
that innovations will rescue us from the threat of scarce resources. In the face of this it is tempting 
to do nothing and wait and see (Martin & Kemper, 2012:52). So some countries will press ahead 
with their own internal GHG reduction targets and others will probably delay, enjoy the free-ride 
and hope the problem goes away. The developing world (non-Annex I countries) meanwhile will 
carry on with their development agendas and resist any attempts to get them to reduce GHG 
emissions at the expense of economic growth or without some compensation.  As previously 
described in Section 1.2.1 page 15, some progress was made at COP 18 at Doha (Climate Connect, 
2012). However, it remains to be seen to what extent countries will act on their intentions; therefore 
the compliance market uncertainty is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. 
In South Africa, it appears that some form of local carbon tax (and possibly a carbon cap and trade 
later on) will emerge although the details are still being debated and there is much opposition from 
the trade unions and from the high carbon emitting industries. A draft policy paper was been 
published for comment (SA National Treasury, 2010) and a carbon price of R 120/tCO2e was been 
proposed. The policy was amended and re-issued for comment in May 2013 (SA National Treasury, 
2013). However, the policy proposal has been drastically watered down in response to business 
opposition with the result that the tax will only come into force in 2015 and the tax-free thresholds 
will remain fixed until 2019. In its current form the South African carbon tax policy will allow carbon 
emitters to offset their emissions by up to 10% of their total and pay an effective carbon tax of R 72 
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allowed – will the offsets have to be bought from particular registries, or particular types of 
registries, and will these be Type 1 or Type 2 or possibly a mixture of these? However, it is likely that 
the South African government will try to keep the carbon tax revenues within South Africa so as to 
minimise capital outflows and maximise local project benefits. The impact of implemented carbon 
tax policies on both Type 1 and Type 2 markets should be to establish a lower limit on the carbon 
price at least until the supply of local carbon credits exceeds the new demand generated by the 
carbon tax implementation (Urban Earth, 2012).  
Having examined carbon markets and carbon pricing broadly, it is important to recognise that 
carbon credits are only worth what they can be sold for on the carbon market. The vehicle for selling 
carbon credits is the carbon registry and there are successful registries and less successful registries. 
However, it is not only the general carbon market and the chosen registry that determines the value 
of a particular project – it is also the nature of the carbon project itself. 
2.10.  Carbon registries and projects 
Before looking at why particular registries work well with Type 2 projects, we first need to explore 
how Type 2 carbon projects work – who gets involved and how and what are the various roles and 
role-players. 
Typically Type 2 projects are not motivated primarily by GHG reduction, but rather by the need to 
deliver tangible sustainable development and community benefits, such as: poverty alleviation, 
health and environmental improvements, and energy provision. These needs are well-defined and 
motivated for in the MDGs. Therefore these projects tend to be created in response to a community 
need. However, in practice it is difficult to measure the SD impact of a carbon project on its affected 
environment and communities. 
2.10.1. Sustainable development  
The problem of measuring SD impacts of a project is complex and often subjective. This is partly 
because the words “sustainable”, “development”, “social development”, “community benefits” and 
“poverty alleviation” mean different things to different governments, businesses and people. 
Perhaps that is why the CDM process and rules delegate the SD management to the government of 
the host country through its DNA – this is done formally through the Letter of Approval (see Section 
2.7.1, page 31 on how the CDM works). 
Nevertheless, the UNFCC does provide some guidance in their report on CDM benefits (UNFCCC-
CDM, 2011:9). This report states that there is wide agreement that SD “comprises of three mutually 
reinforcing dimensions, namely economic development, social development and environmental 
protection.” To be useful, these three components need to be defined. In the report, the UNFCCC 
optimistically suggested that all that was required is a list of SD indicators with suitable metrics. 
Then, presumably, armed with these one applied the metrics to the indicators, applied suitable 
weighting factors and a number emerged which was a measure of the SD. By comparing the before 
and after values, the impact of the project could be measured. This was obviously very difficult to do 
as is evidenced by the scarcity of studies which have actually carried out this exercise. The UNFCCC 
said that only two such studies have been done. It seems that in the end, no matter how 
complicated a process one adopts, it comes down to subjective judgements by the parties involved 
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One interesting fact that emerged from the UNFCCC’s analysis of SD outcomes of CDM projects is 
that there appears to be an inverse relationship between SD improvements and high GHG 
reductions. So, as one might have expected, the big industrial CDM projects delivered high CER 
returns but little SD improvements – and the reverse is true too (UNFCCC-CDM, 2011:16-19). The 
analysis used a set of 15 SD indicators and applied them to 350 CDM projects. The highest scoring 
indicators in order of the number of claims made in the project PDDs were Economic-Local job 
creation, Environment-Noise pollution and dust reduction, Environment-Promotion of renewable 
energy, Economic-Technology transfer, Environment-Protection of natural resources and 
Environment-Efficient utilisation of natural resources – these scored over 100 claims. Ranked the 
lowest were the social benefits, none of which scored more than 100 claims. The social benefits 
were: health and safety (52), engagement of local population (41), poverty alleviation (10), labour 
conditions and human rights, promotion of education, and, lastly, empowerment of women and care 
of children scoring only three claims. (UNFCCC-CDM, 2011:12 Figure II-1). Note that this analysis was 
done on the basis of statements made in the PDDs; what actually happens as the projects unfold is a 
different story – the study found that there was rather poor agreement between the PDD claims and 
surveys carried out after the projects had been registered. For instance 19% of the surveys had no 
matches with the PDD claims at all and only 10% had a better than 50% match. All this shows that 
applying complicated indicators is difficult to do and likely to be misleading. 
Even if it was possible to get a generally accepted methodology for assessing the impact on SD, there 
remains the problem of getting sufficient information to apply the chosen methodology. The 
standard CDM PDD and VCM PIN documentation is not sufficient, especially as these documents are 
usually produced before the project is running and contain intentions rather than facts on actual 
performance. The next source of information could be the periodic verification audits, but 
unfortunately these tend to concentrate on the carbon credit calculations because this is where the 
money is. At present there appears to be no strong governance over the delivery of SD benefits, nor 
any drive to document these benefits. So researchers in the field are driven to doing detailed case 
studies on a few examples: for instance a 2006 paper on four case studies in Vietnam, South Africa, 
Costa Rica and India (Gupta et al., 2006). This study compartmented SD into the usual three 
components (Environment, Economy and Social) and applied their own SD index methodology to 
score the projects so that they could be compared and ranked against each other. Apart from being 
able to rank the projects, the study also concluded that there were four key indicators of success of 
a project (success in terms of achieving a high ranking using the Gupta et al 2006 paper’s 
methodology) – these were: 
 Demand-driven projects deliver the best SD outcomes, this is where the host country has a 
strong interest in the project and where the local stakeholders are keen participants 
 Well-designed projects that are small and inexpensive, with clear baseline analysis, well-
defined roles and responsibilities do best 
 Good quality documentation is essential 
 Demonstrative effect: the successful projects tend to lead the way for other projects 
There are several other SD-related indices in use, such as Cosbey’s Development Dividend (Cosbey et 
al., 2006), the OECD-IEA Development Index (OECD-IEA, 2010) and the Action Impact Matrix 
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To establish the need and initiate a suitable project some essential role players are required. 
Although the actual role players vary from project to project and some roles overlap, in this 
researcher’s experience the role players and roles described in Section 2.10.2 will generally be 
present in a carbon project.  
A particular aspect of SD relevant to the Umdoni case study in this dissertation (Section 4, page 69) is 
the effect of indoor air pollution (IAP) on health. The Umdoni project is a fuel-switch project which 
uses bio-ethanol gel fuel to partially displace other commonly used fuels such as wood and paraffin 
and one of the SD benefits claimed was improved health due to reduced IAP. The seriousness of IAP 
on people’s health in sub-Saharan African is apparent from the statistic that 32% of the global deaths 
and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (only South Asia was higher 
at 37%) (Bruce et al., 2006:798 Table 42.3).  
2.10.2. Project role players 
There will always be a champion or project conceiver who has the vision of what the project should 
deliver and has the skills and the drive and the connections to make it happen. This person could be 
a member of the community itself, or someone in a non-government organisation (NGO), or 
sometimes a local government person, or perhaps a funding organisation looking for suitable 
projects.  
It was shown in Section 2.10.1 that according to Gupta et al. (Gupta et al., 2006) successful projects 
amongst other things had well-defined roles and responsibilities. 
The necessary role-players are: 
 Community representatives 
 Project Proponent 
 Project Developer 
 Local Government representatives 
 Funders 
 Carbon registry, carbon auditor and carbon offset customers 
It is worth looking at these in more detail in order to get to grips with typical Type 2 project 
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Figure 6: Typical role players for a Type 2 project 
Source: (Atkins & Prasad, 2012) 
Figure 3 attempts to show the idealised interactions between the role players. It is assumed that a 
project champion has emerged and has started off by finding a suitable project proponent to look 
organise the project and arrange the carbon credit processes. The project proponent first engages 
with the community and together they negotiate and define the scope of the proposed project. This 
is done in the form of a Project Idea Note. Next the project proponent finds and assembles the rest 
of the team – these being a project developer (who will manage the project), a local government 
representative (if required), a funder and the carbon registry. The appointed project developer then 
plans the project in detail and documents this as a Project Design Document (PDD). The PDD is then 
discussed, modified if necessary, and finally agreed by the community, the local government (if 
involved), and the funder (often an NGO) with the project proponent driving the negotiations. The 
project proponent now has to secure funds, usually through the funder. If the funder requires 
changes to be made to the project design, then this must be negotiated by the project proponent 
who involves the affected parties (community, project developer, local government, funder). Once 
the funding has been secured, the project proponent draws up the necessary contracts. This is an 
important step as it determines who will own the carbon credits, how they will be managed and sold 
(e.g. contract with a suitable carbon registry) and what will be done with the resulting carbon 
revenue. The project is then implemented, with the project developer managing the project. Once 
completed and signed off to the satisfaction of the main role players (community, project 
proponent, local government and funder), the project moves into the monitoring phase, carried out 
by the project developer and overseen by the project proponent. The project then runs for a period 
(usually a year) and then the project proponent requests the carbon registry to appoint a suitable 
carbon auditor to do the required audit. The carbon registry can then start selling the credits. The 
carbon revenue would usually be managed by the project developer under the constraints of the 
relevant contracts and overseen by the project proponent. This whole process is described in more 
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2.10.2.1. Community representatives 
As with all projects, in whatever domain, one of the prerequisites for success is to ensure that the 
project will deliver what the proposed beneficiaries want (not necessarily ‘need’). So one of the first 
actions should be to find out what the community wants. This is usually done by identifying 
legitimate community representatives who will act on behalf of the community and interpret the 
wants (and perhaps needs) accurately and commit the community to the project and its success. The 
project developer will often assist in the wants/needs analysis by collecting data and analysing it, but 
the community representatives should have the final say as to what the community wants to get out 
of the project. As was discussed in Section 2.10.1, projects where the local stakeholders are keen 
participants deliver the best SD outcomes (Gupta et al., 2006). 
2.10.2.2. Project Proponent 
The project proponent plays the role of ‘deal-maker’, much like the producer in the movie business. 
This involves working with the community representatives and the local government, appointing a 
suitable project developer, finding a funder and arranging funding and the carbon finance side of 
things with an appropriate carbon registry. The project proponent is also responsible for producing 
documentation such as the PIN, approving documentation produced by the project developer (the 
PDD), checking that the project has been implemented as planned, and, nce running, is delivering 
the promised outcomes. According to Gupta et al. good documentation was an indicator for success 
in a carbon project (Gupta et al., 2006). One of the outcomes of a carbon project is, of course 
achieving the predicted GHG reductions. This is based on an agreed GHG reduction calculation 
method (called a ‘methodology’ as in the CDM nomenclature) and a monitoring plan. Naturally, the 
project proponent (and the project developer, carbon auditor and registry for that matter) would 
need to be paid for these services and this payment can be funded in various ways, such as setting 
aside some of the future carbon revenue, or including the professional fees as part of the project’s 
costs and getting these funded by the funder. Clear baseline analysis was another indicator of a 
project’s success according to Gupta et al. (Gupta et al., 2006).  
2.10.2.3. Project Developer 
The project developer does the actual, hands-on work of developing the project plan and seeing that 
the project goes ahead as planned. As described in Section 2.10.2.2, professional service providers 
such as the project developer can be funded out of the carbon revenue or form part of the project’s 
costs.  
2.10.2.4. Local Government representatives 
Sometimes, community projects will need to get the buy-in from a local or national government 
department. For instance, this could be required when the project is funded by a government 
agency, or when some form of planning permission is needed or permits required. Local government 
involvement was required in the Umdoni project (see Section 4, page 69). This could be done 
through a government representative who will make sure that the project doesn’t contravene any 
rules and regulations. Sometimes the local government can also be a source of funding and 
expertise. 
2.10.2.5. Funder 
Most Type 2 projects cannot survive on the carbon revenue alone and so additional funding is 
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with the project proponent. The funder will typically need to be involved during the project planning 
and implementation as well as once the project is up and running. Most funders will require detailed 
project documentation before and during the project implementation and regular audit reports once 
the project is running. 
2.10.2.6. Carbon registry, carbon auditor and carbon offset buyers 
The carbon registry is responsible for registering the audited carbon reductions in the form of 
Verified Emission Reductions (VERs), based on the agreed carbon reduction methodology, and then 
marketing and selling the VERs to their customers. 
The carbon registry appoints an independent carbon auditor who will calculate the project’s VERs 
using the agreed methodologies. The auditor should be objective and independent of all the other 
project participants, have the required carbon auditing skills and be credible in the eyes of the 
carbon offset customers (Kollmuss, Zink, & Polycarp, 2008:33) 
The carbon registry will typically levy a transaction fee (per tCO2e transacted), this varies from 
registry to registry. The CDM charges 2% of the CER value for small-scale projects21 (Guigon et al., 
2009:20). In the case of Credible Carbon, the registration fee of R 1.00/tCO2e will be paid by the 
project itself (usually out of the carbon revenue). If the VERs are immediately retired there is no 
additional fee levied by Credible Carbon, but if the VERs are held and then traded or retired later, 
then there is a further R 1.00/tCO2e fee which is payable by the VER owner. Credible Carbon would 
appoint a carbon auditor and the carbon audit fees are usually paid out of the carbon revenue. 
The carbon offset customers can be any individuals or any business entities that need or want to 
offset their carbon footprints. Their reasons for buying carbon offsets could include: an ethical desire 
to reduce their carbon footprint, a corporate requirement to do so, a legal requirement, or to meet a 
commercial objective (such as reducing carbon tax cost-effectively) (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 
2012:7). 
These then are the role players that should be involved in any carbon project. They are involved at 
different stages of a project’s life cycle as described next. 
2.10.3. A typical Type 2 project life-cycle 
Naturally all projects are different and events unfold in many ways – a typical Type 1 (VCS) life cycle 
sequence is: PIN → PDD → Validation → Registration → Monitoring → Verifiaction → Issuance → 
Transfer of ownership (Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:6 Table 2). However this study was not able 
to uncover project life-cycle information for Type 2 projects in general. What was possible was to get 
this information in the case of Promotion of Access to Carbon Equity (PACE) and the associated 
Credible Carbon Registry22. In this case the process usually includes the steps shown in Figure 7 
(page 46). 
  
                                                             
21
 CDM defines small-scale projects as those generating less than 15 000 CERs per year. 
22
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         Actions           Outcomes and milestones 
  Community need identified by a project 
champion 
Champion finds a project proponent to run 
the project 
Project proponent works with the 
community to define a project to satisfy the 
community need 
Project proponent appointed 
Project proponent produces a 
Project Idea Note (PIN) 
PIN is approved by the 
community 
Project proponent assembles the other 
project players (project developer, a local 
government representative, the NGO 
representative (if reqd.) and possibly a 
funder) 
Project developer prepares a Project 
Definition Document (PDD) 
Project developer gets the PDD approved 
by: the community, the NGO (if reqd.), 
carbon registry and funder 
PDD approved by project 
stakeholders 
Project proponent secures funding 
Project proponent prepares contracts 
Project developer manages ongoing project 
and monitors project deliverables 
Carbon auditor appointed and 
audit is carried out. The VERs 
are registered in the registry. 
The auditor notes any 
problems that need to be 
attended to 
Project developer appointed 
PDD produced. The PDD lists the 
project details, including the promised 
deliverables (community benefits, 
GHG reduction methodology, GHG 
baseline analysis, GHG reduction 
calculations, costs, timing) 
Re-negotiate PDD if required 
Contracts prepared and 
signed 
Project is signed off by project 
proponent 
Registry markets and sells the VERs.  
Project proponent instructs registry to 
appoint a carbon auditor and carry out the 
audit to verify GHG reductions and SD 
benefits delivery. 
Project proponent distributes 
the proceeds as per the agreed 
budget. 
Project champion identifies a 
community need 
Figure 7: Sample project process diagram 
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As can be seen, the project process is quite complicated and can become extremely bureaucratic 
and expensive as has happened with the Type 1 project processes, which are even more complicated 
and require more documentation and accredited experts to produce the documentation. 
The next point of interest for this research was the question of what makes a particular registry 
successful and attractive to a Type 2 project. Before looking at particular registries, it is useful to set 
the scene by examining how registries work, what registry standards are being applied and looking 
at the mechanics of carbon offsetting. 
2.11.  How does a carbon registry work? 
A carbon registry is like a financial stock exchange in that it puts sellers and buyers together and 
allows them to carry out buying and selling transactions and tracks who owns which VERs and which 
VERs have been retired by whom. Each block of VERs is identified by a unique transaction code in the 
registry so that the life cycle of a particular VER block can be tracked – this history includes: which 
project it originated from and when, who sold it and when, who bought it and when, and who 
retired it and when. In addition, a carbon registry does a number of other things, the foremost being 
that it guarantees that the VERs it has registered conform to a set of standards. These standards 
should be open to the public. The registry also has access to the project documentation (PIN, PDD 
and audit reports) and can make these available to legitimate, interested parties, such as potential 
VER buyers. Generally the registry will issue retirement certificates so that an offset customer has 
evidence of the VERs that have been retired and are eligible for offset purposes. This transaction 
tracking also helps prevent the same credits being retired more than once (Kollmuss et al., 2008:39-
42). 
A successful carbon registry will carry a reasonable stock of audited VERs covering a range of 
projects and will have a track record of selling VERs at competitive prices to a range of buyers – the 
quality of the VER-generating projects and the legitimacy of the VER auditing will contribute to the 
price that its VERs will command (Conte & Kotchen, 2010). The efficiency of the registry’s carbon 
auditing processes will determine the cost to the project of registering its VERs and this cost and the 
VER selling price determines the net carbon revenue available to the project stakeholders.  
To be successful a carbon registry has to be able to convince the project supplying carbon credits 
that the registry will add value by getting a good price for the carbon credits. In order to get a good 
price for its carbon, a registry has to convince potential buyers that the carbon credits and the 
underlying projects are real and the projects have delivered the promised community benefits and 
GHG reductions. One of the ways carbon registries achieve this is to adopt and implement rigorously 
appropriate carbon registry standards. 
2.12.  Carbon registry standards 
2.12.1. Compliance market standards 
The compliance market is regulated by the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) and other market entities 
operating under Kyoto Protocol. The guiding principles of the CDM are strong and simple (Fairhurst 
et al., 2012:15); CDM projects must: 
I. Be approved by the host country and provide benefits to the host country 
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III. Result in measurable climate change mitigation outcomes 
IV. Produce emission reductions that are additional to what would have occurred without the 
project. 
The CDM principles look simple and elegant, but in practice they are difficult to apply because of the 
need to go down into great detail in order to ensure that rules are applied consistently and 
rigorously. Volumes have been written about the CDM and a whole industry has developed around 
the preparation of the required CDM documentation and carrying out the monitoring and 
verification processes (CDM Rulebook, n.d.). 
2.12.2. Voluntary Carbon Market standards 
The VCM is currently fragmented and evolving rapidly. There are many competing registries and 
standards and there is no overall standards body, such as the United Nations and the CDM EB. 
Surprisingly, in spite of this anarchic state of affairs, the VCM is alive and well and growing. For 
instance, the African VCM volumes went from about 3 million tCO2e in 2010 to 8 million tCO2e in 
2011 and the African market value went from US$ 26 million in 2010 to US$ 60  million in 2011 (see 
Appendix B) (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:24)). The growth in the African VCM in terms of 
volume and value continued from 2011 to 2012 although at a much lower rate: the African VCM 
market value went up to US$ 66 million in 2012 caused by small increases in volume and value 
(Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:28 Figure 3). 
The VCM splits neatly into the Type 1 and Type 2 categories.  
The main players in the Type 1 market are the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), the Climate Action 
Reserve (CAR) and the Gold Standard (GS). Together these accounted for 82% of the over-the-
counter (OTC) trade23 in the VCM in 2011 (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:vii).The standards in all 
of these are closely modelled on the CDM standards. 
The Type 2 market is much more diverse in respect of the standards being applied, for instance, in 
addition to the big three standards discussed in Sections 2.12.2.1, 2.12.2.2 and 2.12.2.3, there are 
many more, such as VER+, American Carbon Registry, BMV, CarbonFix, CCB, CCX, GHGS, ISO 
14064/65, J-VER, Panda, Plan Vivo, Social Carbon Mechanism, VER+, Green-e Climate Protocol for 
RE, Green-e Climate Program and others. Three of the biggest standards in terms of traded VER 
volumes using them are described in detail in this section. 
2.12.2.1. Verified Carbon Standard 
This standard was previously known as the Voluntary Carbon Standard. It is London-based and 
operates a VER registry. However, the VCS transaction costs are high because the VCS requires much 
of the CDM overheads; such as the requirement for projects to be audited by a Designated 
Operational Entity24 (DOE) (Fairhurst et al., 2012:47). 
In 2011 VCS projects were traded at an average price of US$ 3.7/tCO2e with a volume of 41 million 
tonnes and 189 projects were validated in 2011 (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:69). 
                                                             
23 OTC. VERs can either be bought through a private carbon exchange or through the OTC market via brokers 
or online carbon stores.  
24
 DOE. The DOE is an independent auditor, accredited by the CDM Executive Board that carries out the 
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2.12.2.2. Climate Action Reserve 
The CAR is only active in the USA and Mexico. It does carbon accounting only and doesn’t track any 
co-benefits such as community development. 
In 2011 CAR projects were traded at an average price of US$ 7.3/tCO2e with a volume of 9 million 
tonnes and 56 projects were validated in 2011 (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:67). 
2.12.2.3. Gold Standard 
The GS started off as an attempt to improve the CDM project screening process so as to get higher 
quality projects into the CDM pipeline. The GS restricted the range of allowable projects to 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. The standard also tightens up on the CDM 
additionality rules, which aim to verify that permanent CO2 reductions are achieved and that the 
projects do improve SD in the project’s host country. Lastly, the GS also forces project developers to 
undertake full stakeholder consultation about all aspects of the project’s impact on the environment 
and the community. The GS covers both CDM projects and VCM projects. The VCM projects are 
limited to those that reduce GHG by less than 5 000 tCO2e per year, these are called Gold Standard 
Micro projects. The GS Foundation has managed to limit the costs to a first year fee of US$ 7 500 and 
an annual fee of US$ 1 500 per year (for a maximum sized project) (Fairhurst et al., 2012:47). 
In 2011 GS projects were traded at an average price of US$ 10.4/tCO2e with a volume of 9 Mt and 50 
projects were validated in 2011 (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:68). 
2.12.2.4. Credible Carbon registry and its standard 
The registry and its standard used in this dissertation as a case study is Credible Carbon – an example 
of a small Type 2 registry (Cartwright, 2012). 
The Credible Carbon standard and guiding principles are simple and are reasonably easy to 
implement in practice. Credible Carbon projects must conform to the following conditions: The 
projects must be real and up and running, hey must reduce carbon and contribute to poverty 
alleviation, 70% of the carbon revenue after audit fees must be returned to the project community, 
the projects must be situated in sub-Saharan Africa and be locally developed, the total VERs of 
carbon sequestration projects, such as tree-planting must comprise less than 25% of total VERs from 
all projects, and lastly, the project deliverables must be audited by recognised carbon project 
auditors.  
In addition, projects must answer four key questions satisfactorily: Is the project real, is the agreed 
technology installed and working according to plan, are the carbon calculations unbiased, verifiable 
and done according to industry-accepted methods, and lastly, is the project making a visible 
difference to poverty in the community? 
The benefit of this type of compact standard is that it is intuitively easy to understand, rather than 
overly legalistic and jargon-dependent, and it is easy to audit for conformance to the standard. 
Because the standard makes sense to people unfamiliar with the carbon market, it means that 
potential buyers have more confidence that they are not buying a lot of hot air. 
Having discussed the carbon markets, carbon pricing and carbon market standards, the next step is 
to examine how this invisible and intangible product, GHG reduction, can be turned into money 
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2.13.  Carbon offsetting 
This is the process of buying VERs (or CERs in the CDM market) from another entity and using them 
to offset one’s own carbon footprint. The idea with offsetting is to first do all one can to reduce 
one’s own carbon emissions by  investing in new, more efficient equipment or changing one’s 
business processes and only then resort to buying offsets. In the compliance market offsets are 
bought in order to meet carbon reduction targets when other methods have been exhausted or 
have become too expensive.  
In the compliance market for the Annex I countries, subject to CDM rules, the principle of 
‘supplementarity’ is applied. This means that a country should reduce its carbon emissions through 
its own efforts before buying supplementary offsets. However, the Kyoto Protocol and CDM do not 
place upper limits on the offset quantities a country can buy; this is left to the individual countries to 
regulate as they wish. For instance, the EU allowable offset percentage ranges from 0% to 20% with 
an average of 12% (Climate Lab, 2009). 
In the VCM, there are no global controls on what percentage of one’s carbon emission reductions 
can be met through offsets. However, such limits are likely to emerge as individual countries and 
companies start applying voluntary emission reductions under cap and trade arrangements. This 
would make sense from the overall climate change point of view as one would want to encourage 
high-emitters to focus on reducing their own emissions first rather than just buying someone else’s 
efforts. From individual companies’ point of view, it makes sense for the company to first get its own 
house in order before resorting to buying offsets, otherwise it risks losing ‘green credibility’ and 
being accused of ‘green-washing’. 
2.13.1. Carbon credit ownership 
The ownership of carbon credits has been identified as a risk area in carbon trading, because 
potential buyers will not be willing to transact unless it is clear who the legal owner of the credits 
and whether any constraints have been imposed on the spending of the resulting carbon revenue 
(Cosbey et al., 2006:115). This applies to both the compliance and voluntary carbon markets. 
Ownership and revenue allocation issues are generally covered in Emission Reduction Purchase 
Agreements (ERPAs) and Voluntary Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements (VERPAs). 
2.13.2. Voluntary carbon market offset buyers 
Peters-Stanley et al suggest that there are two types of buyer: “purely voluntary” and “pre-
compliance” (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011:8). The former generally buy to offset their carbon 
emissions and to satisfy their CSR objectives. The latter buy speculatively, anticipating future 
compliance implementation which would drive up the VER prices. Guigon goes so far as to say: “One 
of the main drivers of the voluntary market is ‘pre-compliance’ market participants who seek early 
climate investments in hopes of gaining a return in the future compliance market.” (Guigon, 2010:3). 
Another aspect of voluntary buyers is that they do not treat VERs as a featureless commodity; rather 
they are interested in the story behind the credits (Taiyab, 2006:19). Such as who benefits from the 
source project, where it is, what technology is being used and what are the impacts on the 
community and the environment (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011:15). Buyers are prepared to pay a 
premium for credits with a good story as mentioned in a 2012 VCM report “Credits with a high 
average price (>$ 8/tCO2e) were transacted by purely voluntary buyers who sought to support 
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2012:31). In 2011 corporate buyers dominated the VCM, accounting for 92% of the transactions. 
These corporate purchases were mostly for CSR and public relations (PR) purposes (54% of the 
total), while resale accounted for another 22% (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:viii). The PR and 
reputation drivers for high prices for “charismatic carbon” are supported in a paper by Conte and 
Kotchen (Conte & Kotchen, 2010:95). 
In South Africa, an added dimension appears to be the need for local export companies to reduce 
their carbon footprint in response to overseas customer pressure (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 
2012:38). In addition to this a South African carbon tax has been proposed by the South African 
National Treasury which includes a mechanism for offsetting carbon emissions by purchasing and 
retiring offsets, is likely to expand the range of VCM offset buyers to include high industrial emitters 
(Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:71). The details of this tax was under discussion at the time of 
writing and was expected to be implemented as from January 2015 (Momoniat & Morden, 2013). 
The motivations of the Global 500 companies with regards to climate change actions and reporting 
on and reducing carbon footprints is interesting in that environmental drivers are definitely affecting 
decision-making in large companies and companies that act on these drivers are rewarded with 
higher stock prices and improved reputation. Companies are also becoming aware of business 
opportunities arising from changing customer behaviour in the light of climate change and low 
carbon strategies (PwC, 2012:5).  
The regional distribution of VER sources and buyers shows that Africa remains a very small player, 
both on the supply and the demand side. This is shown in Table 3. 





America Africa Asia  Oceana Europe Total Percent 








tCO2e M tCO2e % 
North America 20.30 - - - - 1.20 21.50 33.6% 
Latin America 1.10 0.20 - 0.30 1.50 2.80 5.90 9.2% 
Africa 0.70 - - - 0.03 3.90 4.63 7.2% 
Asia  2.50 - - 1.30 1.00 21.50 26.30 41.1% 
Oceana 0.30 - - - 1.80 1.70 3.80 5.9% 
Europe 1.50 - - - - 0.40 1.90 3.0% 
Total (MtCO2e) 26.40 0.20 0.00 1.60 4.33 31.50 64.03 100.0% 
Percent (%) 41.2% 0.3% 0.0% 2.5% 6.8% 49.2% 100.0%   
Source: (Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013) 
Africa supplied 7.2% of the global total of 64 million tCO2e (VERs), with most of the sales volume to 
Europe (84%). It should be noted that these figures are for the Type 2 market (mostly under the VCS 
standard) – similar statistics for the Type 1 market do not appear to be available, neither are 
statistics showing the distribution within Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. 
Increasing awareness of carbon emissions and associated risks and opportunities amongst local 
South African businesses was demonstrated by the Carbon Disclosure Project report for South Africa 
2012 (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2012). The business response rate for the top 100 JSE companies 
was 78% for 2012, down from 83% in 2011, but still the second highest in the world. The responding 
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performance in the various CDP performance categories (with six SA companies now qualifying for 
the Carbon Performance Leadership Index – CPLI).  The extent to which the CDP participants will 
affect the VCM market for VERs in South Africa is unclear. Most of the responding companies appear 
to intend meeting their emission reduction targets through their own efforts (energy efficiency, 
switching to low-carbon energy sources, process changes etc.), rather than by resorting to buying 
carbon emission offsets. Several of the participants aim to generate VERs through their emission 
reduction efforts (e.g. SASSA with solar water heaters, Tsb Sugar and Rainbow through using 
bagasse25 and chicken litter as low-carbon energy sources). Many of the business identified carbon 
taxes as a potential risk to their businesses.  
2.14. What makes a particular carbon registry attractive to a Type 2 
Project? 
This is the crux of the matter – what are Type 2 projects looking for from a carbon registry and how 
best can this be provided? 
From the project proponent’s point of view the best registry will deliver the highest net cash return 
quickly and sustainably and with the least disruption to the project stakeholders. 
To do this the registry must be credible so that its VERs command high prices; this requires 
consistent and rigorous carbon auditing against accepted standards and a track record of high 
quality projects. The project screening and audit processes must be simple and fast so as to keep the 
transaction costs low and deliver rapid results. The registry must have access to appropriate 
potential offset buyers so that VERs can be sold quickly and cost-effectively. The registry must also 
have a good understanding of the project and its deliverables so that it can market the VERs 
effectively. It must have expert knowledge of the different GHG reduction calculation methodologies 
and be able to apply them. The registry must have access to a number of independent carbon 
auditors so as to be able to fit the right auditor to a project. However, even after a project is up and 
running, is reducing GHG emissions and getting revenue by selling its carbon credits and benefitting 
its host community, many contentious questions remain (Chapple, 2008:12-14) 
2.15. Carbon trading issues and debates 
The debates cover a wide range of issues, here a selection: 
 Human induced climate change is not happening and if it was it is not caused by human-
generated GHG emissions, it is just part of natural variations in climate 
 Climate change is much bigger than mere humans and nothing we do will make any 
difference, so why waste money on this 
 Carbon trading doesn’t reduce global GHG emissions, it just gives big polluters the 
opportunity to duck their responsibility to reduce their own emissions and pass the buck 
(and bucks) to others 
 Reducing GHG emissions and poverty alleviation are two separate issues and should be kept 
separate 
 Carbon trading is just a big scam to make money for Western consultants and it doesn’t 
reduce global GHG emissions nor does it benefit the poor 
                                                             
25
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 Throwing money at poverty does not solve the poverty problem and this applies to carbon 
money as well as any other international aid money 
 The most important outcome of carbon trading is to benefit and uplift the project 
communities 
 The most important outcome of carbon trading is technology transfer from the developed to 
the developing world 
The most important outcome of carbon trading is to let the market find and deliver the most cost-
effective way to reduce GHG emissions. The UK’s Department for International Development 
produced a report on similar issues and found widely differing views amongst the various 
participants in the voluntary carbon market (Chapple, 2008). 
Some of these can be dismissed as the ravings of fringe radicals or the opinions of climate change 
denialists, but some of them are important and need to be addressed. The choice of which issues are 
worthy of further discussion is of course subjective, nevertheless, here is one such choice: 
2.15.1.  What is the most important outcome of carbon trading? 
This depends on the point of view:  
From the climate change point of view, the most important result is the cost-effective, global 
reduction in GHG emissions and it doesn’t matter where the reduction happens, as long as the 
emissions are reduced permanently and do not emerge somewhere else due to leakage26(Chapple, 
2008:15). Taiyab defines permanence as the ability of a GHG-reducing project to “weather variability 
and uncertainty in circumstances while continuing to deliver carbon emission reductions”, and 
leakage as the reduction of a project’s carbon reduction that occurs outside the project’s boundary, 
but is due to or related to the project (Taiyab, 2006:4). So, a climate change mitigation practitioner 
might say that cost-effective GHG reduction is the most important outcome of carbon trading. 
From the polluting company’s point of view, GHG emission reduction is mostly, like all other forms of 
regulation, a necessary evil. As long as the playing field is level and the rules are fair, GHG reduction 
can become a business opportunity. Carbon trading adds more flexibility; so if it is cheaper to buy 
carbon offsets rather than to change a manufacturing process, that’s what a business will do. There 
is also considerable debate as to whether the Kyoto Protocol and its CDM is a cost-effective and 
efficient method of reducing CO2 emissions. For instance, Nordhaus and Boyer argue convincingly 
that the CDM is an expensive way of reducing CO2 emissions, with a benefit-cost ratio of only 0.14 
(Nordhaus & Boyer, 1999:34). So, the company might say that meeting its emission reduction targets 
at the least cost is the most important outcome. 
From the polluting country’s point of view, GHG emission reduction is mostly something that its 
government has decided needs to be tackled and the carbon market is an attractive way to do it and 
avoids the need to micro-manage every company. The government just sets up the rules and applies 
them and, out of self-interest, the affected companies will do the right thing. An added benefit is 
that if the carbon money goes to a developing country, it reflects well on the giver and hopefully 
                                                             
26 Leakage is the increase in GHG emissions outside the project’s boundary and caused by the project. For 
example, a project which replaces kerosene with bio-ethanol gel from a constrained source, might cause 
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benefits the receiver. Of course, some countries, notably the US, decided that the Kyoto Protocol 
was not the best way to tackle climate change. The analysis by Nordhaus and Boyer shows that the 
US would have borne the bulk of the costs of the Kyoto Protocol on Annex I countries’ production 
costs, followed by Europe and Japan (Nordhaus & Boyer, 1999:30). So, from the polluting country’s 
point of view, meeting its emission reduction targets at the least cost is the most important outcome. 
From the point of view of the country hosting the carbon reduction projects, it is good from all 
points of view. Foreign money and technology flows in, the local people benefit and the climate 
benefits (Ohlhoff, Markandya, Halsnaes, & Taylor, 2004:11). The desired benefits include social, 
economic, environmental and technological benefits (Olsen & Fenhann, 2008:2821 Table 1). So, for 
the project host country, getting as many projects implemented as quickly as possible, regardless of 
the GHG reductions, as long as they deliver the promised SD benefits, is the best outcome. 
This is presumably why the carbon market has evolved as it has – it attempts to satisfy the needs of 
all the stakeholders – meeting GHG reduction targets at the national and industry level, attracting 
investment into the developing countries to benefit the poor and making or saving money along the 
way. 
2.15.2.  Offsetting re-distributes rather than reduces global GHG emissions 
This is evidently true because the aim of carbon offsetting is not mitigation but rather to provide a 
mechanism for more efficient GHG reductions by allowing a GHG emitter who wishes to or has to 
reduce GHG emissions to purchase carbon credits from another entity which can do it more cost-
effectively. And in the case of the CDM and the VCM, benefit the project which is supplying the 
carbon credits.  
Nevertheless, one can argue that offsetting has helped reduce global GHG emissions by assisting the 
implementation of GHG-reducing projects which would not otherwise have happened. Ulrika Raab in 
her paper on carbon market mechanisms puts the global CDM reductions at more than 1 billion 
tCO2e (Raab, 2012:xiii). The literature i  full of confirmed reductions in GHG emissions – after all, this 
is what the whole, complex and expensive CDM machine is about – making sure that the emissions 
claimed are additional to what would have happened in the absence of the CDM, permanent and do 
not result in leakage (the displacement of the emission reductions to somewhere else, outside the 
project’s boundaries). However, there are also strong views that countries and companies shouldn’t 
be let off the hook by being allowed to buy their way out of their emissions problems through offset 
purchases, rather just force everyone to reduce their emissions for the common good. But it doesn’t 
appear that any government has the stomach to do that unilaterally and who is going to go first and 
put themselves at an economic disadvantage? 
A related question is to do with additionality – would the project that generated and sold the carbon 
credits have gone ahead and reduced emissions anyway, even if there was no market for the carbon 
credits? 
This question is fundamentally difficult to answer, because it depends on what would have 
happened in the absence of the GHG reducing project and carbon trading. Would the developing 
countries have gone ahead anyway and introduced renewable energy, or planted or preserved 
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Another question is: does capping the emissions of a business or a country reduce global GHG 
emissions? If all that happens is that the country/business with an emission cap moves its 
manufacturing offshore to a country/business that doesn’t have a cap, then the global emissions 
have probably not been reduced (Monbiot, 2013). 
This is where the CDM concept of additionality comes in. If the carbon-reducing project would not 
have been done in the absence of carbon trading and carbon offset revenue, then the GHG 
reductions are said to be additional. If the carbon reducing project would have been implemented 
anyway, with or without the carbon revenue, then all that has happened is that the GHG emitter 
who bought the offsets has met its technical GHG reduction obligations, but the total future GHG 
emissions are unchanged because neither party has changed its GHG emissions behaviour from 
business as usual (Schneider, 2009:243). 
So does that mean that the additionality requirement will solve the problem? No, the problem has 
just changed into a new problem, that of proving that a project would not have gone ahead anyway 
– we are back to the unknowable. 
It is relatively easy to make the call with projects such as gas fields venting methane for years and 
then suddenly starting to flare the gas, thereby reducing the effective GHG emissions by converting 
methane into CO2 (methane is about 21 times more potent a global warming agent than CO2). They 
hadn’t bothered to burn the methane before because this didn’t benefit them, but as soon as they 
were paid to do it they did. 
There many examples of dubious additionality claims that have got through the CDM screening 
process. Research done by the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (Wara & Victor, 
2008:13-14) describes the enormous number of new coal power stations that have been built in 
China in the last decade (100 GW per year in 2006 and 2007). The large amount of coal powered 
generation then lead to such serious pollution problems, coupled with coal shortages, that the 
Chinese government changed its energy policies to favour clean energy and this was reflected in the 
Chinese CDM projects in 2007, with almost all new hydro, wind and natural gas projects claiming 
CDM credits. In the opinion of Wara and Victor: “Taken collectively however, these individual 
applications for credit amount to a claim that the hydro, wind, and natural gas elements of the 
power sector in China would not be growing at all without help from CDM. This broader implication 
is simply implausible in light of the state policies…“.  
It is also difficult to decide what would have happened in the absence of carbon revenue with 
something like a government housing improvement project which adds ceiling insulation, energy-
efficient lights and solar water heaters. Kuyasa, which is such a project, reduces GHG emissions by 
about 2.4 tCO2e per household per year (Cosbey, Murphy, Drexhage, & Balint, 2006:119), but would 
the government have done the project anyway? It might have done it anyway, but the presence of 
an extra carbon revenue stream might have made the project more attractive and easier to fund. 
Sections 2.15.1 and 2.15.2 are possible response to two of the many contentious questions that have 
arisen about carbon trading and much research has been done on these. However there do appear 
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2.16. Some notable gaps in the research literature on exploiting 
carbon revenue 
Much has been written about the CDM, VCS, GS and the VCM, but not much about the small end of 
the carbon market. This is understandable because in order to make an impact on global warming, 
enormous reductions of GHG emissions need to be achieved, so large scale interventions are 
required – the Kyoto Protocol and its associated mechanisms was intended to be such a large scale 
intervention. Note that in itself, a perfectly operating CDM would have a net zero effect on emission 
reductions. This is because the notion of offsetting and additionality – if the CERs were truly 
additional then the GHG reductions would exactly balance the emissions the country was trying to 
offset, if not, a net increase in GHG emissions could result (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012:55) Big as the 
CDM’s contribution has been towards meeting the demand for CERs and development finance, it has 
left large gaps. This is evidenced by the low penetration of the CDM in some of the developing and 
least-developed countries (Fenhann, 2012). Therefore other mechanisms are required and there are 
several of these have been proposed at successive COP meetings. Examples are the New Marketing 
Mechanisms (NMMs). 
2.16.1.  New Market Mechanisms 
These are still being fleshed out and it is too early to say what impact the NMMs will have on GHG 
reductions, the carbon offset market and developing countries. The idea behind the NMMs is that 
ALL countries should participate, not just the old Annex I countri s, and that all should strive to 
reduce their own emissions and not just produce offsets for other countries (Raab, 2012:55). There 
will be more flexibility and less prescription and each country will do what is appropriate in that 
country. The outcome will be internationally acceptable emission reduction credits that can be 
traded. However, the NMM mechanism is complicated and it appears all too likely that it will suffer 
from the same problems that beset the CDM – too much bureaucracy resulting in high transaction 
costs and long lead times. Time will tell (Andersone, 2012). Therefore, it doesn’t appear that the 
NMMS will address the plight of small carbon projects which do not deliver big GHG reductions (of 
the order of a few thousand tCO2e per year), but do deliver good community benefits. NMMs will be 
discussed further in the section 2.17.5, page 15. 
2.16.2.  So what is the best strategy for small carbon projects? 
There is not much research literature on using carbon revenue to help finance small SD projects. This 
is probably due to the fact that each project is small in scope, that every project appears to be 
different and that the carbon revenue is too small and the additionality aspect too weak to warrant 
trying to use Type 1 market mechanisms (such a CDM, GS, VCS, etc.). This dissertation aims to fill 
some of these gaps. 
2.17. Major debates 
2.17.1. What would constitute successful carbon trading in the VCM: High offset 
tonnages, large GHG reductions, environmental protection, economic 
development, social development or technology transfer? 
The answer appears to be all of the above, depending on whose point of view is being considered. 
The company buying the offsets wants to get the best value from its money. That usually means 
paying a reasonable price for offsets from a high quality project – high quality in the sense that the 
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The community affected by the project generating the carbon credits wants to get as much money 
from its credits as quickly as possible with as little hassle as possible. The project proponent usually 
wants to deliver the sustainable development first and foremost and sees the carbon revenue as a 
useful co-benefit. 
The host country wants to benefit its people through sustainable development and be able to show 
real GHG emission reductions. 
The carbon registry would like to attract many high quality carbon projects whose VERs are easy to 
sell at high prices and which are easy and clean to audit. 
So the champions of a carbon project should be aware of the different expectations from the 
different stakeholders and plan to satisfy them. 
The answer also depends on which market one is talking about – the compliance market or the 
voluntary market. The compliance market is very definitely mostly about GHG emission reductions, 
whereas in the VCM many buyers consider that “a carbon offset’s contribution to social and 
sustainable development is as important as its climate benefits.” (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 
2012:29). 
2.17.2. What is good sustainable development? 
Once again, the answer will depend on who you ask. The list of desirable SD outcomes might contain 
similar outcomes, but the priority order will vary considerably. 
The community will probably want tangible and immediate benefits, such as improved quality of life, 
improved health and safety, job creation opportunities and poverty alleviation. 
The project proponent should want to deliver what the community wants, but the carbon credit 
purchaser might have different ideas; such as a strong and visible environmental impact. 
(Corbera et al., 2009:33) 
2.17.3. Have the developing countries benefitted from carbon trading? 
If the measure is simply how much outside money has been invested in a country then the answer is 
yes. The CDM investment amounts to US$ 150 billion spread over 4 600 projects since 2005 (Raab, 
2012:xiii) . It gets more complicated when one tries to see in what way the project’s country 
benefitted – the claimed economic benefits (e.g. job creation) are usually high, the claimed 
environmental benefits are middling and the social benefits are almost always very low by 
comparison (UNFCCC, 2012). A cynic might remark that this is exactly what one would expect a 
capitalistic system to deliver – money. There has been a significant amount of technology transfer 
according to studies cited by Ulrika Raab, about a third of CDM projects resulted in technology 
transfer to some degree (Raab, 2012:21). There is some evidence that GHG reduction efficiency and 
SD benefits are always traded off against each other. If a project yields high GHG reductions, it 
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2.17.4. What will happen to the CDM when the current Kyoto commitment period 
expires at the end of 2012 and what will the impact of this be on the voluntary 
carbon market? 
This is important to projects trying to decide whether to use the compliance market or the VCM for 
generating future carbon credits (Michaelowa et al., 2011:21-23). 
The question of what will happen to the Kyoto Protocol at the end of 2012 was not resolved at 
COP 17 in Durban – all that happened was the Parties agreed to come up with a plan and targets to 
be discussed in 2015 and leading up to formal agreements in 2020. The general feeling was that this 
was just not good enough and if no serious emission reductions are achieved until 2015-2020, then 
the global temperature increase will almost certainly not be kept below 2°C.  However, there is also 
increasingly the feeling that the Kyoto Protocol with its present participants does not include enough 
of the big emitters to make a big enough difference. The USA has stated it will not be part of Kyoto 
in its current form, Canada has opted out altogether and Japan and New Zealand will not be part of 
CP 2. The developing country emitters, with China and India being the biggest emitters, have never 
been part of Kyoto and are still arguing for being allowed a period of catch-up growth whilst the 
Annex-1 countries do all the emission reduction work. COP 18, held in Doha in December 2012, has 
firmed up some issues (see section 1.2.1, page 15), but there is still more talk than firm 
commitments and actions. Meanwhile, the CDM and the EU ETS are in trouble as described next. 
As was discussed in the Literature Review (Section 2.7.2, page 32), the compliance carbon prices 
have crashed and are at an all-time low of €2 on the EU ETS (PointCarbon, 2012:6). This is because of 
a continuing surplus of credits and the proposed 2013 allowances appearing to be too generous. So, 
with the carbon price so low, it is difficult to see how the EU ETS can make any impact on emission 
reductions as things stand – the carbon allowances will have to be radically reduced and the CP 1 
surpluses written off instead of being carried over into CP 2. The affected countries and industries, 
still in the grip of a recession and high national debt, will not be happy with any additional financial 
pressure. So more stone-walling and delays in decision-making can probably be expected. The CDM, 
of course, is also affected by low carbon prices, in addition to other problems. 
The CDM has been trying to re-invent itself so as to increase the number and range of projects that it 
can be applied to. This is in response to criticisms that it is not working for the developing countries 
apart from China and India. In an attempt to streamline the CDM processes and reduce the 
transaction costs, the CDM has introduced a number of changes. These include: 
 The Programme of Activities (PoA), which allows a generic project to go through the CDM 
process and then many actual implementations of the generic model can benefit from the 
CDM without each sub-project having to go through the whole process. This does reduce 
the costs and time somewhat, but it is still a challenge for smaller, distributed projects. One 
of the objectives of the PoA is to allow projects to start small and then scale up. An 
encouraging fact for Africa is that 20% of the PoAs registered by 2012 have been in Africa 
(Raab, 2012:20). 
 Simplifying additionality rules. 
 Continually adding new methodologies in an attempt to cover the multitude of different 
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 Standardised baselines and default baseline parameters which will allow projects to choose 
a baseline off-the-shelf instead of having to carry out research and then justify their chosen 
baseline.  
 Providing funding to help projects get themselves validated and registered though grants 
and loans, such as provided by the ACAD Facility (Michaelowa et al., 2011:88). 
No doubt these CDM measures have helped and will help more projects generate revenue from their 
GHG emission reductions, but fundamental problems remain. The PoA process is still complex and 
expensive and will only suit some groups of projects. Simplifying additionality carries the risk of 
further reducing actual global GHG reductions and devaluing CER value even more as buyers lose 
faith in the integrity of the CDM. Standardised baselines introduce new problems, such as under-
crediting some projects and over-crediting others and not taking into account changing trends 
(Schneider et al., 2012). Lastly, loan funding, whilst helping projects get started, can result in loan 
repayment problems later on. What is becoming clear is that the focus of the CDM is moving from 
big developing economies (China, India and Brasil) to the LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa (Raab, 
2012:viii). 
Having discussed the possible future of the CDM and the compliance market post 2012, the question 
of what will happen in the voluntary carbon market can be addressed. 
There is likely to be some degree of pre-compliance27 activity as companies prepare for what their 
government regulators might force on them or whilst waiting for initiatives such as REDD+28 to be 
included in the EU ETS list. This is already happening in the case of  REDD projects which are now 
included in the VCS methodologies and are growing rapidly; as described by Dinesh Babu 
(Michaelowa et al., 2011:101). 
The current focus on CSR has grown, even under adverse economic conditions, and so is likely to 
intensify as business improves. One aspect of CSR in developed countries is the reduction of carbon 
footprints in businesses; therefore if CSR activities grow, then so will the need for carbon footprint 
reduction and hence the need for VERs for offsetting purposes. 
On the downside, if the CDM falls out of favour and no one wants to buy CERs, then many CDM 
projects will turn to the VCM hoping to sell their credits there. Given the relative size29 of the 
compliance market and the VCM, the VCM is likely to be flooded with CERs. The additional CERs 
could amount to 1 billion tCO2e by 2020 in a VCM sized at 95 million tCO2e in 2011 (Michaelowa et 
al., 2011:108; Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012:12). At this stage, national regulation is likely to play 
a part, in that governments might prefer their industries to buy voluntary carbon credits from local 
carbon projects rather than from somewhere else – thus keeping the economic and social benefits 
within the country. However, without regulation or specific CSR pressure to stay local, corporations 
are likely to shop around for the cheapest offsets. 
                                                             
27 Pre-compliance is the practice of companies hedging their bets by voluntarily reducing their emissions in 
expectation of being forced to do so in the near future. 
28 REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. 
29
 In 2011 the VCM was about 1% of the total global carbon market in terms of transacted tonnes (Peters-
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2.17.5. What is the likely impact of the New Market Mechanisms on the carbon 
markets? 
The new market mechanisms (NMMs) and other flexible mechanisms are emerging from the Bali 
Action Plan, the Cancun Agreement, the COP 17 in Durban and the COP 18 in Doha. They are 
intended to provide more flexibility in the GHG emission reduction systems and markets in the 150 
non-Annex-1 countries. In Ulrike Raab’s words, the NMMs “… should stimulate mitigation action 
across broad segments of the economy. The mechanism should safeguard environmental integrity 
and ensure a net decrease/avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions” (Raab, 2012:xvii). This sounds 
very much like the CDM, and it is, but the big difference is that NMMs will focus on whole sectors of 
a country’s economy, not just on specific projects. Also, the policing of the schemes will rely much 
more on the host country instead of single global managing entity such as the CDM EB. Of course 
NMMs will probably introduce a whole new set of problems such as how to calculate emissions 
reductions across a non-homogenous group of emitters (Raab, 2012:xvii). 
One of the NMMS is the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) scheme, see page 60. 
The take-up of NAMAs by the target countries has been good, with more than 50 countries having 
submitted NAMA proposals by early 2012 (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012:62).   
Another is REDD+, which allows countries which look after their forests by avoiding deforestation 
and forest degradation or even planting new forests, to claim carbon credits.  
Another is sectoral crediting and trading. Instead of measuring GHG reductions for a particular 
project or PoA group, the sectoral approach manages the emissions from defined sectors. An 
emission target for a particular sector, for instance electricity generation, will be defined by the host 
country. If that sector manages to get its emissions below the target it is awarded sectoral credits. 
With sectoral trading, a form of cap-and-trade system, a cap for the sector is set and the country 
would be issued with an appropriate number of tradable units. These credits can then be kept or 
traded (Michaelowa et al., 2011:116). How fungible the credits are in practice will depend on the 
governance mechanisms, so it is hoped that these will not get over-complicated and expensive to 
apply. 
Japan, having opted out of any Kyoto CP 2 commitments is embarking on its own scheme, BOCM as 
discussed in the section on emission trading systems in developed nations (see Section 2.7.3, page 
35).  
It is still too early to see exactly what the NMMs will consist of let alone estimate their impact on the 
carbon market. Nevertheless it is worth having a brief look at what is evolving and attempting to 
assess what impact the NMM might have. 
The NMMs started with the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) at Bali in 2007. The 
idea behind NAMAs was to move beyond the rigid CDM structures let the host countries put forward 
emission reduction proposals that would suit their circumstances. By doing this it was hoped that 
developing countries would become more proactive in conceiving and implementing GHG reduction 
projects. The NAMA framework is starting to take shape – there are two main types; unilateral 
NAMAs and supported NAMAs. The unilateral NAMAs are funded and implemented by the host 
country itself, whereas the supported NAMAs are those which only get carried out if they get 
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all the necessary information required to attract and inform potential investors/buyers. The details 
of the registry were finalised at COP 18 in December 2012 and a “fully operational, dynamic web-
based registry” will be implemented by September 2013 (Climate Connect, 2012:3). Other parts of 
the NAMA system include reporting processes, standards, guidelines and verification processes. 
The evolution of climate change mitigation mechanisms is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Evolution of carbon market mechanisms 
Source: (Raab, 2012:72 Figure 5) 
So what will this evolution of the compliance market mean to the VCM? 
It is probably bad news for the VCM, in that if the compliance market really succeeds and 
successfully caters for small, diffuse projects, then the main reason for the existence of the VCM falls 
away. However, some researchers, such as Guigon, see an on-going role for the VCM in providing a 
platform for learning and innovation, field-testing new mechanisms and standards, capacity-building 
in developing countries and offering pre-compliance opportunities (Guigon, 2010). 
3. Methodology 
This chapter will describe methodology relevant to this dissertation from two points of view. Firstly 
the research methodology used and secondly the functional methodology of GHG reduction 
measurement, carbon market analysis and measuring community impacts. 
Firstly, the author would like to make it clear that he is strongly in favour of using carbon trading 
both as a means of reducing GHG emissions efficiently and also as an excellent way of providing 
additional revenue and technology to get small, SD carbon projects implemented. These are often 
projects that otherwise would not have got off the ground. So there will be some bias in the 
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"Research is not helped by making it appear value free. It is better to give the reader a 
good look at the researcher. Often it is better to leave on the wrappings of advocacy 
that remind the reader: Beware." (Stake, 1995:95) 
Secondly, the generalisations made here are, in the words of Robert Stake (Stake, 1995:7): “petite 
generalisations”, which apply to the case considered here and cannot therefore be safely 
generalised to all carbon projects. To be able to get enough evidence to provide “grand 
generalisations” is beyond the scope of this research. 
Thirdly, on the question of validation of case study data, the case work researcher should carry out 
some “triangulation” – Denzin (as cited in Stake, 1995:112-114) identifies four categories of 
triangulation: 
 Data source triangulation (where one looks at similar cases at other times and in other 
places, or with different people being involved) 
 Investigator triangulation (where another researcher is engaged to repeat the research) 
 Theory triangulation (conduct a peer review by researchers coming from a different 
theoretical angle) 
 Methodological triangulation (using multiple methods to study the same case from 
different viewpoints) 
However, although it was not possible to achieve these levels of validation, some degree of cross-
checking and triangulation on the case study information was possible: for instance, at least six 
different people from three different organisations were involved in drawing up the Umdoni 
documentation (namely Anton Cartwright and Derek Morgan of PACE, Carl Wesselink and Shanaaz 
Moosa then of SouthSouthNorth, and Margaret McKenzie and Amanda Botes of Urban Earth). Also, 
personal interviews were held with Anton Cartwright (PACE), Nana Ndlovu of PPT and Siya 
Hlongwane of the Umdoni Municipality – these participants provided some first-hand descriptions of 
some aspects of the Umdoni case study.  
3.1. Research methodology 
There are a number of ways this dissertation could have been approached, such as: 
 A high level data analysis of the publically available data from the various carbon market 
registers – This was not feasible because suitably detailed project information is not readily 
available from sources such as the CDM pipeline, the GS database and the VCS database for 
example. There is data on GHG reductions and CDM methodologies used, but nothing much 
on project organisation, project costs, stakeholder engagement and community benefits 
achieved. 
 Field surveys of suitable projects and structured interviews with the relevant participants – 
This would have been ideal, but time and cost constraints prevented this approach. 
 Multiple, detailed case studies of projects so that a comparative analysis of similar projects 
could be carried out – This would also have been good, but once again, the lack of readily 
available information in sufficient detail and time and cost constraints meant that this 
approach was not feasible in this case. 
 A single unique case chosen for its relevance, generalisability, convenience, quality of 
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Therefore, after considerable investigation into the alternatives, a deep dive into a single case study 
was chosen. 
Case studies are well-suited to this dissertation, where the research questions are about “how” and 
“why” as shown in Table 4 (Yin, 2009:8). A new column has been added to Yin’s table indicating the 
suitability or not of each strategy for this particular dissertation. 
Table 4: Research methodology choice 









Suitability for this 
dissertation 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes Can’t control 
events in the field 




No Yes Would be suitable, 
but time and cost 







No Yes/no Would be suitable, 
but doesn’t 
address the “why” 
question 
History How, why No No Up to date 
information is 
required 
Case study How, why No Yes This was the 
chosen method for 
this dissertation 
Source: (Yin, 2009:8) 
Choosing a single case study has several advantages. Within the available resources it is possible to 
gather detailed information on the project’s history, who the stakeholders are, how the project was 
organised and is being managed, what the problems were and how these were overcome and how 
the project community has benefitted. A number of personal, unstructured interviews with some of 
the participants were also carried out and these gave a deeper insight into the project than could be 
obtained from the formal reports and audits. The chosen case study project was then be analysed 
against the backdrop of what happens to similar projects that have chosen the Type 1 Market route 
(e.g. CDM, GS and VCS). However there are some problems associated with limiting the analysis to a 
single case study. 
The main shortcoming of using a single case study is that it is difficult to generalise and extrapolate 
the findings to similar projects and thereby establish how replicable the project might be. To do this, 
one would have to repeat the detailed case study analysis with a large number of other projects and 
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many of us case-workers feel that good instrumental30 case study does not depend on being able to 
defend the typicality of ”31  
Nevertheless case study methodology is powerful, as Baxter and Jack (Baxter & Jack, 2008:556) 
conclude:  
“Case study research is more than simply conducting research on a single individual or situation. This 
approach has the potential to deal with simple through complex situations. It enables the researcher to 
answer “how” and “why” type questions, while taking into consideration how a phenomenon is influenced 
by the context within which it is situated. For the novice research a case study is an excellent opportunity to 
gain tremendous insight into a case. It enables the researcher to gather data from a variety of sources and 
to converge the data to illuminate the case.”  
Finally, this dissertation has researched the compliance and voluntary carbon markets in order to 
understand the main factors affecting small carbon projects and then has used this knowledge to 
understand why the chosen case study was successful in its generation of carbon revenue.  
3.2. Research design 
According to Yin, good case study research design should include: the research questions, possibly a 
hypothesis, the unit of analysis (scope of the research), data collection needed to address the 
research questions/hypothesis and finally, how the results will be interpreted (Yin, 2009:27). 
3.2.1. Research questions 
Choosing the right questions is as important as finding the answers and often more difficult, as Stake 
says, we need to find questions “that will direct the looking and thinking enough and not too much” 
(Stake, 1995:15). This dissertation started off with much broader questions and they were narrowed 
down as the research progressed – this was the final result: 
 What are the main factors that contribute to the effective generation of net-positive carbon 
revenue from small, SSA projects? 
o How can these factors be managed so as to maximise the net carbon revenue? 
3.2.2. Unit of analysis 
This is about what the case study covered and it is important to define this widely enough so that 
the research questions and the hypothesis could be adequately covered, but narrowly enough so 
that the work involved was feasible within the skills and time and money resources of the researcher 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008:545; Yin, 2009:21). In this dissertation, possible units of analysis could have 
been: 
 CDM and VCM in Africa – probably too broad 
 VCM projects in Africa – probably too broad 
 Small community projects and how they are funded – probably too broad 
 VCM carbon registries – probably too broad 
The unit of analysis was narrowed down to something manageable but still useful – the chosen unit 
of analysis is: small, poverty-alleviating projects which successfully manage to capture a useful 
                                                             
30 An instrumental case study is one which seeks to be instrumental in achieving something other than pure 
understanding (Stake, 1995:3) 
31
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amount of net carbon revenue. This process of defining the scope more tightly is also known as 
“binding”. Baxter and Jack describe a number of ways a case can be bound, and that is using 
different combinations of where, when, what type of activity and the context (Baxter & Jack, 
2008:546).  
The last two items on Yin’s list of five research design must-haves are data collection and the 
interpretation of the results. 
3.2.3. Data collection 
The relevant data comprised information about the carbon markets and the case study needed to 
allow the key carbon project enablers and disablers to be identified in order to answer the research 
question which sought to establish the main factors that contribute to the generation of carbon 
revenue from small, SSA projects. 
The data collection process involved the following: 
 Desktop research into: climate change, the UNFCCC, CDM, the nature and theory of carbon 
markets, carbon market standards, carbon pricing, carbon projects, carbon taxes, GHG 
reduction calculation methodologies, reports and documentation relating to the case study, 
etc. 
 Meetings and interviews with people in the carbon business and associated with the case 
study project. Three key people were interviewed during this dissertation’s research – these 
were:  
o Anton Cartwright of PACE and Credible Carbon, he is an economist and a carbon 
market expert 
o Nana Ndlovu, a project developer working for PPT 
o Siya Hlongwane, of the Umdoni Municipality and responsible for the Umdoni gel fuel 
project. 
 The author’s own work as a consultant working for PACE and Credible Carbon. The 
information gathered in this way can be described as “Mode 2” knowledge which is 
knowledge produced in the process of finding and applying solutions to work-place 
problems (Gibbons et al., 1994:3-16). Gibbons et al. argue that although this knowledge is 
not contained or processed in an academic discipline, it can nonetheless be just as useful as 
traditional, peer-reviewed information. 
Once the data had been obtained, the next step was to analyse and interpret the data. 
3.2.4. Interpretation of the results 
The context in which the chosen case study project operates was analysed and compared to the 
CDM and big VCM contexts in order to identify the main factors that contribute to the effective 
generation of net-positive carbon revenue from small, SSA projects. Note that this study is 
essentially qualitative rather than quantitative, so the plausibility of the interpretation depends on 
making logical connections and linkages rather than on statistical tests aimed at proving correlations 
and causations.   
3.2.5. Case study choice 
A number of candidate subjects for the case study were found and evaluated, these included both 
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 Reliance Compost, Western Cape, South Africa (Cartwright, 2012) 
 Kuyasa housing improvement project, Western Cape, South Africa (Kuyasa CDM, 2010) 
 Cosmo City housing improvement project, Gauteng, South Africa (City-of-Johannesburg, 
n.d.) 
 Cato Manor housing improvement project, KZN, South Africa (Moosa, 2011) 
 LifeStraw water purification project, Kenya (Vestergaard-Fransen, 2011) 
 Hout Bay Recycling Co-op Project, Western Cape, South Africa (Lin & Cartwright, 2012)  
 Umdoni bio-ethanol gel fuel project, KZN, South Africa (Atkins & Prasad, 2012) 
The criteria used to select a suitable case study are best described as relevance, generalisability, 
ease of access to the data, extent and quality of documentation, availability of the role players and 
ease of access to them and the project’s life-cycle stage. Robert Stake, discussing case selection, 
suggests choosing cases which maximise learning, are easy to get to and whose participants are 
cooperative, but cases that are too atypical of the field under study should not be chosen (Stake, 
1995:4). 
This is how the selection process unfolded: 
Kuyasa – This is a CDM GS project so it was ruled out on relevance as I was looking for a VCM 
project. 
Cosmo City – This is also a CDM project, based on Kuyasa but it hasn’t been implemented yet, so it 
was also ruled out. 
Cato Manor – This was a definite possibility, but the project is still in its early stages and has not yet 
had its first carbon audit. 
Lifestraw – This one was too big and too far away. 
Hout Bay Recycling Co-op – Interesting, but too small in terms of GHG reductions. 
The Umdoni project had all the right attributes for this case study and was therefore chosen.  
It was relevant in that it is a poverty-alleviating project, it exploits the pro-poor part of South Africa’s 
energy policy, and it is highly replicable because there are many similar communities where its 
lessons could be applied. 
The ease of access to the data and data quality and detail criteria were satisfied, because the 
researcher had access to both the project documentation and also the carbon registry data. 
The role player access was no problem because of the connections with the businesses, Promotion 
of Access to Carbon Equity (PACE) and Credible Carbon, of which the researcher is a part. PACE is a 
project proponent and Credible Carbon a VCM registry. 
Life-cycle stage: The project was mature and had been through two carbon audits by two different 
auditors with different approaches.  
3.3. Functional methodology 
3.3.1. Carbon project impacts on emissions and development 
3.3.1.1. Measurement of emission reduction 
The CDM has developed hundreds of “methodologies” or calculation methods for estimating GHG 
emission reductions, together with processes and auditors to check the accuracy of the emission 
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processes are expensive and take a long time, but they do provide strong assurances that the 
emission reductions are happening. These methodologies can be found on the CDM website 
(UNFCCC-CDM, 2012a). The UNEP Risoe Centre maintains a spreadsheet of CDM projects, 
methodologies used and how far each project has progressed in the CDM process (Fenhann & UNEP 
Risoe Centre, 2008). 
The list of approved methodologies is continually growing and at any time there is a queue of 
proposed new methodologies waiting for the CDM EB to give their stamp of approval so that they 
can be used by carbon projects. The methodologies cover every conceivable method of reducing 
GHG emissions, including from large-scale industrial applications such as flaring (burning) GHGs 
instead of venting them, destroying CFCs, improving energy efficiency, switching fuels from fossil 
fuels to carbon-neutral bio-fuels, growing forests, and more controversially, agreeing not to cut 
down forests. Some of these are easy to measure, such as burning methane instead of just venting 
it, but others are more complicated (UNFCCC-CDM, 2012a).  
In all cases the process starts with establishing the “baseline” against which the project’s impacts 
will be measured. The first step is to decide on the project boundary, which is often not as easy as it 
sounds – the words used by the CDM are “The project boundary shall encompass all anthropogenic 
emissions by sources of greenhouse gases under the control of the project participants that are 
significant and reasonably attributable to the CDM project activity.” (CDM Rulebook, n.d.). The idea 
of the project boundary is to closely define exactly which emissions are “in” and which are “not” so 
as to avoid double-counting of emission reductions when projects might overlap and so that the 
auditors know what has to be checked. Having decided on the project boundary, the next step is to 
define the baseline and to calculate the anticipated emission reductions – see Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Baseline and emission reductions 
Source: Author’s own diagram 
The baseline emissions are those that would have occurred in the absence of the project being 
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not implemented? This immediately raises many questions, because one just doesn’t know what 
might have happened over the next few years which would have affected GHG emissions within the 
project boundary. In the end the authors of the PIN will decide on a baseline methodology and put 
forward supporting arguments for its choice. Later, the CDM EB will review the PDD and decide if the 
baseline is reasonable or not (CDM Rulebook, n.d.). A monitoring methodology must always be 
chosen to match the baseline methodology.  
The process in Type 2 markets is similar, except the project proponent chooses and applies the 
methodology which is later reviewed by the carbon auditor after the project has run for a period 
(usually a year) and changed if the auditor sees fit. The Umdoni case study (Section 4, page 69), for 
example, used the Type II–E Energy Efficiency and Fuel Switching for Buildings methodology 
(UNFCCC-CDM, 2012a). In this methodology the baseline is calculated assuming that the existing fuel 
(assumed to be paraffin for Umdoni) will continue to be used and the emissions are calculated using 
approved emission factors (the emission factor for paraffin was 2.5421 kgs CO2e per litre of paraffin 
(DEFRA, 2011:8 Table 1b). Then the emissions are re-calculated using the intervention technology 
instead of the existing one – for the Umdoni case study, this involved calculating the emissions 
produced by using bio-ethanol gel stoves instead of paraffin stoves for a portion of the time 
determined by the amount of gel fuel and its usage rate (Section 4.4.5.1, page 75). The difference 
between the two emission quantities is the emission reduction attributable to the project (in Figure 
9, page 67, this would be the area between the business-as-usual baseline and the baseline after 
emission reduction). The CDM website (http://cdm.unfccc.int/) provides all the required information 
to make the correct choice of methodology and apply it.  
3.3.1.2. Assessment of sustainable development impact 
As was from the literature review (see Section 2.10.1 page 15), SD appears to be difficult to define 
and quantify, but easy to see when it is there. The Credible Carbon standard does require its projects 
to deliver SD benefits although it does not specify a quantitative method to be used. This is because 
the inherent difficulty of measuring SD would drive up the costs of project preparation and 
subsequent audits and because there is no guarantee that the resulting metrics would be 
meaningful (Cartwright, personal communications, 2012 on various dates). Nevertheless, the 
Credible Carbon standard does address the SD impact issue through one of its four audit questions: 
Is the project making a visible difference to poverty in the community? (See Section 2.12.2.4 page 
49). It is left up to the project proponent to describe the expected SD benefits in the PIN and the 
carbon auditors to interpret and answer this question in their audits. The SD impacts in the Umdoni 
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4. Umdoni case study 
4.1. Introduction 
The Umdoni case study was presented at the “Strategies to overcome poverty and inequality: 
Towards Carnegie III” conference at UCT in September 2012 and much of this chapter comes directly 
from the conference paper (Atkins & Prasad, 2012). 
This chapter describes the process of how a poor community in Umdoni, KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), South 
Africa achieved GHG reductions and converted these into carbon revenues and then recycled the 
bulk of the revenue back into their community. A voluntary carbon project proponent (PACE) and 
registry (Credible Carbon), specialising in poverty alleviation projects, assisted the community with 
the project preparation and the auditing, registering and selling of the carbon credits. The project, 
Umdoni Gel Stoves, is a ‘fuel-switching’ project which makes use of bio-ethanol gel supplied under 
the South African Government’s Free Basic Alternative Energy (FBAE) policy, and using gel stoves 
supplied by donors and local government (DME, 2007). 
The project enabled poor households to partially displace wood, paraffin and dung fuel sources with 
cleaner-burning bio-ethanol gel (a by-product of the local sugarcane industry). This results in:  
 reduced paraffin fire threat and indoor air pollution, mainly affecting women and children 
 less time spent collecting firewood, especially by women and children 
 reduced household expenditure on energy 
 conservation of dung on croplands with the associated improved soil fertility 
 creation of sustainable village businesses selling and distributing the bio-ethanol gel 
 reduced GHG emissions. 
The bulk of the carbon revenue (70%) went back to the community and is being used in ways 
determined by them. The remainder of the revenue covers project management and carbon registry 
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4.2. Umdoni Gel Fuel low Income Housing Project 
     
Map of SA with Umdoni in Kwazulu-Natal                                  Map of Umdoni Municipal area 
Source: (Statistics South Africa, 2011)                                          Source: (Umdoni Municipality, 2009) 
Figure 10: Map of Umdoni Municipal area  
                                                                   
The Umdoni Local Municipality, part of the Ugu District municipality, is on the east coast of South 
Africa in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). It has a population of 75 000 people in about 20 000 
households. It is a predominantly poor area, with high unemployment and is approximately half 
rural and half urban. The map in Figure 5 shows the Umdoni area highlighted on the lower eastern 
coast.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
4.3. How the Umdoni project started 
The project was not initially conceived as a GHG reduction project which would attract carbon 
revenue, rather it formed part of the Umdoni Municipality’s drive to implement its Free Basic 
Alternative Energy (FBAE) obligations under the South African FBAE Policy (DME, 2007). South Africa 
also has a Free Basic Electricity Policy (FBE) (DME, 2003). This policy provides grid-connected 
households, which have monthly energy consumption below a certain threshold, with an initial 
amount of free basic electricity, currently this is 50 kWh/household/month in most areas (Ekurhuleni 
provides 100 kWh/household/month) (Ballantyne, 2012). The qualifying monthly energy threshold, 
which is used as a proxy for selecting poor or indigent households, also varies across the country – 
for instance, for Eskom32 customers in cities it is  < 250 kWh/household/month, whilst in the Cape 
Town municipal supply area it is < 450 kWh/household/month (Ballantyne, 2012). 
However, 25% (12.5 million) of South Africa’s population are not grid-connected (DOE, 2012) and 
cannot benefit from the FBE. Note that the 2011 South African census reports that 84.7% of 
                                                             
32
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households used electricity for lighting and 73.9% for cooking (Statistics South Africa, 2011:55). The 
FBAE policy refers to eligible households as being in areas where “no electricity infrastructure 
exists”, so it is debateable whether to use the 75% figure from the DOE or the 73.9% to 84.7% from 
the census.  
Instead they are covered by the FBAE which aims to provide indigent households with alternate 
forms of energy equivalent to that received by FBE beneficiaries. In the DME Policy document this is 
specified as alternate energy to the value of R 55 per household per month. This amount to be 
escalated by the South African inflation rate plus 1.5%, 2012, this would come to 
R81.45/household/month.33 Umdoni Municipality, after discussions with the proposed Umdoni pilot 
community of 4 000 households, chose to implement FBAE allowance as 7 litres of bio-ethanol gel 
fuel per household per month for the pilot community (this was intitialy 5 litres/month/household) 
(Umdoni, 2011:179). KwaZulu-Natal is home to large sugar industries of which bio-ethanol 
production forms part, so this choice appeared to be sensible (Cartwright, 2007).  The ethanol stoves 
were funded by the Umdoni Municipality with some contribution from USAid donations (Siya 
Hlongwane, Umdoni Municipality, personal interview, 2012 September 26) . At this stage PACE, the 
future project proponent, and Project Preparation Trust (PPT), as a project developer, started to get 
involved and developed the plan to capture carbon revenue for the project (Ngubane, 2012). The 
stakeholders involved were: the Umdoni pilot community, the Umdoni Municipality, PPT, PACE and 
Credible Carbon and its carbon auditors. 
  
Figure 11: Umdoni residents collecting their gel fuel 
Source: (Cartwright, 2012) Credible Carbon Projects 
4.4. The process to generate carbon revenue 
The first step was to formalise the project by negotiating and producing a set of documents. This was 
managed by PACE and PPT, working with all the stakeholders. The set of documents comprised: The 
Project Idea Note (PIN), the Umdoni Verification Report, Umdoni Audit reports, agreements with the 
Umdoni Municipality, PPT and the carbon auditors. These are described next in Section 4.4.1. 
                                                             
33 See Appendix C. The 2012 price for bio-ethanol gel fuel is about R 70 for 7 litres (Adrienne Barrett of 
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4.4.1. Project Idea Note – PIN 2008  
This was prepared by Derek Morgan and Anton Cartwright of PACE (Morgan & Cartwright, 2008). 
The PIN identified the project name, the partners, location, the project boundaries, the 1 July 2008 
commencement date and the 10 year duration. 
The project was described as comprising 4 000 volunteer households who would be supplied with 
bio-ethanol gel cooking stoves and 7 litres of bio-ethanol gel per household per month. The benefits 
were described as (Morgan & Cartwright, 2008:3): 
 Fewer accidental indoor fires as ethanol gel is safer than paraffin 
 Less air pollution in houses 
 Reduced firewood collection 
 Less money spent on household energy 
 Improved soil quality as more cattle dung would be left on the fields 
 Reduction in GHG emissions as bio-ethanol gel is effectively carbon neutral 
 Opportunities for local businesses for the distribution and sale of the gel fuel 
 Providing a model for replication of similar projects elsewhere 
 Part of the implementation would be training for the Umdoni community, working with the 
Umdoni Municipal resources. The training and awareness-raising would include how to 
maintain and use the stoves, the problems caused by unsustainable firewood gathering, 
paraffin fire danger and the health impacts of indoor air pollution. Where the demand for 
the gel stoves exceeds supply, preference would be given to female- and child-headed 
households as these were thought to be the most needy. 
4.4.2. Baseline methodologies, calculations and assumptions  
See Section 8.4 Appendix D, Table 9 for the PIN 2008 calculations. Note that there were some errors 
in the original PIN 2008 and these have been shown in the table. The CDM methodology chosen for 
calculating the carbon emission reductions was the Type II–E Energy Efficiency and Fuel Switching for 
Buildings methodology (UNFCCC-CDM, 2012a). The advantage of choosing an existing, globally 
endorsed calculation method such as this is that it adds credibility to the VERs and saves time and 
money by not having to develop and prove a new methodology, also carbon auditors would be 
familiar with it and have access to resources and precedents. 
Part of these methodologies involves calculating the “baseline” (see Figure 9, page 67). The baseline 
is a forecast of what the GHG emissions would have been if the project intervention hadn’t 
happened. In Umdoni’s case the business-as-usual (BAU) baseline assumed that the households 
would have used paraffin if the gel fuel had not been present. In the PIN it was argued that this 
assumption was conservative (in that it would understate the actual GHG emissions in a BAU case, 
which would have used an unknown mixture of wood and dung, some of which is unsustainable) 
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This is where problems can arise because one rarely has enough actual information to prove the 
validity of the assumptions and gathering the required information takes time and raises the project 
costs. In the case of Type 1 projects, much time and effort is invested into trying to firm up the 
baseline, with debatable benefits – a lot of paper is generated, but one is still left with assumptions 
about what would have happened in the absence of the project. 
The baseline further assumed that households typically boil 22 litres of water per day (Section 8.4 
Appendix D, Table 9, Row 18); from that the required energy can be calculated and the amount of 
paraffin required to provide that energy. This again involved a trade-off between making broad-
based assumptions about actual heated water quantities and actual paraffin stove efficiencies or 
doing a full-blown research project to get possibly better figures. The calculation finally came up 
with carbon emissions of 1.02 tCO2e/household/year for the paraffin baseline as detailed in Section 
8.4 Appendix D, Table 9 Row 28. 
At this stage a questionable assumption was made. This was that because 7 litres of gel fuel typically 
only lasts a household for seven days a month the VER revenue would be used to buy additional 15 l 
of gel fuel per month, which would then be enough for the whole month. Unfortunately, this 
additional fuel was never bought (due to having to wait for the project to roll out, get the audits 
done, sell the credits and for the community to decide what it wanted to do with the money). 
Consequently, the gel fuel only lasted for a quarter of the month, whilst the calculations assumed 
the whole month, so the carbon savings were overstated (Table 9, page 96, Row 33 and 35). In 
addition, an error was made in the gel fuel emission factor calculation (Table 9, page 96, Row 11). As 
discussed in the 2012 audit (Section 4.4.5, page75), it could also have been argued that a logic error 
was made in the PIN 2008, in that gel fuel should be considered to be carbon neutral seeing as it is 
produced from a renewable and sustainable source (sugar cane waste). 
In any event, the Umdoni project went ahead with assumed (incorrect) carbon reductions of 
between 2 600 tCO2e and 3 500 tCO2e per year, depending on how many stoves would actually be 
rolled out. Once the roll-out had progressed for a few years, a carbon auditor was engaged to do the 
first verification report, described next. 
4.4.3. Umdoni Verification Report 2011 
This was prepared by SouthSouthNorth (Wesselink & Moosa, 2011). 
The report was based on a review of the PIN documentation, a site visit and some interviews with 
the key participants and was based on Credible Carbon/PACE’s four key principles, shown with 
quotes from the audit findings: 
 Is the project real and working as planned? – “Yes” 
 Are the agreed technologies in place and working? – “Yes, with some reservations about 
stove maintenance being required” (the Umdoni Municipality subsequently replaced all the 
damaged stoves at its own expense). 
 Are the estimated GHG reductions “plausible and unbiased”? – “Yes, but the auditors 
proposed a different calculation method, which came to similar figures as in the original PIN, 
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 Can the poverty alleviation impact be readily seen? – “Yes” 
The SD impacts were described in the audit as stemming from cost savings due to buying less 
paraffin, worth about R50-R70 per household per month, labour saving through not having to collect 
as much wood and dung fuel (not quantified), possible reduced respiratory problems through 
improved indoor air quality, and reduced accident risk because the gel fuel stoves were intrinsically 
safe (Wesselink & Moosa, 2011:2). The audit report went on to say that although these poverty 
alleviation benefits might appear to be low, they are significant relative to the prevailing levels of 
poverty in the Umdoni community. Also the project helped facilitate the implementation of the FBAE 
policy in Umdoni. 
So, based on this audit, all looked in order and the baseline calculations, although done in a different 
and simpler way, reinforced the original PIN 2008 emission reductions. 
4.4.3.1. Baseline methodologies, calculations and assumptions 
Some simple tests done as part of the audit confirmed that the gel fuel did typically last for about 
seven days each month, which confirmed the assumption that gel fuel displaced about one quarter 
of a typical household water heating energy consumption. The audit then said “if the estimate of 4 
tons of emissions (from cooking and water heating) per annum per household is accurate, then the 
displacement of 1 tCO2 per household per year through the use of gel fuel is plausible and unbiased, 
given the relative emissions of gel fuel, compared to paraffin.” (Wesselink & Moosa, 2011). 
However, this author has been unable to establish where the four tonnes of emissions per year per 
household assumption came from or whether the quantity of water heated is 22 litres or 88 litres – 
and these are crucial to the calculation of the baseline.  
4.4.3.2. SD benefits 
The SD impacts were described in the audit as stemming from cost savings due to buying less 
paraffin, worth about R50-R70 per household per month, labour saving through not having to collect 
as much wood and dung fuel (not quantified), possible reduced respiratory problems through 
improved indoor air quality, and reduced accident risk because the gel fuel stoves were intrinsically 
safe (Wesselink & Moosa, 2011:2). The audit report went on to say that although these poverty 
alleviation benefits might appear to be low, they are significant relative to the prevailing levels of 
poverty in the Umdoni community. Also the project helped facilitate the implementation of the FBAE 
policy in Umdoni. 
Following on the 2011 audit, the PIN was updated to reflect the adjusted calculation method and the 
new assumptions, as is normal practice for carbon reduction projects. It is shown in Section 4.4.5 
(page 75) that the second audit, done in 2012, used a third calculation method that depended on the 
relative amount of paraffin versus gel fuel needed to provide the typical daily energy requirement 
for these households – and this method detected and corrected the errors in the original PIN and 
revised the optimistic assumptions made in the first audit. 
4.4.4. Updated PIN December 2011 
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The updated PIN reflects the 2011 audit findings and calculations as detailed in Section 4.4.3, that is 
GHG emission reductions of 5 535 tCO2 for the period 2008 to 2010 plus the other community 
benefits described in Section 4.4.3.  
Then, as is good practice in the carbon offset project world, a second audit was commissioned in 
2012. The intention was to make sure the project was still delivering as promised and update the 
GHG reduction calculations if required. This was done by a different auditor to the previous one, also 
good practice – to get a fresh and possibly different view. 
4.4.5. Umdoni Verification Report 2012 
The audit was carried out by Urban Earth (Mckenzie & Botes, 2012). This was a much more detailed 
audit, covering the period January 2011 to April 2012. As in the previous audit, the Credible 
Carbon/PACE four questions were addressed, shown with quotes from the audit findings: 
 Is the project real and working as planned? – “Yes” 
 Are the agreed technologies in place and working? – “Yes, the technology is in place and 
functioning and the households receive 7 litres of gel fuel per month which lasts for about 7 
days” 
 Are the estimated GHG reductions “plausible and unbiased”? – “No, the estimates do not 
appear to be reasonable” (This will be explored further in Section 4.4.5.1). 
 Does the project have a discernible impact on poverty? Can the poverty alleviation impact 
be readily seen? – “Yes” 
4.4.5.1. Baseline methodologies, calculations and assumptions – paraffin 
baseline 
By now it was evident that the gel fuel would remain at 7 litres per household per month and that 
this would typically last for seven days, thus displacing about a quarter of a household’s baseline 
energy, still assumed to be in the form of paraffin. At this stage, the new auditors raised the issue of 
whether it was reasonable to assume that paraffin should be used for the BAU baseline calculations. 
Many of the households could not afford to use paraffin exclusively, so this was an important 
question. The auditors concluded that it was reasonable on the basis of “suppressed demand”. 
4.4.5.2. Suppressed demand 
The detailed reasoning applied is documented in Appendix One in the second audit report (Mckenzie 
& Botes, 2012). Suppressed demand is a relatively new CDM concept. In simplified terms, 
suppressed demand is an attempt to allow deprived communities to benefit from GHG reductions 
achieved against the higher baseline energy consumption that they would have enjoyed if they could 
have afforded it. The CDM has an elaborate set of rules to govern this what-might-have-been future 
and these rules are still in the process of being put to the test of practical implementation. So, in the 
case of Umdoni it appears to be reasonable to assume that if the residents could, they would use 
fuel other than firewood and dung. The alternatives are, in order of preference, if they were 
affordable:  
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 Gas (LPG) – eliminated because gas appliances are more expensive than gel stoves 
 Paraffin – this is feasible and available so should be used for the suppressed demand 
baseline 
The auditors then estimated how much paraffin would be displaced by one day’s use of gel fuel, and 
knowing paraffin’s carbon dioxide emission factor (from recognised default parameters published by 
DEFRA34 (DEFRA, 2011:8 Table 1b)), the GHG reduction of the avoided paraffin could be calculated. It 
turned out that roughly one litre of paraffin would last one day as would one litre of gel fuel. So, 
since the gel fuel lasts for seven days per month on average, the emission reduction calculation is 
simply: 7 litres of paraffin × 12 months × 2.5421 kgs CO2e per litre of paraffin = 214 kgs CO2e per 
household per year.”  This is in contrast to the original PIN and the 2011 audit which used 1 
tCO2e/household/year.   
It should be noted that there are large uncertainties in this method, for instance: it is difficult to 
determine how long paraffin would actually last a household because it depends on how much 
water they heat, is cooking done at the same time, the amount of other fuels being used to 
supplement the paraffin, the type of paraffin stove and how efficient it is in practice and many other 
factors. Similarly it is difficult to estimate accurately how long the gel fuel typically lasts for the same 
reasons. Because of these problems the auditors also considered two other ways of calculating the 
baseline and the emission reductions. 
4.4.5.3. Electricity baseline 
This method assumes that under suppressed demand, households would choose electricity as their 
main source of energy and the gel fuel would be displacing the electricity and thus reduce emissions 
proportional to Eskom’s grid emission factor (assumed to be 0.99 kg CO2/kWh) (Eskom, 2011:Table 
3). The calculation was done by working out the energy produced by burning the annual amount of 
gel fuel (12 x 7 litres = 84 l per household per year) and applying the Eskom grid emission factor. This 
yields a figure of 290 kg CO2e per household per year (compared to the original PIN figure of 1 000 
kg CO2e and the paraffin baseline method of 214 kg CO2e.). However, as simple as it sounds, this 
method is also dependent on assumptions which are difficult to verify, for example: the useful 
energy produced by the gel fuel should be compared to the useful energy produced by the electrical 
heating device. So the relative thermal efficiencies of gel fuel stoves and electric kettles need to be 
taken into account. These are all unknown factors in the Umdoni community and are influenced by 
how the gel fuel stoves are operated (vent open or closed), how big the pot of water being heated is, 
does it have its lid on, how much water is heated and not all used whilst it is hot thus losing energy 
through cooling of unused water. This information could be acquired through suitable field research 
using Controlled Cooking Tests (Nexant, 2010:26), but so far this has not been done in the case of 
Umdoni. Faced with all this uncertainty, all one can do is to make the best assumptions one can with 
the resources available and try to ensure that the calculations are conservative.  
The last methodology considered, and the simplest, was to use the suppressed demand principle of 
“minimum service level” (UNFCCC-CDM, 2012b:5) and a baseline of the FBE allowance of 50 kWh per 
month per household.  
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4.4.5.4. Minimum Service Level baseline 
The reasoning is that the FBAE policy is intended to be equivalent to the FBE policy that more 
fortunate households benefit from. Therefore one can argue that the amount of the baseline energy 
that is being displaced is equivalent to the FBE allowance of 50 kWh per household per month. The 
emissions reductions are therefore simply: 
12 months x 50 kWh x 0.99 (the Eskom GEF) = 594 kg CO2e per household per year. 
As the auditors pointed out, this felt wrong, because it results in exactly the same VERs regardless of 
what fuel is actually being used and how much is being used. Nevertheless, according to the Urban 
Earth audit report, Steve Thorne of SouthSouthNorth, who worked with the CDM Executive Board on 
suppressed demand issues, feels that the idea has merit. He is discussing this with the CDM EB 
working groups (Cartwright and Thorne, email communication, 2013 June 14).  
4.4.5.5. SD benefits 
The impact on poverty was found to be beneficial and discernible, although this was not expressed 
in quantitative terms. The audit report stated that the gel fuel project has resulted in less reliance on 
paraffin, which has reduced the risk of respiratory illnesses and accidental injury (fires and burns). 
Household costs were reduced through reduced purchases of paraffin. And for households using 
firewood for fuel, less time was spent on fuel collection thus freeing up the time for more useful 
activities and reducing exposure to the dangers of firewood collection, as one householder noted 
“Fetching firewood is very dangerous because of the snakes and bushpigs” (Mckenzie & Botes, 
2012:21-22). 
4.5. Umdoni case study discussion and conclusions 
Each project is different and will encounter different problems and find different solutions, so it is 
necessary to be cautious in generalising from one case. Nevertheless some lessons can be derived 
from the Umdoni project experience. The analysis in this section was based on the literature review, 
the case study and was supplemented by information obtained from the PACE and Credible Carbon 
experiences and interviews (see Section 3.2.3) (Cartwright, personal communications, 2012 on 
various dates). 
4.5.1. The type of carbon market chosen is important 
The Umdoni project could have chosen to try to register in a Type 1 market (e.g. CDM, GS or VCS), 
but none of these would have been viable for several reasons: 
 Transaction costs too high compared to the expected carbon revenue 
 The project had already started before the carbon revenue process began, so there would 
have been additionality problems 
Therefore the Type 2 market was chosen for Umdoni.  
4.5.2. Was the project type likely to attract high carbon prices? 
The Umdoni project, with its green character (bio-ethanol fuel instead of paraffin) and SD co-
benefits was thought to be an attractive project for potential offset buyers. Switching to clean 
energy does have a significant effect on community well-being. This is due to SD benefits such as 
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fire risk and saving some household money through reduced fuel purchases (Sections 4.4.3.2 and 
4.4.5.5). 
4.5.3. The registry and associated standard was appropriate 
PACE, the project proponent, had already tried the VCS route with other projects without success. 
The main problem was the detailed and complex documentation required and the long time it took 
to get through the process. PACE therefore recommended using a small VCM Type 2 registry with 
low audit costs for Umdoni. The track record of the chosen registry (Credible Carbon), demonstrated 
that the carbon credits traded had attracted prices comparable to GS and VCS in the past – in 2012 
the average VER prices realised were: Credible Carbon $6/tCO2e, GS $10/tCO2e and VCS $4/tCO2e  
(Table 5, page 83). This decision proved to be correct for Umdoni because the average Umdoni VER 
price achieved in 2012 was $11/tCO2e and all the Umdoni credits were quickly sold out. 
4.5.4. Would the right type of buyers be attracted to the project? 
Buyers of VCM carbon credits tend to buy for two main reasons: pre-compliance (i.e. getting ready 
for the introduction of carbon emission regulation) or for image and PR reasons (Section 2.13.2, 
page 50). In the case of the Umdoni project, the buyers were expected to be local South African 
companies because of Umdoni and Credible Carbon’s small scale and lack of international exposure. 
Also, with no South African carbon regulations as yet on the horizon, pre-compliance buyers were 
unlikely. However, because of Umdoni’s environmental and SD impact as described in Section 4.5.2, 
it was felt that corporate buyers buying for PR and image reasons would be interested – and this is 
what actually transpired. 
4.5.5. Would the project generate enough carbon credits to cover the setup and 
transaction costs? 
The initial PIN indicated carbon emission reducti ns of 2 600 tCO2e per year (Section 4.4.2). 
Assuming a price of R100/tCO2e, this would generate R260 000 in the first year, more than enough 
to cover the audit and project developer costs (of R35 000 plus R90 000, these being the budgeted 
amounts in the initial Umdoni negotiations (Cartwright, personal communications during 2012). As 
has been seen in the case study description, the emission reductions had to be radically reduced in 
later years because of incorrect calculation assumptions. On the basis of the downward-revised VER 
calculations of 0.219 tCO2e/household/year (see Section 4.4.5.2, page 75), this resulted in the 
reduced figure of 800 tCO2e for Umdoni’s 4 000 households. The down-rated revenue would have 
been 800 tCO2e × R100/tCO2e = R80 000 which would not have been enough to cover the audit and 
project developer costs. The Umdoni experience also showed how sensitive a project’s carbon 
revenue is to the calculation of the emission reductions – apart from the incorrect assumptions 
made in the earlier years, the possible variations in baseline reductions highlighted in the 2012 
audit, namely 0.214 kg/household/year, 0.290 kg/household/year and 0.594 kg/household/year are 
startling (Mckenzie & Botes, 2012:10-13). Therefore it is important for the project proponent and 
the carbon auditors to monitor changes in acceptable emission reduction methodologies in the 
Type 1 markets (especially the CDM, VCS and GS) so as to maximise the legitimate emission 
reductions from their projects. 
The size of the carbon reductions that can be generated from fuel switching in a poor community is 
small – in the case of Umdoni, the baseline is less than 1 tCO2e per household per year for water 
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carbon price of not more than R100/tCO2e, and leading to less than R 100/household/year for the 
gel fuel switching. In the case of Umdoni, the weighted average selling price achieved up to February 
2013 was R93/tCO2e as recorded in the Credible Carbon Registry
35.  
This indicates that the project scale for low emission reduction projects such as household fuel 
switching is critical. If Umdoni could be scaled up from 4 000 to 20 000 households then the carbon 
revenue aspect is definitely financially viable, even if the price of carbon drops further. So, although 
the Credible Carbon audit costs of around R 35 000/year are an order of magnitude less than those 
of Type 1 markets, they are still high for projects such as the Umdoni project. To cover the carbon 
market costs and project overheads, a project would need to generate at least 600 tCO2e/year (600 
tCO2e × R60/t = R36 000, assuming a carbon price of around R60/tCO2e, this being at least what 
Credible Carbon has achieved for its smaller projects) (Cartwright, personal communication 2013, 
May 30). 
4.5.6. Carbon credit ownership issues  
The risks of not clearly establishing the ownership of carbon credits is that potential buyers might 
not be willing to risk purchasing VERs where the ownership could be contested or the disbursement 
of the proceeds could be challenged (Section 2.13.1, page 50). The risks are higher in the case of 
projects with SD benefits and multiple beneficiaries (Cosbey et al., 2006:115). 
In the case of Umdoni ownership of the VERs was clearly defined in a contract between the project 
proponent (PACE), the project developer (PPT) and the funder/local government (Umdoni 
Municipality). The VERs are owned by PPT who is contractually bound to disburse the net revenue 
after audit costs have been covered according to an agreed budget. The budget specified the 
amount to be paid to PPT to cover their project development costs. The balance of the revenue was 
to be paid into a fund for the community to spend in specified ways – to be chosen by the 
community and agreed to by PACE and the Umdoni Municipality and managed by PPT. It is apparent 
that if complex arrangements such as these had not been formally agreed upfront the project risked 
becoming embroiled in legal arguments and potential buyers could have been scared off. 
In spite of the short-comings of the Umdoni project, with respect to its low GHG emission potential, 
the various auditors all agreed that the poverty-alleviating co-benefits make it worthwhile even if 
the VER revenue has been lower than expected. 
4.5.7. Umdoni project SD benefits  
In UNFCC terms, SD consists of three interacting elements, these being economic, social and 
environmental (Section 2.10.1, page 40). The Umdoni case study and its two audits have shown that 
benefits falling into each of these three categories were possibly realised though not all were 
quantified (Sections 4.4.3.2 and 4.4.5.5. 
4.5.7.1. Economic benefits 
The economic benefits were derived from reduced fuel purchases because of the availability of free 
gel fuel and from the proceeds of the sale of the project’s carbon credits. The fuel purchase savings 
were estimated at R50-R70 per household per month (Section 4.4.3.2), whilst the proceeds from the 
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sale of VERs amounted to R 783 888 for the sale of 8 389 tCO2e at an average price of R93 per tCO2e. 
(these figures were obtained by the author from the Credible Carbon registry transaction records, 
which are not publically available due to confidentiality constraints). Of the R783 888 gross 
proceeds, R559 896 (71%) went back to the project and the remaining 29% went to the project 
proponent and project developer for project preparation and audits. This gives an idea of the scale 
of the economic benefits, which although small per household, are still significant in view of the 
levels of poverty in the area, as described in the audits (Mckenzie & Botes, 2012:22). 
4.5.7.2. Social benefits 
The Credible Carbon standard did not require the SD benefits to be quantified and so the audits did 
not contain quantified data on social benefits and these can only be inferred. The project involved 
the selection of the volunteer households, the training of the community in the use of the gel fuel 
stoves as well as the interaction with the project teams, the auditors and the gel fuel distributers. All 
this might have promoted more social interaction in the community. In addition, the time freed up 
through less fuel collection effort, could have had a beneficial social effect. Finally, there could have 
been health benefits from reduced indoor air pollution and fewer fire-related accidents, although 
these werent quantified either (Sections 4.4.3.2 and 4.4.5.5). 
4.5.7.3. Environmental benefits 
The level of GHG emission reduction was measured in the audits and amounted to somewhat over 
8 000 tCO2e over the five year life of the project so far – this would be considered a small carbon 
project. Other possible environmental benefits not mentioned in the audits and not measured could 
be improved soil conditions due to reduced removal of dung from the fields and a smaller impact on 
the surrounding bush through less firewood gathering. However, this is conjecture. 
5. Analysis and discussion 
  
5.1. Limitations of the case study approach in this study 
The Umdoni case study was used in an explanatory sense rather than a predictive sense in this study. 
The carbon markets were researched and analysed in order to unpack the main factors that affected 
the Umdoni project and to understand this case study fully. The intention was not to propose an 
ideal project model based on the case study which could then be replicated throughout SSA, but 
rather to identify a set of important factors and to put forward suggestions as to how these factors 
could be taken into account for any project.  
It can also be argued that the Umdoni project findings are generalisable with respect to identified 
factors. For instance, all carbon projects need to choose in which carbon market to operate, select 
the most appropriate and cost-effective registry and standard, decide how best to position 
themselves with respect to potential offset customers and emphasise their SD benefits, choose 
effective role players, apply the most beneficial emission methodology and clarify contractual issues 
such as carbon credit ownership and the disbursement of the resulting carbon revenue. 
5.2. Introduction  
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 What are the main factors that contribute to the effective generation of net-positive carbon 
revenue from small, SSA projects? 
o How can these factors be managed so as to maximise the net carbon revenue? 
The net carbon revenue generated by a project is a function of the price per unit of emission 
reduction credits, the quantity of emission reduction credits and the costs associated with the 
generation of the carbon credits. These are linked by the equation: 
Net carbon revenue = (Price × Volume) – (Costs) 
Where: 
Price  = Currency units per tCO2e or VER 
Volume = Quantity of VERs (measured in tCO2e) 
Costs  = Transaction costs (measured in currency units) 
The transaction costs as used in this analysis consist of: 
 Preparation, documentation and validation costs for the PIN and PDD 
 Contract costs 
 Audit costs 
 Registry costs 
Each of Price, Volume and Costs are themselves affected by other factors and a possible set of these, 
based on the research done in this study, have been identified in Figure 12. This figure is a simplified 
influence diagram which shows influences and dependencies amongst variables as discovered in this 
study. For instance, the type of market a project trades in was found to influence the price obtained 
for the project’s carbon offsets. The price was also found to be influenced by the ‘attractiveness’ of 
the project, which in turn was found to be influenced by its SD benefits and the project type and so 
on. Each of these influencing factors has been analysed in Section 5.3 and its sub-sections (note that 
the order in which the factors have been discussed does not imply a ranking in terms of importance 













































Figure 12: Factors influencing price, volume and cost 
Source: Author’s own diagram 
5.3. Main factors for effective carbon revenue generation for small 
projects in SSA 
For the sake of consistency and comparability, this section has used the “Maneuvering the Mosaic: 
State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2013” report extensively as a source of data (Molly Peters-
Stanley & Yin, 2013). This report analysed the 2012 VCM in various ways and compares 2012 to 
2011. Unfortunately this report does not show analyses of price by location of source projects, nor 
does it show SSA as a separate region, nevertheless, it has provided some useful insights for this 
study in this section.  
5.3.1. Carbon market choice influence on price 
The possible choices are: 
 Compliance market or voluntary market 
 Type 1 or Type 2 market 
Currently, the VCM is commanding higher prices than the CDM primary market, with prices of 
$5.9/CO2e compared to the CDM prices of less than $1/tCO2e (Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:vii). 
Of course this could change in the future depending on what happens in the compliance market over 
the next few years.  
With regards to Type 1 markets within the VCM, the VCS was the dominant standard in 2012 with  a 
market share of 61% and an average price of $4/tCO2e (Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:34). The 
VCS was followed in volume by the GS with an average price of $9/tCO2e. This study was not able to 
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Type 2 markets and have not attracted much research effort. The Umdoni case study carbon credits 
would not have been appropriate for anything other than the VCM because of its small scale 
compared to the CDM transaction costs.  
5.3.2. Project attractiveness influence on price 
Projects with strong SD co-benefits generate carbon credits which achieve higher prices than those 
that don’t - this apparent from the price difference between standards that enforce co-benefit 
measures and those that don’t, for instance $10/tCO2e for GS credits, and $7/tCO2e for VCS+CCB
36 
compared to just $4/tCO2e for VCS only (Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:40 Figure 37). Another 
example is clean cookstove projects, which attract even higher prices, namely $20/tCO2e.  Fuel-
switching projects (similar project type to Umdoni), recorded an average price of $3/tCO2e for 2012. 
(Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:30 Figure 27). This was very different from the Umdoni volume-
weighted average VER price of $11/tCO2e (R93/tCO2e) – possibly reflecting the small size and 
attractiveness of the project (this price was calculated by the author from the Credible Carbon 
Registry, with 8 389 tCO2e sold for R 783 888). Also, ‘charismatic carbon’ offsetting may lead to PR 
and image enhancement for corporate buyers (Conte & Kotchen, 2010:95). 
Finally the research showed that smaller VCM projects realise higher prices, with micro projects 
(<5 ktCO2e/yr) priced at $10/tCO2e in 2012, while prices for small to mega (5-20 ktCO2e/yr through 
to 1 MtCO2e/yr) carbon ranged from $8.7 down to $5.8 on average (Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 
2013:29). 
The effect of project attractiveness was also apparent in the Credible Carbon prices achieved for 
different types and sizes of project; for instance the Umdoni VERs achieved an average price of 
$11/tCO2e compared to the average price of $6/tCO2e across all the Credible Carbon projects (Table 
5). This difference is probably explained by the much lower price achieved by a compost-related 
project (which also happened to be much bigger than Umdoni in terms of emission reductions); the 
compost project was evidently not as attractive as the Umdoni project to potential buyers. 
5.3.3. Registry and Standard influence on price 
 As discussed in 5.3.2, standards which promote co-benefits, such as the GS and VCS+CCB, achieved 
higher prices in 2012 than the others. A comparison of these with the Umdoni-Credible Carbon 
prices in 2012 US dollars is shown in Table 5 (the exchange rate used in the conversions for 2012 was 
R8.1/USD). 
Table 5: Registry+Standard price comparison 2012 
Standard $/tCO2e R/tCO2e 
GS 10 81 
VCS+CCB 7 57 
VCS only 4 32 
Credible Carbon + Umdoni 11 93 
Credible Carbon overall 6 46 
This comparison shows that the registry plus its associated standard does have an impact on carbon 
prices achieved as shown in Table 5. Also, the Umdoni project, using the Credible Carbon registry 
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compares well in price terms with the best of the big VCM registries and the overall Credible Carbon 
average price falls in the middle of the range. 
5.3.4. Buyer type influence on price 
As discussed in Section 2.13.2 (page 50), types of VCM carbon credit buyers include purely voluntary 
buyers and pre-compliance buyers. The voluntary buyers have tended to be driven by the quality of 
the underlying project in terms of SD benefits as well as the credibility of the GHG emission 
reductions, whereas the pre-compliance buyers have purchased speculatively in anticipation of 
carbon taxes or compulsory emission reductions driving up the prices. Corporate offset buyers may 
also buy for PR and reputation reasons and therefore  ‘charismatic carbon’ offsets may achieve 
higher prices from these buyers (Conte & Kotchen, 2010:95). Umdoni, with its SD co-benefits, has 
sold almost all its carbon to a single corporate buyer for offsetting its carbon footprint, presumably 
for image and PR reasons.  
Having considered the influences on price, the next sections analyse the effect of various factors on 
the volume of carbon credits a project generates – and the volume sold directly affects the net 
carbon revenue. 
5.3.5. Supply and demand influence on price and volume 
Like any other market, the carbon market prices are largely driven by supply and demand (unless 
floor and ceiling prices are in effect). The impact of large surplus CERs in the CDM primary market 
has resulted in the precipitous drop in prices at the end of 2012 – as discussed in Sections 2.7.2, 
page 32 and 2.17.4, page 58. However, the supply and demand balance is largely out of the control 
of an individual project, although a project can generally choose which market to operate in and 
thus try to avoid situations of price crashes and lack of liquidity. 
As far as the VCM is concerned, the supply surplus in the compliance markets has not adversely 
affected the VCM volumes, which have grown by 4% from 2011 to 2012, although the market value 
dropped by 11%, implying a price drop of about 15%. Suppliers of offsets believe that this drop was 
caused by “perceived offset oversupply and knock-on effects of the collapse of the EU carbon price” 
(Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:v-vii). The supply demand balance can affect the volume of credit 
a project can sell at a particular price, and it is possible that CER holders will start trying to sell their 
carbon credits on the VCM, thus flooding the market and causing prices to crash. However, this 
hasn’t happened yet and less than 1 MtCO2e of CDM offsets appear to have been sold to voluntary 
buyers in 2012 (1% of the 2012 VCM total) (Molly Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013:xiv).  
With regards to Credible Carbon, the volumes have gone up enormously from 10 000 tCO2 in 2011 to 
40 000 tCO2 in 2012, while the average price has dropped from R93/tCO2e in 2011 to R46/tCO2e in 
2012. This price drop was largely due to the lower prices achieved by a compost project in 2012. The 
Umdoni VER prices were less affected; dropping from R93/tCO2e in 2011 to R80/tCO2e in 2012 
(these figures were obtained by the author from the Credible Carbon registry). 
5.3.6. Project VER output performance on volume 
This study has identified three key factors that influence the volume of GHG reductions a project 
produces for sale, these being; the project scale or size, the emission reduction calculation methods 
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5.3.6.1. Project scale (in terms of carbon credit output) 
 The GHG emission reduction (VER) potential of a project depends on the scale of the project 
and the emission reduction intensity of the intervention technology. For instance, in the case 
of the Umdoni case study, the scale of the project is about 4 000 households, the 
intervention technology is bio-ethanol gel fuel stoves (switching from biomass and paraffin 
stoves) and the emission reduction intensity worked out to be 0.214 tCO2e per household 
per year in the 2012 audit (see Section 4.4.5.2, page 75). In Umdoni’s case, the calculated 
VER volume is directly proportional to the number of households and the amount of gel fuel 
supplied and burnt. This is recognised by the Umdoni Municipality which has been increasing 
the number of beneficiary households by about 1 000 households per year, but it is unclear 
whether the annual expansion will continue in the future. However, the 7 litres of gel fuel 
per household per month allowance, which is part of the FBAE policy implementation, has 
not been increased since the project started in 2008 (Section 4.3, page 70). So Umdoni could 
increase its carbon credit volumes by increasing the amount of bio-ethanol gel supplied from 
the current 7 litres per household per month, ideally up to about 30l per household per 
month, which would last a household for the full month. This is where an active and 
interested NGO could help by lobbying the local government or finding additional funding. 
5.3.6.2. Emission reduction calculation methods 
One might think that CDM projects, being subject to stringent regulation, have little choice as to 
which methodology to use. This is not the case; there are so many methodologies, covering a 
multitude of variations of different technologies that there is a great deal of choice. Many projects 
are not simple and one-dimensional and the choice of methodologies is not always straight-forward. 
In the VCM, and especially in the case of Type 2 projects and registries, there is generally even more 
flexibility – depending of course, on the particular registry and its standards. 
Different VCM registries use different sets of standards and methodologies. However, for a registry 
to be successful in selling VERs at good prices, it needs to apply standards and methodologies that 
are acceptable to the potential population of carbon buyers. The easiest way to do this is to use 
existing CDM methodologies. These are well-documented and usually have been applied to real 
projects over many years. Thus there is a wealth of case-study material available which helps a 
project to decide which methodologies to use. Sometimes the CDM methodologies are very 
restrictive for some project types, for instance in the case of forestry-related projects (Guigon, 
2010:13). In these cases, new methodologies have been developed outside of the CDM by some of 
the bigger standards. The VCS with its Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU) carbon 
projects is one example. 
As has been discussed, it is difficult to calculate the emission reductions achieved by a project 
because it requires the business-as-usual baseline emissions to be calculated and then the impact of 
the project intervention relative to the baseline to be calculated. Both of these calculations rely 
heavily on assumptions about the baseline and the project impact. These assumptions and 
calculations are often subject to challenge and in the case of the Type 2 VCM; this is the carbon 
auditor’s job. The choice of methodologies that a project uses is made by the project proponent who 
will have an expert knowledge of CDM and VCM methodologies. This choice is formalised in the PIN 
or PDD and will be validated by the carbon auditor at each audit. While the project proponent will be 
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expense of the credibility of the project’s carbon reductions. Because the carbon auditor, who is 
strictly independent, will simply apply the accepted norms in the carbon industry and this might 
radically reduce the audited amount of carbon. Therefore a project proponent should err on the side 
of caution and make conservative choices of methodology rather than trying to push the boundaries 
of acceptability and risk disappointments after the first audit. The carbon registry, for its part, needs 
to ensure that its VERs are credible so that it can negotiate high prices from its buyers. In the end, 
though, the auditor’s word is final and a good registry will not attempt to influence the auditor, and 
the auditor, with a reputation to protect will not usually risk producing an audit that might be 
challenged. In the case of Umdoni it has been shown that the original PIN contained some errors and 
was far too optimistic as a result; the errors were not picked up by the second auditor either, but 
were only discovered by the third auditor in 2012 (see Section 4.5, page 77). 
In the Umdoni case study, the initial baseline chosen in the PIN by the project proponent PACE was 
based on the assumptions that the gel fuel would last for about 7 days and that the gel fuel would be 
displacing whatever the Umdoni households were actually using – such as firewood, animal dung 
and paraffin. However, it was difficult to find out exactly how much of each fuel was actually being 
used without mounting a lengthy and expensive monitoring exercise. Even if such a survey was to be 
done, the variability across the population would probably be unacceptably high. So PACE chose to 
use the CDM principle of suppressed demand and to assume instead that the households would 
have used paraffin rather than firewood and dung if they could have afforded it. The baseline thus 
became paraffin-based. The next step was to estimate the carbon emissions from the use of a 
paraffin stove. This was difficult, because there are many different types of paraffin stoves with 
differing thermal efficiencies. Worse, when field trials (using the Controlled Cooking Test protocol 
for instance) have been carried out on stoves of various types, there is also a big variation in cooking 
performance (Pennise et al., 2010:24). Factors such as the pot size, pot lids, wind conditions and 
how high the stove wick was turned up all play a large part in cooking efficiency. So the auditor 
relied on simple fundamentals – in the Umdoni case the relative stove efficiencies were ignored and 
the relative calorific values and emissions of bio-ethanol gel versus paraffin were used.  
The CDM is attempting to remove these baseline difficulties by introducing standardised baselines 
(Schneider et al., 2012). When these have been developed and field-proven then the VCM registries 
will no doubt adopt them too and the transaction costs will be further reduced.  
It is important to note that methodologies change over time so the choice of methodologies should 
be reviewed each year. This should be done by the project proponent rather than relying on the 
carbon auditor. If the project proponent decides to change the project’s methodologies, this is 
formalised in an updated PIN or PDD – and at the next audit the auditor will check on the 
appropriateness of the choice. Note that if the auditors disagree with the choice of methodologies 
or how they were applied, they will propose an acceptable methodology and apply that rather than 
simply rejecting a project’s VERs. 
5.3.6.3. VER ownership issues and their impact on volumes sold 
This issue is not really a function of market dynamics, but it is highly relevant to the successful sale of 
VERs (2.13.1, page 50). Most registries won’t undertake to sell a project’s VERs unless the ownership 
of these is legally clear. So if the ownership is contested, the project might not be able to sell the 
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be too late for an easy resolution. An example of this would be a solar water heater project, where a 
funder pays for the capital equipment and installation costs, an installer does the installation and a 
project developer manages the whole project. The funder could claim ownership of the VERs on the 
grounds that the funder supplied the equipment without which the project wouldn’t have 
happened, the installer might also claim ownership because of the installation work, the project 
developer might claim ownership because that is the default position in the CDM world,  the owner 
of the premises on which the solar water was installed might claim ownership as the SWH could be 
regarded as part of the structure and lastly a tenant might claim ownership of the VERs by virtue of 
being the one who uses the hot water. The easiest way to avoid such ownership problems is for the 
stakeholders to contractually agree on which party owns the generated carbon credits and what is to 
be done with the proceeds. 
In the case of Umdoni, the potential owners of the credits were: the Umdoni Municipality who 
funded the project and the supply of the gel fuel, PPT the project developer who managed the 
project, PACE the project proponent and the householders themselves. The contract that was finally 
negotiated stated the PPT, as the project developer would own the credits, but that the proceeds 
from the sale of the credits would be used to pay Credible Carbon for the audits and PPT for their 
project development work and that the remainder would be made available to the community to 
spend as they saw fit. These allocations were quantified and specified in a formal budget. In due 
course the carbon auditor would check that the sales revenue had been spent correctly (Cartwright, 
personal communication 2013, May 30). The next section analyses the cost factors. 
5.3.7. Transaction costs: Registry audit and preparation costs 
The costs involved in carbon trading are critical to small projects with low GHG reduction potential, if 
the costs outweighed the carbon revenue then the project has lost money. This could happen 
through lack of knowledge on the part of the project proponent, or because costs that should have 
been covered by the carbon revenue suddenly aren’t because of a drop in carbon prices, or an 
adverse carbon audit reduced the claimable emission reductions, or the project roll-out didn’t 
proceed as planned – so there is some risk present. 
Registry, audit and preparation (costs vary from market to market and register to register. In the 
CDM environment, some of the registry and audit costs are known, such as the Transfer plus 
Brokerage costs (1% + 0.03% of the CER value), but the bulk of the costs can vary enormously, 
ranging from Euro 150 000 up to Euro 590 000 (Axel Michaelowa & Jotzo, 2005:513 Table 1). In a 
later study, Guigon et al. have estimated costs for the CDM at Euro 249 000 for a typical 50 000 
tCO2e/yr ‘large’ project and Euro 21 000 for a ‘small’ project of 5 000 tCO2e/yr. By comparison, three 
of the big VCM standards (VCS, GS micro and VER+) have costs of Euro 16 600, 14 800 and 17 300 
respectively for small projects (Guigon et al., 2009:24 Tables 4 and 5). The VCS cost of Euro 16 800 is 
not much less than the CDM figure of Euro 21 000 – this is partly why this study classified VCS as a 
Type 2 registry and standard. 
In the Umdoni case study, the registry, audit and preparation costs were considerably lower – less 
than R 30 000 per audit (Euro 2 600 in 2009 terms). This huge difference in transaction costs (a 
factor of 6 or more) between the Type 1 VCM environment (such as the VCS and GS) and Type 2 
(such as Credible Carbon) can determine whether it’s worthwhile attempting to generate carbon 
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5.4. Analysis and discussion summary 
This study has identified the main factors that contribute to the effective generation of net-positive 
carbon revenue from small SSA carbon projects (see Figure 12, page 82) and has analysed how these 
factors and their management can explain the success of the Umdoni project, used as a case study in 
this dissertation: 
 Choice of carbon market effect on price (Section 5.3.1) – Umdoni chose to trade in the Type 
2 market because of the higher prices, lower costs, faster turn-around and the less stringent 
additionality rules applying (i.e. not having to register the project before it had started). 
 Project attractiveness effect on price (Section 5.3.2) – the analysis showed that VERs 
generated under standards that measured co-benefits achieved higher VER prices than 
those that didn’t. Another dimension that emerged smaller VCM projects realise higher 
prices. With regards to the case study, the Umdoni price was $11/tCO2e compared to the 
average of all Credible Carbon transactions in 2012 of $6/tCO2e, this was probably due to 
the relative attractiveness of Umdoni to the main buyer. 
 Registry and standard choice effect on price (Section 5.3.3) – the analysis showed that the 
standards that measure and audit co-benefits (and therefore SD) achieve higher prices than 
those that. The Umdoni price was shown to be higher than the GS average price (and the GS 
was top of the VCM prices), whilst the overall average Credible Carbon prices were higher 
than those of the VCS but lower than the GS prices. 
 Buyer type effect on price (Section 5.3.4) – this research was unable establish a connection 
between buyer type and the price achieved. With regards to the case study and Credible 
Carbon all that could be deduced was that particular buyers have strong preferences for 
which type of project they favour.  
 Supply and demand effect on price (Section 5.3.5) – so far the VCM appears to be growing in 
volume steadily in spite of the upheavals in the compliance market. However the Type 1 
VCM total market value dropped from 2011 to 2012 indicating an average price drop of 
about 15% - so perhaps the over-supply in the compliance market has made itself felt in the 
VCM. 
 Project scale effect on the emission reduction quantity (Section 5.3.6.1) – a project can 
increase its emission reductions by increasing its scale and/or improving the emission 
reduction intensity. In the case of Umdoni, the municipality has been increasing scale of the 
project by increasing the number of households with gel stoves each year. Another way to 
increase the emission reductions would be to increase the monthly amount of bio-ethanol 
gel; however this has not happened as yet. 
 Emission reduction calculation methods impact on emission reduction quantities (Section 
5.3.6.2) – Credible Carbon only uses carbon industry endorsed methodologies, such as the 
CDM suite, this adds credibility and reduces transaction costs. The Umdoni experience with 
over-estimating emission reductions showed that errors in assumptions and calculations do 
happen in spite of using expert auditors and conservative assumptions. Because new 
methodologies are continually being added and old ones revised, the project proponent and 
the auditor need to keep up to date so at to be able to make the best selection for the 
project. The baseline methodologies suitable for Umdoni produced a wide range of baselines 
from which the 2012 Umdoni audit the auditor conservatively chose the lowest one on the 
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that the choice of the right methodology is critical to avoid loss of credibility and unexpected 
reductions in VERs which might reduce the revenue to the point where the transaction costs 
are not covered.  
 VER ownership issues (Section 5.3.6.3) – establishing the ownership of the project’s VERs is 
of the utmost importance and this needs to be done before the project starts. The Umdoni 
project VER ownership was set out in a contract between PACE (project proponent), PPT 
(project developer) and the Umdoni Municipality (the local government and funder), which 
gave the ownership to PPT, but with explicit provision for payment of the carbon revenue 
(net of the documentation and audit fees) to the community once the defined project 
developer costs had been covered. The contract also documented what the community had 
chosen to spend its share on, namely renewable energy or energy efficiency technologies. 
 Transaction costs (Section 5.3.7) – The total transaction costs for small CDM projects were 
found to average Euro 21 000, the VCS averaged Euro 16 600 and the GS came in at 
Euro 14 800. In comparison the Credible Carbon costs are generally about Euro 2 600 
(R35 000), lower by a factor of six. Note that this study was unable to find data on other 
Type 2 registries, so it is not known if Credible Carbon is typical.  
These then are the main factors that contribute to the effective generati n of net-positive carbon 
revenue from small, SSA projects and this analysis has shown how these factors applied in the 
Umdoni case study and how this project was largely able to manage them so as to generate carbon 
revenue in excess of R 500 000 after all costs had been covered (Section 4.5.7.1, page 79). 
6. Conclusions 
This study has identified the main factors that contribute to the effective generation of net-positive 
carbon revenue from small, SSA projects and has explored how these projects could best position 
themselves to maximise their net carbon revenue. This was done by using the Umdoni case study as 
a lens through which the market factors were explored. 
The key decisions and actions that concern a small SSA project seeking to generate carbon revenue 
were found to be: 
6.1. Choice of carbon market 
The choices are: 
 Compliance market or voluntary market 
 Type 1 or Type 2 market 
Both of these choices are affected by the financial viability of the project (in terms of positive net 
carbon revenue), which is a function of the project size (in terms of GHG reduction potential) and 
the carbon price compared to the transaction costs 
As has been shown earlier in Section 2.3, page 15, the carbon-financial break-even point for CDM 
projects at current prices is about 50 000 tCO2e/year – the CDM being a Type 1 compliance market. 
At the other extreme, the break-even point for a Type 2 VCM project is about 600 tCO2e/year under 
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2013:vii) and transaction costs of about R35 000 (Case study Section 4.5, page 77) and 
600 tCO2e × R60/tCO2e = R36 000.  
The Type 1 VCM break-even point would fall somewhere in the middle depending on the registry 
and the standard, this is because the Type 1 VCM transaction costs, whilst lower than the CDM costs 
(Bumpus, Liverman, & Lovell, 2010:3), are still higher than Type 2 costs because of the more onerous 
auditing processes.  
A second factor which could influence the market choice is the likely price a project could realise in 
different markets with different standards. The research showed that at current prices, it is better 
for a small project to use the VCM ($4-$10/tCO2e) rather than the CDM market ($1/tCO2e).  
 Therefore the choice between the compliance market (CDM) and the VCM is clear – at 
current prices any small project would benefit from choosing the VCM. 
Within the VCM the prices for Type 1 registries and standards ranged from $4/tCO2e (VCS without 
co-benefits) to $10/tCO2e (GS with co-benefits). This showed that projects with verifiable co-benefits 
attracted significantly higher prices than others. Credible Carbon and Umdoni achieved an average 
price of $11/tCO2e; this showed that this example of a Type 2 VCM registry with a small charismatic 
project was able to outperform the GS average. However, the Umdoni project might be an outlier, 
bearing in mind that the average price, across all projects that Credible Carbon achieved in 2012 was 
$6/tCO2e. Also, although the Type 1 VCM (with co-benefits) prices were higher than the average 
Type 2 VCM prices; the costs of the Type 1 VCM were found to be higher than those of the Type 2 
case study (by a factor of six). Therefore the project would have to be large before the higher prices 
outweighed the higher costs. So the choice between a Type 1 VCM versus a Type 2 VCM is not so 
clear. 
 The choice between the Type1 VCM and Type 2 VCM depends on the current prices, the 
project type (with co-benefits verified or not) and the size of the project. 
6.2. Choice of registry and standard 
The research showed that standards which recognised and verified elements of co-benefits (SD) 
outperformed those that didn’t. This was shown by the GS price of $10/tCO2e and the VCS+CCB price 
of $7/tCO2e (both of these standards measure and verify co-benefits) compared to the pure VCS 
price of $4/tCO2e 
 Projects that have strong co-benefits will benefit with respect to their VER price by choosing 
a registry and standard that recognises and verifies co-benefits and markets the carbon 
credits taking this into account. 
Naturally, in choosing a specific registry for a project, the project team would carry out an 
appropriate due diligence exercise as is generally good practice before appointing any professional 
service. It is recommended that the points covered include: the registry’s track record of 
governance, prices, volumes in stock, volumes sold and sales turnaround time; the registry’s 
financial standing and credit record should be good; the range of project types carried by the registry 
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defined and reasonable; the registry should offer a secure, online trading platform so as to facilitate 
the marketing and selling process. 
 It is recommended that the project team select a registry with good online facilities, in good 
financial standing, with an acceptable track record and which is compatible with the project 
with regards to type and size and whose costs are well-defined and reasonable compared to 
other registries. 
6.3. Positioning of the project 
The findings confirmed that not all projects are the same and that projects with strong SD benefits, 
command higher prices than projects which lack SD features. This was demonstrated by the 
difference of projects with and without co-benefits in the Type 1 VCM and by Credible Carbon’s 
experience with the Umdoni project attracting a much higher price than the price across all the 
Credible Caron projects, some of which were less charismatic. Therefore is appears to be worthwhile 
when setting up the project to ensure that the co-benefits are defined, measured and managed. This 
will then enable the registry to market the resulting VERs more effectively. 
 Projects that have SD co-benefits will benefit from defining, measuring and managing these 
in order to attract higher carbon prices. 
6.4. Choice of project proponent 
The project proponent plays a key role in the success of the project (see Section 2.10.2.2, page 44) 
and based on the PACE and Credible Carbon experience, the suggested choice criteria are that the 
ideal project proponent should have: 
 a good track record of governance and successful project implementation 
 shown itself to be in good financial standing with a clean credit record 
 a range of projects previously managed by the project proponent that are compatible with 
the project under consideration 
 costs that are clearly defined and reasonable 
 the required technical expertise in applying internationally accepted carbon emission 
reduction methodologies 
 access to a broad range of credible carbon auditors expert in the type of project under 
consideration 
 access to a broad range of project developers expert in the type of project under 
consideration 
6.5. Governing the project  
Based on PACE and Credible Carbon experience, this should be done collectively by all the 
stakeholders, led by the project proponent. Some important issues and suggested best practice that 
have been identified in this project are: 
 It is recommended that all the affected role players be involved in the project from the 
outset and they be kept updated with progress as the project unfolds 
 Ownership of the VERs must be established upfront through formal contracts between all 
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 Future problems can be averted by producing a project budget, formally agreed to by the 
affected parties, that shows how the carbon revenue is to be distributed, for instance to 
cover the project preparation documentation, the audit costs, the project developer costs 
and the final allocation to the project beneficiaries (which could be the host community) 
 The allocation and spending of the sales revenue needs to be transparent and 
communicated to all the stakeholders. 
7. Further research 
In the context of maximising carbon revenue for small, poverty-alleviating carbon projects, there are 
many areas which would benefit greatly from additional research.  
Some of these are: 
1. Investigate the health benefits derived from using cleaner forms of cooking and heating 
energy and displacing three-stone fires and paraffin stoves. 
2. Investigate the impact of black carbon emission from domestic cooking devices on health 
and GHG reduction. 
3. Make a case for adding black carbon to the current set of GHGs as recognised by the 
UNFCCC. 
4. Investigate fuel use and actual stove efficiencies in the field in rural communities in sub-
Saharan Africa in order to justify a standardised baseline for cooking stove interventions. 
5. Investigate why the mass roll-out of projects such as Umdoni and Kuyasa are not being 
achieved and propose solutions. 
6. Investigate the relative emission reduction and SD benefits of biofuel cooking stoves versus 
energy-efficient and clean-burning wood fuel stoves.  
7. Investigate the implementation of the Free Basic Alternative Energy policy in South Africa: Is 
it being applied universally? Has the FBAE allowance kept up with inflation as legislated? 
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8. Appendices 
8.1. Appendix A: CDM Pipeline analysis spreadsheet 
Table 6: Analysis of the CDM pipeline 
 
Regions
As at 1 July 2012 Number % kCERs % kCERs % Number % kCERs %
Total CDM 4296 100.0% 611280 100.0% 2187305 100.0% 1620 100.0% 958982 100.0%
China 2101 48.9% 390158 63.8% 1273074 58.2% 841 51.9% 573607 59.8%
India 854 19.9% 69133 11.3% 279855 12.8% 348 21.5% 142832 14.9%
Africa 88 2.0% 17711 2.9% 628845 28.7% 18 1.1% 13505 1.4%
Sub-Saharan Africa 55 1.3% 11995 2.0% 40925 1.9% 11 0.7% 2906 0.3%
South Africa 20 0.5% 3498 0.6% 16666 0.8% 8 0.5% 2537 0.3%
Total CDM incl. 
rejections and 
withdrawals 10426 41.2% 15.5%
Source
CDMpipeline UNEP Riso 2012.07.01 from the CD4CDM website, retrieved 25/07/2012
http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMpipeline.xlsx
Registered kCERs by region
kCERs % kCERs kCERs % kCERs
China 390158 63.8% 573607 59.8%
India 69133 11.3% 142832 14.9%
Africa 17711 2.9% 13505 1.4%
ROW 134278 22.0% 229038 23.9%
Total CDM 611280 100.0% 958982 100.0%










As at 1 July 2012 Number kCERs kCERs Number kCERs kCERs 
Total CDM 4296 611280 142 1620 958982 592
China 2101 390158 186 841 573607 682
India 854 69133 81 348 142832 410
Africa 88 17711 201 18 13505 750
Sub-Saharan Africa 55 11995 218 11 2906 264








































94   
 
8.2. Appendix B: Carbon volume and value analysis 
Table 7: Analysis of the Voluntary carbon Market by volume and value 
  
North 




Europe Oceana Europe Total 
2010                 
Volume MtCO2e 23 18 3 (5%) 17 5 1 n/a 66 
Value US$ Millions 118 95 26 (7%) 81 40 3 2 360 
US$/tCO2e 5.1 5.3 8.7 4.8 8.0 3.0 n/a 5.5 
Euro/tCO2e 3.7 3.8 6.2 3.4 5.7 2.1 n/a   
2011                 
Volume MtCO2e 30 28 8 (9%) 7 19 8 2 92 
Value US$ Millions 178 108 60 (13%) 80 40 20 15 466 
US$/tCO2e 5.9 3.9 7.5 11.4 2.1 2.5 7.5 5.1 
Euro/tCO2e 4.3 2.8 5.4 8.3 1.5 1.8 5.4   
Change analysis                 
Vol increase % 30% 56% 167% -59% 280% 700% n/a   
Val increase % 51% 14% 131% -1% 0% 567% 650%   
US$/tCO2e incr.% 16% -27% -13% 140% -74% -17% n/a   
Euro/tCO2e incr % 17% -26% -12% 143% -73% -15% n/a   
  
       
  
Source: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2012. figure 23 p24 
   
  
  
       
  
Exchange rates 2010 2011 2012           
Euro 1 1 1 
    
  
US$ 1.40 1.38 1.28 
    
  
ZAR 9.53 10.90 11.24           
Source: http://www.x-rates.com accessed 5/11/2012 
    
  
  
       
  
Volume and Value 
for the VCM and 
CDM 











Volume MtCO2e 66 92 39% 224 263 17% 
 
  
Value US$ Millions 360 466 29% 2675 2980 11% 
 
  
US$/tCO2e 5.5 5.1 -7% 11.9 11.3 -5% 
 
  
(Note: the EU and Oceana figures were excluded from the VCM totals because they 
are relatively small) 
  
  
Source for VCM: State of the Voluntary Markets 2012 figure 23 p24 
   
  
Source for CDM: State and trends of the carbon market 2012 Table 3 p49 
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8.3. Appendix C: Free Basic Electricity Policy inflation adjustment 







2007 - - R 55.00 
2008 11.50% 13.00% R 62.15 
2009 7.10% 8.60% R 67.49 
2010 4.30% 5.80% R 71.41 
2011 5.00% 6.50% R 76.05 
2012 5.60% 7.10% R 81.45 
 
The starting value of the FBAE support is R 55.00 and the annual escalation is the South African 
inflation rate plus 1.5%,; to be reviewed after five years (DME, 2007). 
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8.4. Appendix D: Carbon Calculations  
Note that these were the 2008  
Table 9: Calculations for PIN 2008 





1 Conversion factors         
2 MJ per kWh MJ  3.60 http://www.iea.org/stats/unit.asp 
3 MJ   J  1.00E+06   
4 TJ J  1.00E+12   
5 kWh/TJ kWh/TJ  277777.78   
8 Eskom Grid Factor kg/kWh 0.93 0.93   
9 Paraffin Emission Factor kg/kWh 0.245 0.245 http://www.defra.gov.uk/%20environment/
climatechange/uk/%20individual/pdf/acton
CO2-calc-methodology.pdf 
10 Gel Fuel Emission Factor kg/TJ 79600.00 79600.00 EF ID 118139 see http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/EFDB/ef_detail.php (Energy 
(1) -> Fuel Combustion Activities (1.A) -> 
Other Sectors (1.A.4) -> Residential (1.A.4.b)  
11   kg/kWh 0.022111 0.287 The conversion factor for converting the gel 
fuel emission factor from kg/TJ to kg/kWh 
was incorrect. 
13 Calculations      
14 Consider use for water 
boiling only 
(conservative)   
     
15 Specific heat capacity of 
water  
J/kg/C 4186.00 4186.00   
16 Cold water temperature C 10.00 10.00   
17 Heated water 
temperature 
C 100.00 100.00   
18 Litres of water heated per 
day (average) 
l 22.00 22.00   
20 Paraffin (wick stove) 
thermal efficiency when 
boiling 1 kg of water 
% 20.10% 20.10% See P9 of 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/emnews/EMN-
Dec05.pdf 
21 Gel Fuel thermal 
efficiency when boiling 1 
kg of water 
% 49.90% 49.90% See P9 of 
http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/emnews/EMN-
Dec05.pdf 
22 Energy needed for water 
per day = 4186 J/kg/C X 
90c X 22L X 10^-6 
MJ/day 8.29 8.29   
23 Energy needed for water 
per year 
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24 Energy needed for water 
per year using Paraffin 
with a cooking Efficiency 
of 20.10% 
MJ/yr 15050.86 15050.86   





25 Energy needed for water 
per year using Gel with a 
cooking Efficiency of 
49.90% 
MJ/yr 6062.57 6062.57   
26 Paraffin Energy per 
cooker in kWh (1kWh = 
3.6 MJ) 
kW/yr 4180.79 4180.79   
27 Gel Fuel Energy per 
cooker in kWh (1kWh = 
3.6 MJ) 
kW/yr 1684.05 1684.05   
28 Paraffin CO2 Emission 
(Energy per yr x emission 
factor) 
tCO2/yr 1.02 1.02   
29 Gel Fuel CO2 Emission 
((Energy per yr x emission 
factor) 
tCO2/yr 0.04 0.48 The difference is because of the incorrect 
conversion done in Row 11. But also not a 
further logic error – this figure should be 
zero because bio-ethanol gel can be 
considered to be carbon-neutral. 
31 Carbon reduction 
calculations 
        
32 Baseline Existing Stoves = 
CO2 existing paraffin 
tCO2/yr
/cooker 
1.02 1.02   
33 Emission after 
Intervention Existing 
Stoves = CO2 gel fuel 
tCO2/yr
/cooker 
0.04 0.90 Not 0.04 as in PIN. Because the gel fuel only 
lasts for 23% of the time and not 100%, the 
calculation is 77% is paraffin at 1.04 and 
23% is gel at 0.48 = 0.90 
34 Cookers  3000.00 3000.00   
35 CO2 reduction/yr tCO2/yr 2940.00 373.78 Difference because the original PIN 
assumed there was enough gel fuel to 
replace all the paraffin in the baseline plus 
the gel emission factor is incorrect. 
38 Summary of GHG saving 
calculations 
     
39 Baseline emission per 




1.02 1.02   





0.04 0.90  See row 41 below. 
41 Emission reduction tCO2e 
per 
hh/yr 
0.98 0.12  Note that the “corrected” figures 
understate the emission reduction because 
the gel fuel is carbon neutral. The 2012 
figure was 0.214 tCO2e/hh/yr 
42 Number of Gel fuel stoves 
in Year 1 
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2658 336   
44 Additional of Gel fuel 
stoves in Year 2-5 
Total 3600 3600   





3543 449   











99   
 
9. References 
Aasrud, A., Baron, R., & Karousakis, K. (2010). Market Readiness: Building Blocks for 
Market Approaches. Paris. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from www.oecd.org/env/cc/ccx 
Andersone, L. (2012). General Principles for the Design and Governance of a New Market 
Mechanism under the UNFCCC New market mechanism: objectives. Paris. Retrieved 
May 15, 2013, from http://www.oecd.org/env/climatechange/49999922.pdf 
Arens, C., Rammelt, M., Winter, S., Sünnen, R., Krey, M., Vener, J., Blank, D. D., et al. 
(2012). Mitigating Climate Change , Investing in Development Fostering the CDM in 
Least Developed Countries. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://www.jiko-
bmu.de/files/basisinformationen/application/pdf/climate_web_barrierefrei.pdf 
Atkins, P. S., & Prasad, G. (2012). Leveraging carbon for poverty alleviation. Strategies to 
Overcome Poverty & Inequality: Towards Carnegie 3. Cape Town: Energy Research 
Centre, UCT. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.carnegie3.org.za/docs/papers/12_Atkins_Leveraging carbon for poverty 
alleviation.pdf 
Ballantyne, N. (2012). History and Challenges of Free Basic Electricity. In N. Beute, R. 
Wilkinson, R. Morgan, C. Bhurtun, & G. Prasad (Eds.), Domestic Use of Energy (p. 6). 
Cape Town: CPUT. 
Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative Case Study Methodology : Study Design and 
Implementation for Novice Researchers. The Qualitative Report, 13(4), 544–559.  
Bibby, W. L. (2012). Technologies of the Clean Development Mechanism : Neoliberal 
Barriers to Carbon Offsetting in Sub-Saharan Africa. Human Welfare, 1(1), 105–116.  
Bowen, A. (2011). The case for carbon pricing. London. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publications/Policy/docs/PB_case-carbon-
pricing_Bowen.pdf 
Bruce, N., Rehfuess, E., Mehta, S., Hutton, G., Smith, K., & Asia, S. (2006). Indoor Air 
Pollution. In D. Jamison, J. Breman, & M. AR (Eds.), Disease Control Priorities in 
Developing Countries (2nd ed.). Washington: World Bank. 
Bumpus, A. G., Liverman, D. M., Boyd, E., Buck, D., Goodman, M., Lovell, H., & Randalls, 
S. (2008). Accumulation by Decarbonization and the Governance of Carbon Offsets. 
Economic Geography, 84(2), 127–155. 
Bumpus, A. G., Liverman, D. M., & Lovell, H. (2010). The Rise of Voluntary Carbon Offset 
Standards: Self-Regulation, Legitimacy and Multi-Scalar Governance. SSRN eLibrary. 
SSRN. Retrieved May 26, 2013, from http://ssrn.com/paper=1680054 
BusinessDayLive. (2012). No decision yet on carbon tax - Gordhan. Business Day Live. 











100   
 
Button, J. (2008). CARBON : COMMODITY OR CURRENCY ? THE CASE FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL CARBON MARKET BASED ON THE CURRENCY MODEL. 
Harvard Environmental Law Review, 32, 572–586.  
Carbon Check. (2011). Carbon Check DOE appointment. Retrieved May 30, 2013, from 
http://www.carboncheck.co.za/ 
Carbon Disclosure Project. (2012). South African Carbon Disclosure Project 2012 (Vol. 44). 
Retrieved July 5, 2013, from https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDP-South-Africa-
Climate-Change-Report-2012.pdf 
Cartwright, A. (2007). Biofuels trade and sustainable development : An analysis of South 
African bioethanol Working Document. London. 
Cartwright, A. (2011). Umdoni PIN2 revised. Credible Carbon Web site. Retrieved June 27, 
2013, from www.crediblecarbon.com. 
Cartwright, A. (2012). Credible Carbon Web site. Retrieved June 27, 2013, from 
www.crediblecarbon.com 
CDM Rulebook. (n.d.). CDM Rulebook. CDM Rulebook. Retrieved November 14, 2012, 
from http://cdmrulebook.org/home 
Chapple, A. (2008). Making the voluntary carbon market work for the poor. London. 
Retrieved June 3, 2013, from http://www.planvivo.org/wp-content/uploads/Making-
voluntary-carbon-markets-work-final_0.pdf 
City-of-Johannesburg. (n.d.). Cosmo City CDM GS PDD (pp. 1–49). Johannesburg. 
Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://www.joburg-
archive.co.za/2010/pdfs/cosmocity_form.pdf 
Climate Change Working Group (CCWG), African Task Force (ATF), & UNEPFI. (2009). 
And yet it moves . Success stories and drivers of CDM project development in sub-
Saharan Africa (p. 50). Geneva. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/and_yet_it_moves.pdf 
Climate Connect. (2012). DOHA SIMPLIFIED COP18 SUMMARY & ANALYSIS. 
Retrieved January 4, 2013, from http://knowledge.climate-connect.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Doha-Simplified-COP18-Summary-Analysis.pdf 
Climate Lab. (2009). Clean Development Mechanism. Retrieved May 24, 2012, from 
http://climatelab.org/Clean_Development_Mechanism 
Conte, M. N., & Kotchen, M. J. (2010). Explaining the Price of Voluntary Carbon Offsets. 
Climate Change Economics, 01(02), 93–111. doi:10.1142/S2010007810000091 
Corbera, E., Estrada, M., & Brown, K. (2009). How do regulated and voluntary carbon-off set 










101   
 
Cosbey, A., Murphy, D., Drexhage, J., & Balint, J. (2006). Making Development Work in the 
CDM: Phase II of the Development Dividend Project. Canada: IISD. 
DEFRA. (2011). General Introduction What are Greenhouse Gas Conversion Factors ? 
London. Retrieved July 14, 2013, from 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/business/reporting/pdf/110819-guidelines-ghg-
conversion-factors.pdf 
DME Electricity Basic Support Tariff (Free Basic Electricity) Policy. , Pub. L. No. 25088 
(2003). South African Government Gazette. 
DME Free Basic Alternative Energy Policy. , Pub. L. No. Notice 391 of 2007 (2007). South 
African Government Gazette. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/free-basic-alternative-energy-policy-households-energy-
support-programme-notice-391-of-2007-2007-05-07 
DOE. (2012). Select committee on economic development INEP annual performance plan 
2012/13 (pp. 1–22). 
Ellerman, A. D., & Decaux, A. (1998). Analysis of Post-Kyoto CO 2 Emissions Trading 
Using Marginal Abatement Curves. MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of 
Global Change. 
Eskom. (2011). Eskom Integrated Report 2011. Eskom Integrated Report 2011. Retrieved 
June 13, 2013, from 
http://financialresults.co.za/2011/eskom_ar2011/add_info_tables.php 
EU ETS. (2013). CERs and ERUs market as from 2013. Emissions-EUETS.com. Retrieved 
July 1, 2013, from http://www.emissions-euets.com/cers-erus-market-as-from-2013 
Fairhurst, L., Barth, B., Cartwright, A., Isiassaias, I., & Githaiga, D. (2012). Making Carbon 
Markets Work for Your City: A Guide for Cities in Developing countries. (T. Osango & 
F. Diaz, Eds.). Nairobi: UN-HABITAT. 
Fenhann, J. (2012). CDM Pipeline. CDM Pipeline. Denmark: UNEP Riso. Retrieved July 25, 
2012, from http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMpipeline.xlsx 
Fenhann, J., & UNEP Risoe Centre. (2008). “ Guidance to the CDM & JI Pipelines ” 
February 2008. 
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowothy, H., Schartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). The 
New Production of Knowledge (1st ed.). London: SAGE Publications, Ltd. 
Guigon, P. (2010). Voluntary Carbon Markets: How can they Serve Climate Change 
Policies? OECD Environment Working Papers. Paris. doi:10.1787/5km975th0z6h-en 
Guigon, P., Bellassen, V., & Ambrosi, P. (2009). Voluntary Carbon Markets : What the 












102   
 
Gupta, J., Van Asselt, H., & Van Beukering, P. (2006). Pilot Projects in the Climate Change 
Regime and Sustainable Development. The Hague: Institute for Environmental Studies. 
Hunt, S., Scott, A., Bates, L., & Corbyn, D. (2010). Poor People’s Energy Outlook 2010. 
UK: Practical Action, The Schumacher Centre for Technology and Development. 
Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://practicalaction.org/docs/energy/poor-peoples-
energy-outlook.pdf 
Kollmuss, A., Zink, H., & Polycarp, C. (2008). Making Sense of the Voluntary Carbon 
Market. 
Kossoy, A., & Guigon, P. (2012). State and trends of the carbon market 2012. Washington 
DC. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trend
s_2012_Web_Optimized_19035_Cvr&Txt_LR.pdf 
Kuyasa CDM. (2010). Kuyasa CDM Project. SputhSouthNorth. Retrieved November 13, 
2012, from http://www.kuyasacdm.co.za/vision.php 
Larson, D. F., & Parks, P. (1998). Risks, lessons learned and secondary markets for 
greenhouse gas reductions. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/2090.pdf?expires=1372255722&id=i
d&accname=guest&checksum=6FFDB826A591686F6CF62BF9F8E1A68D 
Lin, I., & Cartwright, A. (2012). Hout Bay Recycling Co-op PIN. PACE website. Retrieved 
November 13, 2012, from http://www.carbon.org.za/resources/docs/hbrcpin.pdf 
Lovell, H. C. (2010). Governing the carbon offset market. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Climate Change, 1(3), 353–362. doi:10.1002/wcc.43 
Markit. (n.d.). Markit Meta Registry. Markit Environmental Registry. Retrieved May 22, 
2013, from http://mer.markit.com/br-reg/public/index.jsp?s=cp 
Martin, R., & Kemper, A. (2012). Saving The Planet : A Tale Of Two Strategies. Harvard 
Business Review, 49–56. 
Maxwell, S., Grubb, M., Böhm, S., Boyd, E., Rimmer, A., Newell, P., & Hession, M. (2011). 
Carbon Markets for the Poor: A Contradiction in Terms? UK: GCD. Retrieved June 28, 
2013, from 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/dev/gcd/Event+Report_Carbon+Markets+for+the+Poor? 
Mckenzie, M., & Botes, A. (2012). Carbon Verification : Umdoni Gel Fuel Low Income 
Housing Project (Vol. 27). Retrieved from 
http://carbon.org.za/resources/docs/Umdoni_Gel_Fuel_Carbon_Verification_Report_Fin
al_2012.pdf 
Michaelowa, A, Egenhofer, C., Lin, W., Chen, H., & Liang, J. (2011). Progressing towards 











103   
 
Michaelowa, Axel, & Jotzo, F. (2005). Transaction costs, institutional rigidities and the size 
of the clean development mechanism. Energy Policy, 33(4), 511–523. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2003.08.016 
Momoniat, I., & Morden, C. (2013). Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Carbon Tax Policy 
Paper Process with Carbon Tax Proposal. Pretoria. 
Monbiot, G. (2013). The Great Unmentionable. The Guardian. Retrieved June 26, 2013, from 
http://www.monbiot.com/2013/04/12/the-great-unmentionable/ 
Moosa, S. (2011). Cato Manor Project Information Note. Cape Town: Credible Carbon. 
Retrieved November 13, 2012, from 
http://www.carbon.org.za/resources/docs/CatoManorPIN20111114.pdf 
Morgan, D., & Cartwright, A. (2008). Umdoni Gel Fuel PIN 2008. Cape Town. Retrieved 
December 8, 2013 from www.carbon.org.za 
Morgan, D., & Cartwright, A. (2011). Umdoni Gel Fuel low Income Housing Project PIN2 
Revised December 2011. Cape Town: Credible Carbon. Retrieved from May 15, 2013, 
www.carbon.org.za 
Munasinghe, M. (2011). Linking Environment and Development using AIM. Colombo. 
Nexant. (2010). Assessment of Haiti Alternative Cooking Technologies Program. Washington 
DC. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://ecozoomstove.com/pdf/USAID-
HaitiCookstove.pdf 
Ngubane, E. (2012). Umdoni Gel Fuel - Support letter from municipality March 2012. 
Umdoni: Umdoni Municipality. 
Nordhaus, W. D., & Boyer, J. G. (1999). Requiem for Kyoto: An Economic Analysis of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Energy Journal, 20(01), 1–46. doi:10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-
Vol20-NoSI-5 
OECD-IEA. (2010). Energy Poverty - How to make modern energy access universal? France: 
OECD-IEA. 
Ohlhoff, A., Markandya, A., Halsnaes, K., & Taylor, T. (2004). CDM Sustainable 
Development Impacts. Retrieved from http://cd4cdm.org/publications/cdm sustainable 
development impacts.pdf 
Olsen, K. H., & Fenhann, J. (2008a). A Reformed CDM – including new Mechanisms for 
Sustainable Development. Risoe. Retrieved May 28, 2013, from 
http://dfcgreenfellows.net/Documents/ReformedCDM.pdf#page=36 
Olsen, K. H., & Fenhann, J. (2008b). Sustainable development benefits of clean development 
mechanism projects. Energy Policy, 36(8), 2819–2830. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2008.02.039 
Pennise, D., Charron, D., Wofchuck, T., Jonathan Rouse (HED Consulting), & Anton Hunt 










104   
 
refugee camps, Kenya. Berkeley. Retrieved from 
http://www.berkeleyair.com/component/docman/doc_download/43-evaluation-of-
manufactured-wood-burning-stoves-in-dadaab-refugee-camps-kenya 
Peters-Stanley, M, & Hamilton, K. (2012). State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2012 (Vol. 
6). USA: Ecosystem Marketplace & Bloomberg New Energy Finance. 
Peters-Stanley, M, Hamilton, K., Marcello, T., & Sjardin, M. (2011). Back to the Future - 
State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2011. USA: Ecosystem Marketplace & 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://www.forest-
trends.org/~foresttr/publication_details.php?publicationID=2828 
Peters-Stanley, Molly, & Yin, D. (2013). Maneuvering the Mosaic: State of the Voluntary 
Carbon Markets 2013. Washington DC. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3898.pdf 
Point Carbon. (2013). Carbon price spirals downwards and overall market value plummets. 
Point Carbon. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.2178749 
PointCarbon. (2012). Carry-over of AAUs from CP1 to CP2 - Future implications for the 
climate regime - A briefing note by Point Carbon (pp. 1–33). Oslo. 
PwC. (2012). CDP Global 500 Climate Change Report 2012 - Executive Summary. Retrieved 
from https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/Results/Documents/2012-G500-executive-
summary.pdf 
Raab, U. (2012). Market Mechanisms - from CDM towards a global market. Stockholm. 
Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://fores.se/assets/808/Market_Mechanism_Final_PDF_WEB.pdf 
Rosendahl, K., & Strand, J. (2009). Simple model frameworks for explaining inefficiency of 
the Clean Development Mechanism (No. WPS 4931). Washington DC. Retrieved May 
15, 2013, from http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/05/13/000158349_2009
0513161017/Rendered/PDF/WPS4931.pdf 
SA National Treasury. (2010). Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions : The Carbon Tax 
Option. Pretoria. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://www.treasury.gov.za/public 
comments/Discussion Paper Carbon Taxes 81210.pdf 
SA National Treasury. (2013). Carbon Tax Policy Paper. Pretoria. Retrieved Julty 15, 2013, 
from http://www.treasury.gov.za/public comments/Carbon Tax Policy Paper 2013.pdf 
Schneider, L. (2009). Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and 
lessons learned. Climate Policy, 9(3), 242–254. doi:10.3763/cpol.2008.0533 
Schneider, L., Broekhoff, D., Fuessler, J., Lazarus, M., Michaelowa, A., & Spalding-Fecher, 










105   
 
Spalding-Fecher, R., Achanta, A. N., Erickson, P., Haites, E., Lazarus, M., & Pahuja, N. 
(2012). Assessing the impact of the Clean Development Mechanism. Luxembourg. 
Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/research/1030_impact.pdf 
Spash, C. L. (2010). The Brave New World of Carbon Trading. New Political Economy, 
15(2), 169–195. doi:10.1080/13563460903556049 
Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of case study research (Illustrate., p. 175). Michigan: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Statistics South Africa. (2011). Census 2011 (South Africa). Pretoria. Retrieved May 15, 
2013, from http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf 
Statistics South Africa. (2012). Consumer Price Index. StatsOnline. Retrieved October 2, 
2012, from http://www.statssa.gov.za/keyindicators/cpi.asp 
Stern, N. (2008). The Economics of Climate Change. The American Economic Review, 98(2), 
1–37. 
Taiyab, N. (2006). Exploring the market for voluntary carbon offsets. London. Retrieved 
May 24, 2013, from http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G00268.pdf 
The World Bank. (2011). Poverty. Retrieved January 21, 2013, from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty 
Umdoni. (2011). Umdoni municipality annual report 2011-2012 (p. 228). Scottburgh. 
Retrieved May 23, 2013, from http://www.umdoni.gov.za/pdf/Annual Report 2010-
2011.pdf 
Umdoni Municipality. (2009). UMDONI MUNICIPALITY RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY : Retrieved May 23, 2013, from 
http://www.umdoni.gov.za/pdf/ANEXURES/Sector Plans/Umdoni Rural Development 
Strategy - 2.pdf 
UNFCCC. (2012). Benefits of the clean development mechanism 2012. 
UNFCCC-CDM. (2011). Benefits of the clean development mechanism 2011. Retrieved from 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/about/dev_ben/ABC_2011.pdf 
UNFCCC-CDM. (2012a). CDM Methodologies. CDM Methodologies. Retrieved November 
19, 2012, from http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/index.html 
UNFCCC-CDM. (2012b). Guidelines on the consideration of suppressed demand in CDM 
methodologies. Retrieved November 19, 2012, from 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Guidclarif/meth/meth_guid41.pdf 
Urban Earth. (2012). Proposed carbon tax likely to stimulate carbon industry in SA. Urban 











106   
 
Vestergaard-Fransen. (2011). Sustainable Deployment of the LifeStraw® Family in rural 
Kenya - PDD. Switzerland: Gold Standard Foundation. 
Wara, M. W., & Victor, D. G. (2008). A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets. 
Stanford. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf 
Wesselink, C., & Moosa, S. (2011). Carbon Check for Credible Carbon Umdoni Gel Stoves 
(p. 1). Randburg. Retrieved October 24, 2012, from 
http://carbon.org.za/resources/docs/umdoni_gel_stoves_verification_report.pdf 
Wlokas, H., & Cartwright, A. (2012). Can carbon markets work for the poor - experience 
from a regional carbon registry in Africa. Cape Town. 
Yin, R. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Applied Social Research 
Methods) (4th ed.). Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
 
